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Preface & Introduction
1 Preface & Introduction
1.1 Preface
This work aims to find explanations for current developments in Pashtun tribal
society under the influence of war, foreign militaries and militant political Islam.
For many years anthropologists have worked on understanding and explaining
the highly complex and inhomogeneous structures of Afghan society. Outside
the realm of ethnographic research, the culture, tradition and organization of
tribal communities have been prone to oversimplified and prejudiced (positive
as well as negative) representations. Considering the public and media interest
in the ongoing war, simplifying narratives seem to have taken a strong hold
in Western public discourse. Since Al-Quaeda established a strong network in
Afghanistan under the Pashtun-dominated Taliban-regime, terrorist attacks in
various countries and the US-led ‘War on Terror’, the general (media-) depiction
of Afghans has often tended to portray them as archaic, medieval, bellicose and
„invincible“ in the sense of Afghanistan being „the graveyard of super-powers“
(Shahrani, 2002, p.715).
It might be fair to say though, that the enormous complexity of so many
interrelated developments exacerbates any discussion and, in many cases, only
allows for simplification: the decades – if not centuries – of war, from the Mon-
golian khans to the Anglo-Afghan wars, the geostrategic importance during the
era of ‘The Great Game’, strongly interfering neighbouring countries such as
Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iran and others like India, Saudi-Arabia or the USA, of-
tentimes supporting various opposing factions, the Soviet invasion in 1979, the
civil wars furthering ethnic factionalism, the absence of state-institutions, the
growing influence of various Islamist groups and, since 2001, the effort of the
USA and NATO – who still struggle to define a comprehensive goal for their
missions1 – were all part in forming the current situation. The social structures,
tribal loyalties, the arbitrary drawing of national borders, economic reasons, a
steady influx of weapons, opium production and consumption, widespread anal-
phabetism, the presence of (transnational) militant networks of political Islam,
1A somewhat narrow “definition” of success, coined by the Obama administration was
sometimes worded as “disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaida” (Kipping, 2010, p.1
and p.3).
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and many other factors play into a regionally very diverse set of problems.
Still, some substantial and credible explanations for current processes might
already be out there since quite a while. In my view, the genuine anthropological
perspective applied in the ethnographic work which I am going to bring into
bearing in this paper, allows for a thorough and worthwhile understanding of a
multi-faceted, multi-level state of affairs.
In no way do I want to insinuate that anthropology as a discipline holds
all the answers to every problem. As I will show in the following chapters,
some ethnographic observations might only give clues why certain strategies of
Western involvement do not work the way they are supposedly intended to –
depending on the given aim or perspective of various key stakeholders. The
question why the vast fund of the anything but new anthropologic knowledge
did not take a stronger hold in the general discussion about Afghanistan will
not be discussed in a satisfactory fashion in this paper. Yet a specific goal of
this paper is to ask what new light can be shed on certain developments in
Afghanistan by anthropology.
There could be many reasons coming into play for anthropology not having
a bigger part in past attempts to understand Pashtun tribal cultures: the above
mentioned complexity, the comparatively small reception anthropology enjoys
as compared to other disciplines (for example economics or political science)
may be two of them. However, there is another possible reason that has to
be mentioned in this context: a compelling case can be made that in the last
decades many anthropologists have shied away from taking on issues like modern
warfare and its political implications (Gusterson und Price, 2005, p.39). The
anthropologic expertise misused by colonial powers to subdue so many peoples
around the world might have contributed to this reluctance (see also Canfield,
1988, p.100).
Yet, in recent years, quite some anthropologists have been engaged in con-
sulting the British and the American2 armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
as well as quite some private military companies (PMCs) on their counterin-
surgency (COIN) strategies – adding yet another layer of complexity to the
issues discussed. This „weaponization of anthropology“ hast triggered two reso-
2The US launched the so-called Human Terrain System (HTS) in February 2007, em-
bedding anthropologists in combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan(AAA, 2007). It is run
by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and aims at providing a
better understanding of local socio-cultural conditions to the military and thereby avoiding
and reducing unnecessary violence. First suggested and designed by cultural anthropologists
Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson the project was funded with $41 million(Kipp u. a.,
2006).
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lutions of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) condemning these
kind of endeavours as unethical and potentially dangerous for other anthropolo-
gists around the world and the persons they study (AAA, 2007; Gonzalez, 2007,
p.17f).
In this context, it is very important to clarify that the paper at hand is, not
on any account, intended to function as a guide on „how to win a war against
Pashtuns“ by analyzing changes and adaptions in their organizational struc-
tures over the past decades. In my opinion such an attempt would be destined
to fail anyway. Conventional military approaches to a social and cultural conun-
drum are simply inappropriate to provide for societal changes like developing
democratic structures and advancing human or women’s rights - which, next to
avenging acts of terror, seemed to be desired by Western nations. The only way
a military “solution” could ever achieve that, would be at the high cost of using
brutal force, bloodshed and subjugation which would not only require extensive
manpower and treasure but is clearly not an option for Western militaries. Nev-
ertheless, the available ethnographic data can always be used or misused which
seems to be the crux of not only this discipline.
Various terms will need to be clarified. A short chapter defining the most
important terms in this paper will be followed by an almost equally brief look
into Afghanistan’s history. The vast scope of events and developments in the last
hundred-fifty years alone dictates a very narrow focus on the most significant
issues that have set the parameters for current events. The main question and
focus will be directed at changes in Pashtun tribal structures since 1978.
1.2 Introduction
This paper wants to examine the possibility and extent of structural societal
changes in Pashtun tribal systems since 1978. The question I aim to answer is,
in how far tribal structures have changed and what has triggered those changes.
The relevance of this question lies in its potential to elucidate the societal and
cultural dynamics at play in this conflict, as well as to determine some causes
for the course of events in a persisting struggle. The underlying hypothesis
is that influences like war, foreign interventions and the impact of militant
political Islam have caused an ongoing disarrangement in the traditional tribal
organization of Pashtuns.
In this context, I will attempt to define whether the structures in question
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have actually changed or just express themselves in a new way. A specific fo-
cus will be directed at the following influences on Pashtun tribes: war, foreign
militaries and (transnational) networks of militant political Islam. Therefore,
I will mainly focus on the connections of the Afghan Islamist parties to the
Arab world and to Pakistan and on the connections of the Taliban’s networks
of support in Pakistan and their policies towards, and influence on tribal orga-
nization. The analysis will also take into account the effects of the exilation of
a large proportion of Afghanistan’s population to Pakistan. Furthermore, I will
examine which effects the newly established social structures of refugees and/or
their homecoming as fighters, mujahedin or later as the so-called Taliban, had
on their tribal organization. Doing so, this paper aims to find out about changes
in the relationship between different groups of political, religious, and military
leaders, their amalgamation or possible separation with tribal leaders, elders and
landlords, and whether it is possible to explain the rise of the Taliban in terms
of tribal structures - all this under the influence of foreign military interventions.
In order to establish the ascertainment of structural changes, it will be nec-
essary to first take a look at how the Pashtun tribal systems are described in
ethnographic data from before 1978. This will provide for a guiding frame upon
which later developments can be interpreted. As for a proper assessment it is
necessary to choose the compared subjects, structures and actors in a transpar-
ent manner, I attempt to examine specific groups of Pashtuns in certain contexts
and I will only use generalizing descriptions of Pashtun culture if comparison
proves them valid. Some Pashtun groups will be referred to only in order to
clarify differences and similarities among them, but will not be included in the
final considerations of the aforementioned main questions of this paper. This is
intended to draw a bigger picture of the existing variations in tribal organization
and its factionalism, and to underline the heterogeneity in these segmentary and
at least formerly acephalous communities.
In the first chapter I will include a short discussion of an anthropologic argu-
ment about the appropriateness of the used nomenclature as well as a discussion
of the definition of ethnic groups, their creation, perpetuity and maintenance.
I will also provide several definitions of tribe and a more thorough explanation
of my understanding of Pashtuns as a descriptive ethnonym. This will help to
understand not only how the word tribal is used in this paper and to clarify how
processes of interaction, exchange, exclusion and creation of boundaries can be
interpreted. These definitions also provide a basic framework of understanding
upon which the following chapters will be built. They serve as the theoretical
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framework to explain how certain changes, if found to be of substance, can have
occurred. Furthermore, it will be necessary to distinguish between what can be
seen as an ideal model of the social system of an ethnic group and their actual
behaviour. In order to do so a short description of the Pashtunwali (the code
of conduct describing the ideal Pashtun demeanor, way of life, and traditional
values), and its relevance today will be discussed in chapter 2.2. Subsequently,
a short treatise of Afghan history aims to give a more thorough understanding
of the Afghan political sphere and illustrate the constitutive power tribes have
held (and fought over) for centuries. This basic information will then serve as
a point of departure for a more detailed examination of events since 1978. I
will provide an analysis of the effects of certain occurrences on traditional tribal
structures in each chapter and interpret them, though complex, as a causal
chain in time. In answering the main question of this paper in the conclusion, I
will also attempt to address the question of how anthropology can make sense
of and shed some new light on the current situation in Afghanistan.
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Part I
Definitions & Theoretical
Framework
2 Ethnic Boundaries and the Definition of Ethnic
Groups
As I will compare and analyze possible changes in Pashtun tribal structures,
it is imperative to first take a look at the theoretical framework that constitutes
the lens through which we will be looking at these structures. Therefore I
will discuss what constitutes an ethnic group, its relations and interactions
with “others”, and how changes in structures do not equal changes in culture.
I will emphasize a view which portrays culture as “something characterized
by variation and flux” and, following this strain of thought, showing “cases of
relative stability in ethnic and other social relations as being as much in need
of explanation as cases of change.” (Barth, 1998, p.5).
Here I will rely, to a large extent, on the works of Frederik Barth and Richard
Tapper. I am using the reprinted version of “Ethnic Groups and Boundaries”
from 1998 in this chapter and in some later chapters also the original version
of 1959. Except for some additional explanations the content did not change
much. Of course the debate about ethnicity has evolved since the early 1960s.
Many other scholars, such as Thomas Hylland Eriksen with his book “Ethnicity
and Nationalism” from 1994 and the re-edited version of 2009, have contributed
much to the topic. The academic debate has expanded to many new foci such
as “the commercialisation of identity, [. . . ] the significance of the internet [. . . ]
globalisation, hybridisation and the need of a more inclusive concept of identity
politics” (Eriksen, 2010, preface, viii). The reasons why I rely, encouraged by
the 1998 reissue, so heavily on Barth are that his work was groundbreaking
and still is very valid, significant and of high explanatory power. He studied
Pashtun society and culture in various areas at a time which seems relevant to
the approach I want to use in this paper. By using much of his work from the
1960s I intend to create a basic analysis of what life and social organization in
Pashtun areas was like back then. This should provide the necessary background
to identify the magnitude of changes that took place in the later years of war
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and also gives an idea of the structures which persist. I will then use Barth’s
and Tapper’s theoretical and empirical findings (the latter’s publications used
in this paper range from the late 50s to the early 90s) to look at the more recent
research done on different Pashtun tribal groups, the Taliban and the so-called
New Taliban (see Giustozzi, 2009a).
To start with, let me clarify some points concerning underlying assumptions
which frequently rest subconscious but still influence our perceptions and inter-
pretations. Anthropologists and researchers of other disciplines have an impor-
tant role in defining and creating identities. The presumably objective results
of our research “are used by policy makers to create order, both classificatory
and political.” (Tapper, 1988, p.30). To understand why such a subsumption
into clear cut groups with different names, occupying different territories and
allegedly sustaining distinct fundamental characteristics can only represent a
small portion of the actual facts on the ground, we have to dig a little deeper.
Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of populations in Afghanistan “according to
relatively objective criteria” such as “language, religion or sect, local or tribal
affiliation, productive activity, wealth, and so on” it “is not so easily established”
what exactly these categorizations “mean for people so classified” (Tapper, 1989,
p.232). Already Frederik Barth stated that even most anthropological analysis
is based on the misleading presupposition that cultural variation is discontinu-
ous and that, in essence, there are groups of people who share a common culture
that differentiates them from all others (Barth, 1998, p.8f).
To explain this, Barth reasons: “Since culture is nothing but a way to de-
scribe human behaviour, it would follow that there are discrete groups of people,
i.e. ethnic units, to correspond to each culture. The differences between cul-
tures, and their historic boundaries and connections, have been given much
attention; the constitution of ethnic groups, and the nature of the boundaries
between them, have not been correspondingly investigated. [. . . ] this leaves un-
touched the empirical characteristics and the boundaries of ethnic groups, and
the important theoretical issues which an investigation of them raises” (Barth,
1998, p.9).
The main argument of this starting point is to realize that in general there
never were geographically or socially totally isolated groups of people. Fur-
thermore, the view that such a separation would be necessary to continuously
conserve cultural diversity seems to last, even though empirical analysis proofs
the contrary. Of course such a limiting view, even if not consciously articu-
lated, makes it much easier to do research and to describe a group as special,
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as a kind of single organism, distinct from others. Barth argues to the contrary
that “ethnic distinctions do not depend on the absence of social interaction and
acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which
embracing social systems are built.” (Barth, 1998, p.10).
He goes on to state: “Interaction in such a social system does not lead to its
liquidation through change and acculturation; cultural differences can persist
despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence.” (Barth, 1998, p.10). In the
following paragraphs I will examine how exactly this process can be explained.
Barth considers it necessary to examine empirical data concerning a wide
range of cases in order to adapt theoretical concepts which fit to give thorough
but also easily approachable explanations. In doing so, he starts by emphasizing
that the categories of ascription and identification of ethnic groups are chosen
by the members of the groups themselves and therefore serve to organize in-
teraction between them. In anthropological writings the term ethnic group is,
according to Barth, often understood as describing a people which can sustain
itself biologically, agrees on basic cultural values, provides a commonly accepted
frame for communication and interaction and identifies certain traits and pat-
terns as a sign for membership and can also be identified as such by others
(Barth, 1998, p.10f). Even though in the past this approach came close enough
to explain ethnographic data without totally distorting the results he consid-
ers this to be a limiting and too stiff of a view and equates it to the outdated
“ideal type definition” which declared “a race = a culture = a language” and “a
society = a unit which rejects or discriminates against others.” (Barth, 1998,
p.11). The actual limiting factor in this view is called out by Barth as a precon-
ception about the formation, role, organization and function of ethnic groups
which allows to assume the maintenance of ethnic boundaries as unproblematic.
This would then lead to reducing the number of possible parameters to explain
cultural diversity. Inter alia it would also lead to wrong conclusions about the
nature of continuity in time of such ethnic “entities” (Barth, 1998, p.12).
To solve the problems this view poses, Barth proposes to look at “the shar-
ing of a common culture [. . . ] as an implication and result, rather than a
primary and definitional characteristic of ethnic group organization.” (Barth,
1998, p.11). To prove the validity of this approach empirically, Barth and his
co-authors (of 1969) focused on those diverging individuals who convert their
ethnic identity. They advocate a concentration of anthropologic research on “the
ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses”
because this allows for an analysis of “the social organization of culture differ-
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ence” (Barth, 1998, p.6, p.15). Furthermore, this approach helps to make sure
that it is not the researchers idea about a group that is used for definition, but
that the described ethnic identity is self-attributed by members of the group
and created in and through interaction. Barth also states that the cultural
characteristics with the highest significance are those diacritica which signal
membership in an ethnic group. The cultural norms “that actors themselves use
to evaluate and judge the actions of co-members, implying that they see them-
selves as “playing the same game”” reflect this fact (Barth, 1998, p.6). This
view obviously implies, as Richard Tapper elucidated, that ethnic boundaries
are a construction which is cultural in nature and not depending on territory.
Therefore “the ascription of an ‘ethnic’ identity to a group or individual varies
with the speaker, his audience, and the context.” Tapper (1988, p.22). The con-
struction of these identities always happens in, sometimes competitive, relations
to others and constitutes a political expression or declaration which defines the
relations between the speaker and his audience (Tapper, 1988, p.22).
Barth urges that it is also important to understand that different cultural
traits or manifest cultural forms depict the effects of ecology. By that he does not
mean a history of adjustment to environment but rather spontaneous changes
conditioned by altered ecological circumstances. He declares it fair to assume
that the “same group of people, with unchanged values and ideas, would surely
pursue different patterns of life and institutionalize different forms of behaviour
when faced with the different opportunities offered in different environment”
so that an “ethnic group, spread over a territory with varying ecologic cir-
cumstances, will exhibit regional diversities in overt institutionalized behaviour
which do not reflect differences in cultural orientation.” (Barth, 1998, p.12).
Therefore it would not be appropriate to consider apparent institutional forms
as constructing the cultural features which differentiate an ethnic group. To ex-
emplify this, Barth recounts a story from southern Pashtuns who, judging from
their life in a mountainous environment and their social organization in lineages
do consider the Pashtuns of Swat in the north to be “no longer Pathan” (Pash-
tun) because “their overt pattern of organization seems much closer to that of
Panjabis” (Barth, 1998, p.13). Nevertheless, Barth discovered that by clarifying
under which conditions the northern Pashtuns lived, their “southern brothers”
would concur they were indeed Pashtuns and unwillingly even admitted they
might behave the same way under similar circumstances.
These observations directly lead to the next very important question: why
and when are distinct cultural features a valid marker for different actors and
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when aren’t they? Barth has clearly shown, that “some cultural features are used
by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in
some relationships radical differences are played down and denied.” (Barth,
1998, p.15). It appears, there are two different kinds of cultural matter in
the sense of ethnic contrariness: on the one hand there are overt markers and
indicators that can portray identity, such as language, clothing, house-form
and general life-style, on the other hand, something Barth calls “basic value
orientations” by which he means “standards of morality and excellence by which
performance is judged.” (Barth, 1998, p.14).
This brings us back to the aforementioned question of the maintenance of
boundaries. The different ways in which a group preserves its boundaries and
its identity involves a somewhat sophisticated organization of behaviour and
social ties. When a particular distinguishable ethnic group lives through differ-
ent transformations, the cultural features that constitute the boundaries may
change, the cultural peculiarities of the members may change and even the form
of social organization of the group may change. Still, a persisting differentia-
tion between members and others (outsiders) permits to elucidate the nature of
continuity in ethnic groups and to quest the varying cultural form and content
(Barth, 1998, p.14). The aforementioned focus on ascription, as a decisive factor
in sustaining an ethnic group as a category, also solves another problem: “So-
cially relevant factors alone become diagnostic for membership, not the overt,
‘objective’ differences [. . . ]” (Barth, 1998, p.15). It does not matter in that case
how different their overt behaviour may be, if they proclaim their loyalty and
commitment to a shared culture - which also implies that they are “willing to
be treated” and that they “let their own behaviour be interpreted and judged”
according to this shared culture (Barth, 1998, p.15). Having said that, this also
entails that the dichotomy between members and their understanding of out-
siders (or members of another ethnic group) indicates the acknowledgement of a
restriction concerning mutual understanding, idiosyncrasy “in criteria for judge-
ment of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of
assumed common understanding and mutual interest.” (Barth, 1998, p.15). So
what happens exactly when individuals of dissimilar cultures interact socially?3
Ethnic groups need to contain articulate distinctions in behaviour in order to
3Just to clarify I want to say that I mainly talk about stable inter-ethnic relations up until
now. Other relations (for example some that occur in conflicts and otherwise (colonization,
hybridization, incorporation, annihilation etc.)) will be mentioned later on in context with
specific events.
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persist. One could anticipate a reduction of these differences through inter-
action with other groups - simply because interaction necessitates and brings
about matching values and codes. The mutual consent about these values and
codes does not need to expand farther than is necessary for the social situations
in which members of different groups interact (Barth, 1998, p.16). The nature of
continuity of ethnic groups in interaction suggests that there are not only char-
acteristics and signals for the classification of membership, but that there must
also be an organization of interactions that permits the continuation of cultural
differences (Barth, 1998, p.16). Barth underscores and explains further: “The
organizational feature which [. . . ] must be general for all inter-ethnic relations
is a systematic set of rules governing inter-ethnic social encounters.” (Barth,
1998, p.16). This set of rules may, for instance, prohibit inter-ethnic interac-
tions in certain areas in order to seclude particular sections of the cultures from
engagement, conflict and alteration. By the same token, ethnic identity also
indicates a number of limitations concerning the roles somebody is empowered
to play within his group or in inter-ethnic interactions (Barth, 1998, p.16f). As
goods and institutions of the industrialized countries extend their reach to the
furthest corners of the world, they also have an impact on cultural contacts and
changes. In this respect it is, as Barth points out, of avail to understand that
even “a drastic reduction of cultural differences between ethnic groups does not
correlate in any simple way with a reduction on the organizational relevance of
ethnic identities, or a breakdown in boundary-maintaining processes.” (Barth,
1998, p.33).
The next question to further advance in this topic analytically should be
about what causes ethnic differences to evolve in a given area. According to
Barth, the adequate answers are “the organizational requirements [. . . ], a cat-
egorization of population sectors in exclusive [. . . ] status categories” and the
acknowledgement that the principles employed to one such classification may
differ from that employed to another (Barth, 1998, p.17). Intrinsically this does
not yet allow to fully explain why cultural differences arise. Nonetheless, it
helps to clarify how they persist. The status categories can then be linked to an
independent set of value standards: the more notable the differences between
these value standards are, the more limitations on inter-ethnic interactions do
they encompass (Barth, 1998, p.18).
Occasionally of course there are factors like migration, conflict, defeat or
subjugation which (re-)define inter-ethnic relations. Yet, following Barth’s ar-
gument, the focus on some other processes promises to be more insightful in
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this context - if brought to the light of anthropologic analysis. Namely those
processes which cause individuals or even whole groups to alter or trade their
identity. Even though the mentioned social mechanisms have the tendency to
preserve dichotomies and boundaries, there may, despite the continued existence
of given boundaries, be a process which “may figuratively be called the ‘osmosis’
of personnel through them [. . . ]. Examples of stable and persisting boundaries
that are crossed by a flow of personnel are clearly far more common than the
ethnographic literature would lead us to believe.” (Barth, 1998, p.21). So even
if the persistence of cultural features connected to a certain ethnic group implies
a high degree of intransigence as far as inter-ethnic interactions are concerned, it
does not imply the same inflexibility in the practice of recruiting new members
or ascribing membership to them (Barth, 1998, p.21).
What are the reasons for individuals or groups to alter their identity? First
there have to be some cultural mechanisms in place that allow for such an in-
corporation into another group, from the changing party as well as the receiving
party. If this prior condition is given, for instance the idea of fulfilling the duty
required by a higher power (gods, ancestors or institutions of high status), it
is usually a practical consideration. Typically, the ones changing their identity
might expect a better livelihood and the assimilating, receiving group might
be motivated by apparent gains to the group, or at least its leader(s). Barth
observed this especially in connection with “the role of households as productive
units and agro-managerial techniques that imply an optimal size of 6-8 working
persons, and the pattern of intra-community competition between household
leaders in the field of wealth and influence.” (Barth, 1998, p.22). He also ob-
served southern Pashtuns changing their identity to become Baluch, but not
the other way around. This happens along a “clearly demarcated territorial
border”, particularly when various influences cause the Pashtun identity to be
seen as less attractive (Barth, 1998, p.123). Sometimes individuals or little
groups would embrace this change and accept loosing their status granted by
their rather strictly genealogical and segmentary organized social origins and
integrate themselves into the centralized and hierarchical system of the Baluch.
These changes are therefore affecting the whole ethnic identity, people who un-
derwent them call themselves Baluch and portray themselves as such4. The
4There is in fact a certain statistical variation to the effect that it is heard of some Baluch
saying under particular circumstances they were indeed Pashtuns (Barth, 1998, p.29). Still,
this does not disprove the diacritical categorization of identity ascriptions in boundary main-
tenance. These cases will be addressed on p.34.
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factors contributing to these changes and accounting for this border being only
semi-permeable are found in different values and political organizational struc-
tures of Pashtuns and Baluch. By embracing Baluch identity a Pashtun “man
may, by the same performance, score quite high on the scales that then become
relevant”, meaning the motives to change one’s identity are founded in the pos-
sibility to ameliorate one’s social status and general environment (Barth, 1998,
p.25).
“Baluch tribes are based on a contract of political submission of common-
ers under sub-chiefs and chiefs.” (Pehrson, 1966 in Barth, 1998, p.124). That
allows for integration of other people solely depending on the “ambition and
opportunism of Baluch political leaders.” who “compete for influence and tax
income by incorporating new members into the tribe [. . . ]” (Barth, 1998, p.22,
p.124). The southern Pashtuns on the contrary are aligned in territorially bound
segmentary descent groups. Even though some of them have a chief, which are
usually the leaders of a descent segment, their political deliberations were tradi-
tionally produced in egalitarian councils from which non-descent members are
ostracized. There can not be a full incorporation into the Pashtun tribe, though
one can become a client with an “inferior, non-tribesman serf status, attractive
merely as a last resort.” (Barth, 1998, p.124). In addition, such an arrangement
is not very appealing to the political patron neither: the patron’s liabilities for
the client are extensive, not only when it comes to protecting and defending
him, but the patron would also be held responsible for any problem the client
might cause (Barth, 1998, p.124). Furthermore, the ecological circumstances of
the region Barth describes do not allow for the client to create a big enough
surplus as to be a valuable asset for the patron. The egalitarian organization
“where security springs from a man’s ability to rally communal support, the
political advantages of controlling a few clients are very limited” so that “[. . . ]
people seeking attachment are turned away from Pathan groups due to the
inability of that structure to incorporate them.” (Barth, 1998, p.124). Some
more information about why these changes of ethnic identity take place and
the Pashtuns would not simply work for the Baluch but still remain Pashtun
will be provided on p.34. At this point it is necessary, especially with regard
to Afghanistan, to emphasize that the processes of boundary maintenance by
ethnic groups are strongly influenced by local security. When people live in
fear of violence outside of their primary group, this insecurity itself functions
as a limiting factor on inter-ethnic interaction (Barth, 1998, p.36). These pri-
mary groups tend to accentuate conformity of their members within and the
16
cultural differences in outward interactions. The conformity within is necessary
for the individuals in order to identify themselves as members and to constantly
manifest, (re-)confirm and corroborate their membership, specifically when a
person’s security has to be confided on the other members’ immediate and vol-
untary assistance (Barth, 1998, p.36). Any demeanor diverging from common
value standards of the group “may be interpreted as a weakening of the identity,
and thereby of the bases of security.” (Barth, 1998, p.37). However, regional
safety conditions can be subject to swift transformations which is why purpose-
ful long-term predictions about these processes are hard to produce.
So why is all this relevant for this paper? Because it lays the foundation
to understand the interactions between different Pashtun tribes and their inter-
actions with outsiders. I will examine different aspects of Pashtun and tribal
identities and, as I have tried to point out above, it is important not to un-
derstand these as necessarily rigid or static, but rather as potentially fluid and
exploitable by the involved actors.
To summarize, let us keep in mind that the denotation ‘ethnic group’ in
itself should not be allowed to represent a concrete value in itself which depicts
a generally valid rationale for human behaviour, that the meaning of a social
identity changes depending on context, that a person may assert various ethnic
identities depending on circumstances, that a single or several ethnic identities
maintained by an individual depict a negotiable reality, that members of the
same family might not share the same ethnic identity, that a single ethnic iden-
tity can manifest vastly different traits and, last but not least, that there are of
course factors other than ‘ethnic’ which constitute an identity (Tapper, 1988,
p.31).
The distinctions portrayed above will also be clarified more thoroughly when
it comes to interpreting possible changes in tribal structures. The question to
answer will be of what nature these changes really are and how they affect the
described groups.
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2.1 Tribe & Traditional Tribal Structures
“Tribe, I suggest, is rather a state of mind, a construction of reality,
a model for organization and action.” (Tapper, 1990, p.56).
In 1977, Godelier asked if the difficulties surrounding the definition of the con-
cept of tribe indeed revealed a crisis of “the empirical foundations of anthro-
pology itself” (Godelier in Ahmed, 1983a, p.142). One of the main lines of
anthropological discussion was the question if tribe should be interpreted as an
independent category or rather as a stadium in an evolutionary sense, viewing
“tribal society as a phase in social progress”5 (Ahmed, 1983a, p.143). Today
there seems to be much less argument about the usage of terms such as tribe
or tribal in anthropologic circles than 20 or 30 years ago. In part this might
be caused by resignation, admitting that anthropologists would probably simply
not be able to agree on a dominant definition, in part it may also be caused by a
broader acceptance of various definitions depending more on context. Addition-
ally, it seems somewhat infeasible to find analytic terminology which considers
indigenous categories in their specificity while being broad enough to allow for
scientific comparison and classification of these categories(Tapper, 1990, p.50).
These speculations aside, I will try to provide a definition which not only
reflects my perspective, but seems applicable in the context of this thesis and will
help to shed some light on the questions posed herein6. Doing so, I will (again)
rely on Frederik Barth and Richard Tapper and others. Also, this chapter
is intended to lay the foundation and set up the framework for interpreting
and understanding the following chapters. Choosing from divergent possible
definitions, I will concentrate on some general anthropologic classifications on
the one hand and some specific analysis of Afghan, especially Pashtun tribes
on the other hand. As a consequence, these definitions might not be suitable
for tribes in other regions of the world. When discussing tribes, I will provide
a distinction between tribes and confederacies. In this paper I will follow the
example of the sources above and not apply the term tribe to groups numbering
5Prominent advocates of the latter approach were Gellner and Micaud in their 1973 book
‘Arabs and Berbers. From Tribe to Nation in North Africa.’ (Ahmed, 1983a, p.143). See also
Gellner’s book ‘Muslim Society’ of 1981.
6Or as Richard Tapper has put it: “ [. . . ] it would seem essential not so much to agree on
definitions as to examine the assumptions behind different usages and indeed the sources from
which they derive.” (Tapper, 1990, p.49).
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more than some thousand individuals (Tapper, 1990, p.53). Yet again, it is
important to recognize that tribes are, be it for the influences of states or other
factors, not static in nature and have shown over time to be dynamic, changing
social systems (Tapper, 1983, p.43). More specifically, also tradition is no static,
immutable force but it is changed, “revised, lost, revived, corrupted - as people
use it to interpret and respond to the problems they face.” (Canfield, 1988b,
p.88).
Quite often in anthropology when we talk about tribes, we also talk about
states and the conflicts between these entities. I would go even further and claim
that sometimes we define tribes partly through their interactions with others,
especially with institutions of a state, and tend to see them in this dichotomy.
As illustrated above, it is imperative to keep in mind that in the last centuries
no tribe existed untouched by any state, reflected also in literature where “the
role of states in creating, transforming, or destroying tribal institutions and
structures” is a predominant theme (Tapper, 1990, p.52). In this context it is
also interesting to follow Barfield’s observation on relations between tribe and
state:
“Ironically, the relationship between tribes and states was most prob-
lematic under dynasties of tribal origin. To the extent that they
claimed kinship with the ruling dynasty, the tribes posed a threat to
its stability by assuming an active role in politics.” (Barfield, 1990,
p.177)
Intra- and intertribal rivalries dominated succession struggles, and frequently
members of the same ruling family engaged in protracted civil wars in their
fight for supremacy (Barfield, 1990, p.177, see also Azoy, 1982, p.21). Therefore
it is also consequential not to understand state as a single monolithic entity but
as “a thing of parts on a field of parts” (Anderson, 1983, p.144).
Afghan tribalism has continued to play a big role in politics over the cen-
turies. The political force of Afghan tribes was not entirely founded on pastoral-
ism and nomadism, yet the tribal confederations of the Ghilzai (uncommonly
also referred to as Ghalzi) and the Abdali (which were later called Durrani,
see also p.50) which “provided the basis for central, expanding leadership in
the eighteenth century included large pastoral nomadic elements.”7 (Tapper,
7Sometimes the differences between Durrani and Ghilzai are not without ambiguity and
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1983, p.43). The majorities of both confederations though have been sedentary
farmers (Glatzer, 1983, p.212f). Tapper states that the politically active tribes
or, in other words, those “causing troubles” were rarely pastoral nomads, but
more frequently the settled villagers (Tapper, 1983, p.43). This description also
clarifies that it would be a mistake to think of tribes as equal, per se compara-
ble units and helps to understand that they vary greatly in scale and function
(Tapper, 1990, p.51). Indeed large tribal groups are settled cultivators with lit-
tle or no inclination to nomadism and pastoralism, or as has been theorized by
Tapper and Barth, “tribalism is more necessary to nomadism than nomadism to
tribalism.” (Tapper, 1990, p.54). In Afghanistan pastoral nomadism occurred
as an economic adjustment. Tribal and ethnic identities were traditionally more
relevant as a decisive factor for political and cultural membership than nomadic
or settled lifestyle, which “was rarely of any social or cultural relevance” at all
(Tapper, 1983, p.44 and Tapper, 1989, p.242). Glatzer argues that this model
of genealogical segmentation along the lines of patrilineal descent is used by the
nomads to uphold “social relationships with the settled society, and for stressing
their membership in the Pasthun nation”, even if their actual social organization
is rather based on “common economic interests and close affinal and cognatic
kinship bonds” (Glatzer, 1983, p.221).
One of the important and recurring questions in defining tribes is, to which
extent tribal systems are “necessarily segmentary, egalitarian, decentralized, au-
tonomous, and hence opposed to the state as the source of inequality, central
authority, and government”(Tapper, 1990, p.49). Here again I have to point out
that due to the complex nature of social and cultural idiosyncratic organiza-
tional forms in Pashtun societies there are no unambiguous, simple answers to
this question. There are, for instance, cases in which egalitarian tribes resort
to alternative ideologies, accepting the concept of centralized leadership under
certain circumstances, usually in order to pursue a certain goal and only for
a limited amount of time (Tapper, 1990, p.64). One could retreat to defining
a tribe vaguely as “a localised group in which kinship is the dominant idiom
of organisation, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in
terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins)”, characterized by descent
as a mainstay of dichotomization (Tapper, 1983, p.9 and Tapper, 1990, p.50).
open for negotiation and manipulation. The Babozai, for example, are considered to be a
subtribe of the Hotak in the Ghilzai confederation as long as they are in Zabul province. In
the province of Uruzgan “they are seen as a Nurzai sub-tribe in the Durrani ‘confederation” ’
(Ruttig, 2010, p.6).
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Since such a rather unspecific definition does not seem sufficient in order to
proceed analytically, we have to investigate the various forms of political and
social organization found in different tribal groups. There is yet another ob-
stacle: the question of who defines the cultural characteristics and boundaries
used to describe the distinctiveness between tribes and thereby creates, invents
or produces them. E.R. Leach cautioned already 40 years ago:
“I would claim that it is largely an academic fiction to suppose
that in “normal” ethnographic situations one ordinarily finds distinct
“tribes” distributed about the map in orderly fashion with clear-cut
boundaries between them. . . My own view is that the ethnographer
has often managed to discern the existence of a tribe because he
took it as axiomatic that this kind of cultural identity must exist.”
(Leach, 1959 in Tapper, 1990, p.51).
Nevertheless, I will proceed to describe tribal ways of life as specific as possible
in the given context. Keeping Leach’s warning in mind will purvey a greater
openness and limit the risk of all too static interpretations. Even though the
nomenclature can not be the basis for explaining human behaviour, it will help
to compare different tribal structures, especially when combined with suitable
translations of local classifications and local apprehension.
Furthermore, some comments will have to be made on Islam influencing
tribal society or maybe even being a foundational part of Pashtun tribal iden-
tity (see also p.28). Here the main goal is not to explain and understand religion,
but to explore how religion is seen in society and how religion is used to form
political and social organizational patterns (see Ahmed, 1983a, p.141). Notwith-
standing the strong penetration of Islamic symbols in Muslim societies, many
anthropologists have written about them without specifically or overtly referring
“to the Islamic framework” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.141). In this chapter I will offer
some basic information about Islam in the context of traditional Pasthun tribal
systems. In parts II and III a more thorough depiction of recent developments,
specifically concerning the influence of transnational Islamic networks, will be
offered. After discussing some relevant descriptions of tribe and its organiza-
tional structures in anthropological literature I will later go into further detail
about possible changes observed in recent years. (See p.95.)
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Usually tribes are politically unified, consisting of communities which “are
typically localized ‘subtribes’ of 100 to 150 families [. . . ] with the head of the
households claiming “descent from a common recognized ancestor without nec-
essarily being closely related to each other.” (Tapper, 1989, p.242 and Tapper,
1984, p.259). However, having a central leader is not a prerequisite and was
most frequently not the case in Pashtun traditional structures8, even when they
formed larger regional confederations with neighbouring tribes (Tapper, 1983,
p.9). These confederations are alliances of tribal groups which can encompass
up to several millions of people. They are formed in order to pursue common in-
terests and political purposes and sometimes they are based on alleged common
descent (Tapper, 1990, p.68). The smallest organizational unit being the fam-
ily, the traditional intra-tribal authority, was produced by a so-called jirga, an
egalitarian forum in which “ideally all male members of a certain tribe find con-
sensus about a certain conflict.”9 (Ruttig, 2010, p.2). (More information about
jirgas can be found on p.44, the question about the (loss of) importance of jirgas
over time will be discussed starting from p.98 and p.123.) The characteristics
used to describe membership to a tribe or sub-tribe are manifold. Custom-
arily the indigenous self-ascriptions encompass a wide range of exchangeable
terms (for instance among the Durrani tribe of the Saripul), thereby causing
an insufficient exactness which baﬄes anthropologists but which brings about
“many advantages for the actors” (Tapper, 1991, p.46). These ambiguous, poly-
semic terms are not inevitably used as synonyms, even if they basically refer to
the same group of people, but “often they describe nuances of social structure
and/or organization” (Tapper, 1991, p.46). Nancy Tapper illustrates this by
the examples of three different indigenous terms of the Durrani: aulad (Ara-
bic: offspring of) and the suffix -zai (Pashto: offspring of) can be applied to a
distinct group of agnatic descendants as well as to any other group, up to all
mankind. Tayfa (Arabic: clan, tribe, family) can be used to attribute tribes or
tribal divisions but can also be a categorization for sub-divisions “of any larger
category of animate creatures such as insects or jinns” (Tapper, 1991, p.46).
It comprises historic developments, accentuates a “particular location in time
and space”, implies territoriality and interaction with other tayfa (Tapper, 1991,
8The issue of when and where commanders (qumandán) assumed authority and how this
took place will be discussed in part II of this paper, see also p.80.
9Besides this egalitarian type of political and social organization in jirgas there were also
” ’democratic’ villages with elected headmen and little or no influence of landlords and/or
Khans” and “’autocratic’ villages where the headman represented the landlord and/or Khan.”
(Janata, 1990, p.67).
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p.47). Thirdly wolus (Turkish: ulus : people, nation, tribe) is applied to indicate
“the political nature of social groups at a variety of levels” and its basic idea
is “that all its members should stand together in confrontations with outsiders”
(Tapper, 1991, p.47 and p.51). The potency of a wolus is not only based on
its size and capabilities as a fighting body but also on its proficiency to raise
big amounts of money to bribe government agents, to pay for reparations for
injuries or other disbursements10 (Tapper, 1991, p.51).
So what are in fact the social and cultural units in which Pashtun tribes-
people coalesce and which factors account for their composition? Canfield
described these units as “segmentary systems based on agnatic relationships”
and as “nested systems of obligation based upon degree of relationship through
male ancestors” implying that “the more closely related people are, the stronger
their obligations to cooperate, help, avenge, and so forth.” (Canfield, 1988b,
p.77). Constitutive conditions for social organization are also of material na-
ture: the terrain with “its dramatic features, drastically affects spatial rela-
tions”11, climate and ecology “which influence the production systems” and the
geographic location, determining geopolitical, strategic factors (Canfield, 1988b,
p.83). Based on the topographic conditions many “rural populations are rela-
tively inaccessible” and their “loyalties and interests remain local” (Canfield,
1988b, p.86).
Compared to other tribal groups in Afghanistan the Pashtuns had the most
permeant and definitive system of segmentary lineage organization, being main-
tained “not only in written genealogies but also in the territorial framework
of tribal distribution” (Tapper, 1983, p.43). One example for such a structure
persisting for a long time are the Ghilzai (see p.24 and p.48). Each tribe of
the Ghilzai was described by Anderson as “continuously segmented in localised
patrilineages (khel), identified by forefathers whose patrilineal descendants con-
stitute a qaum12. This latter term applies to any level of inclusion above the
10The term is also used to describe governors who are called woluswal (Ruttig, 2010, p.8).
11As Canfield put it only few “regions of the world are topographically more various and
abrupt than Afghanistan”: with the Hindu Kush mountain range and its highest peaks well
over 7000m also including “abrupt cliffs” and “alluvial plains of varying shapes and sizes” which
are “well watered by the runoff from melting snow and ice” and are “suitable for settled human
habitation” (Canfield, 1988b, p.83).
12The term is derived from the Arabic qoum (nation, tribe, group, family, sect) and indicates
a primordial unity as well as “mutual support of group members and the desirability of inter-
marriage between them” (Tapper, 1991, p.46 and Tapper, 1989, p.243). See also:(Anderson,
1983, p.126).
There is another Pashto word for sect (mazhab) and some authors have argued it “is the
prior basis of identity” (Tapper, 1989, p.236). Yet it is used only in particular regions, mainly
in the context of conflicts between Shiites and Sunnis.
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household (kor)” and combines kinship and ethnicity “into a single category of
common patrilineal descent in contrast to all other relations” (Anderson, 1983,
p.125, accentuation added). That means, qaum is a rather expandable term and
can define any group of people, a family, a clan, a tribe or even a nation, yet it is
always stressing the main focus on common descent (Rzehak, 2011, p.7). Qaum
is a “highly ambiguous and flexible concept, allowing scope for strategic manip-
ulations of identity” (Tapper, 1989, p.236). The term qaum “may sometimes
be applied to persons not related by any semblance of patrilineality, implying,
through the use of kinship idiom, [. . . ] moral obligations as strong and enduring
as the bonds of kinship” (Canfield, 1988a, p.187).
Interestingly enough, according to Jon W. Anderson, among Pashtuns the
Ghilzai traditionally did not see tribe and state as opposing autonomous entities
in their inter-relations or even as competing influences but rather perceived the
state as acting only at the periphery of tribal life in the center13 (Anderson, 1983,
p.121). More specifically they looked at state and tribe as being in a temporal
and ephemeral relation, “in a continuous play of integration and disintegration”,
perceiving opposition between the two mainly through the terms hukumat (the
place where there are governors and governed) and yaghistan, “the lands of
freedom or unrestraint [. . . ] where no man is above another”, which reflects
their more or less acephalous organizational structure (Anderson, 1983, p.125).
Eastern Pashtun tribes hold a similar view, calling their inaccessible and remote
tribal areas ghair ilaqa or “area outside government control” and opposing it to
ilaqa sarkar, the “government area” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.143). From this viewpoint
the antipode to ‘tribe‘ is the ‘city‘ (shahr), where the atrapi14, an expression that
is translated by Anderson as ‘country people‘, are opposed to the “anonymous,
urban (shahri) ways and people” (Anderson, 1983, p.126). For most Afghans
their homeland (watan) is a very strong component contributing to identity. Yet
watan “is ambiguous both as to place (village, valley, district, province, region,
13Anderson describes this view as common among the Ghilzai whose home-territory (wtan)
lies south of the Kabul river bordered by the Hazarajat and Kandahar and who are constituted
by seven major tribes: Hotak, Tokhi, Nasir, Taraki, Kharoti, Suleyman Khel and Ahmadzai.
Today the term ‘Ghilzai‘ has more of a historical value: “Ghilzai rose to prominence in the
eighteenth century when they overthrew the Safavid empire, but were subsequently eclipsed by
Durrani Pashtuns”(Anderson, 1983, p.124f). See also p.48. Since the time of Abdur Rahman
Khan (1880 - 1901) the term Ghilzai is not really used anymore to define an identity and the
confederation ceded to exist. Yet, the tribes and subtribes that constituted it still have the
same names, they are thus identifiable as such and sometimes enormous in size (Anderson,
1975, p.596).
14The term is borrowed from Arabic as well: atraf means directions and signifies that atrapi
have space to move in all directions (Anderson, 1983, p.126).
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nation) and time (place of origin, or of residence)”, an ambiguity which allows
for manipulations to adapt the identity according to personal or group interests
(Tapper, 1989, p.236).
While qabail and atrapi are the conventional denominations for tribesmen,
the word quomi stands for fellow-tribesman. It comprises the notion of shared
patrilineal descent and of “homogeneous unity [. . . ] continuously subdivided
through time into replicas of itself” (Anderson, 1983, p.126). Yet again things
are a little bit more complicated than this description might lead to believe:
most settled groups accept the existence of designated rights of individuals to
territory, which leads to jealousy, rivalry and competition to bordering land
holders, be it brothers, camps, lineages or tribes (Tapper, 1983, p.49), to the
rivalries of paternal cousins (taburwali, also tarboorwali)15 . These rivalries may
“involve such intangibles as leadership but are commonly property disputes” over
“unresolved issues of succession to indivisibles formerly belonging to the com-
mon grandfather or other ancestor” (Anderson, 1975, p.588). This frequently
results in “a short raid, usually at sunrise or sunset, culminating in the capture
of the village or booty like cattle.” (Yapp, 1983, p.197). Yapp describes the
glory of taking part in such a venture as the main motivation for the fighters
who are not themselves concerned with the underlying struggle. He attributes
these raids a “blitzkrieg nature” followed by a swift disintegration of the war
party (lashkar, also: militia) due to the fact that Pashtun warriors would “sim-
ply pack up and leave after a hard day’s fighting, without co-ordination with
or command from the lashkar.” (Yapp, 1983, p.197). Furthermore, tribal wars
are ‘seasonal’, which means that they are linked to “the pattern of crops and
cultivation” causing campaigns to be mainly “fought before or after the har-
vest” as “many a leader has discovered to his dismay that his followers have
melted away at the climax of a battle if the current crop has to be harvested.”
(Ahmed, 1983b, p.198). These agnatic rivalries are therefore circumventing the
development of dynasties, creating profound factionalism even when confronted
with an outside threat, and as Tapper lines out, defying segmentary ideology
(Tapper, 1983, p.49). Barth has related this agnatic rivalries to the cycles of re-
distribution of land (wesh, see also p.38) and Ahmed stated in this context that
conflict between “male siblings and cousins is a common Islamic phenomenon
15The tarboorwali is a significant feature of Pashtun tribal and social structuring: the “patri-
lateral parallel cousin is uniquely separated from all other cousins and siblings” in terminology
by the word tarbooran, which implies enmity or at least “unfriendly relations” (Barth 1959b,
p.11 in Ahmed, 1980a, p.44).
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based on agnatic jealousy and rivalry for inheritance” (Ahmed, 1980a, p.43).
Compared to other Islamic tribal and lineage based groups Pashtuns tended to
use marriage between “close agnatic collaterals” as a means of avoiding “con-
flict between agnatic cousins” much less often, because, as Pathan chiefs would
explain to Barth, “it is never very successful.” (Barth, 1959a, p.40). They
considered it more useful to use the marriage of their sisters and daughters to
strengthen their ties with groups which pursue congruent political goals and
who would in turn support them “in the inevitable conflicts with close agnates”
(Barth, 1959a, p.40). In more general terms it could be said that “political
power and demography interact in a close fashion” (Salzman, 2004, p.121). Or
as Nancy Tapper has put it: “[. . . ] an ambitious household must, in making
marriages, maintain a calculated balance between extending its reach of affinal
ties as widely as possible and consolidating its existing agnatic and affinal links
by further marriages” (Tapper, 1991, p.51). As far as terminology is concerned,
marriage provides the opportunity for different groups such as tayfa to coa-
lesce “separate kin groups for reasons of political expediency” and become qaum
“while retaining their separate membership of different named tribal divisions”
(Tapper, 1991, p.50). Among Durrani Pashtuns exchange marriages are used
to acknowledge the identity of the groups involved as in fact Durrani, thus “it
authenticates male claims to identity”16 (Tapper, 1989, p.242). Since I will not
go into great detail about the highly complex variations, indications and levels
of interaction included in marriage such as forming social relations, I want to
refer to Nancy Tapper’s extraordinary in-depth analysis of marriage, keeping
her final conclusion in mind that “any discussion of marriage based on classifi-
cation into particular modes (such as bride-price marriage or direct exchange)
or in terms of ties it creates within or between groups [. . . ] is bound to be sim-
plistic” (Tapper, 1991, p.278). In order to offer meaningful analysis of marriage
one has to take into account the specific social, cultural, economic and political
implications which can vary greatly from one case to another and which occur
in countless combinations.
Another aspect of tribal organizational patterns should be mentioned: Pash-
tun tribes, tending to designate territorial rights to greater groups, are seen by
Tapper to be more inclined to partake on larger scale political endeavors facing
and confronting outsiders (Tapper, 1983, p.49). Caused by the non-appearance
16There are some Pashto-speaking tribal groups which mainly follow Durrani customs, yet
they are considered to be “fakes” by the Durrani, since they “are said to give daughters even
to Shi’ites” (Tapper, 1984, p.258).
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of a prevailing political authority also those groups tend to “maintain relations
of hostility” with their neighbors and align themselves with “their neighbours’
neighbour, forming a larger pattern of two coalitions or blocs throughout or
even beyond the region.” (Tapper, 1983, p.49). This pattern can be imagined
like the one of a chess board with neighboring opposing factions which asso-
ciate themselves with allies, following the idea that ‘the enemy of my enemy
is my friend‘ (Ahmed, 1980a, p.40f). The systems of bloc-opposition regularly
occurred between small, closely related segments of a bigger descent group, espe-
cially in Swat (Pakistan) and among Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan (Ahmed,
1980a, p.41). It can be said that “disputes between closely related household
heads are the principle cause of divisions within a local descent group” (Tapper,
1991, p.48). These conflicts between neighbors are reinforced by the periodic
process of redistribution of land (wesh, see also p.38). Sometimes though whole
groups might defect such an affiliation and join the opposing party, thus causing
imbalances within this system (Tapper, 1983, p.49). This illustrates that the
formation of these non-permanent alliances does not follow a solid “pattern along
pre-determined segmentary lineages” but that they are created supplementary
to “the segmentary alignment and may cut across the segmentary structure.”
(Ahmed, 1980a, p.41).
There has been quite some criticism within anthropology concerning the
segmentary theory, classifying the organization of social groups into segments,
originally voiced for example by Clifford and Hildred Geertz, Dale Eickelman
and Lawrence Rosen (Ahmed und Hart, 1984, p.3). The main critiques, partly
substantiated through examples about the fluidity in formation of alliances on
the last pages, are that the “segments are neither balanced nor is there equality
between the segments; on the contrary, there is disparity in political resources,
which is exacerbated with the emergence of lineages claiming seniority” (Ahmed,
1983a, p.145). In addition, groups do not necessarily constitute themselves
along a segmentary pattern in cases of political crises (Ahmed, 1983a, p.145).
Nevertheless, a comprehensive alternative to the segmentary theory, bearing its
explanatory utility has not yet been put forward - especially when dealing with
egalitarian, acephalous societies (Ahmed, 1983a, p.145).
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2.1.1 Islam in Pashtun tribal society
As announced earlier in this paper, I want to provide some context concerning
the interplay between Islam and Pashtun tribal society. As I will point out
also in the following chapters, Pashtuns are and consciously perceive themselves
as Muslims of the very first hour and take pride in having embraced Islam
when most Arabs were still fighting Islam (see also p.49). Pashtuns follow
the Hanafi school of Sunnism, as do 90% of Afghans. It is the “most liberal
of the four Sunni schools of thought” (Ahmed, 2000, p.83). The other 10%
are made up by Shiite Hazara, Farsiwan and Qizilbash as well as little bit
more than 10.000 Ismailis(Janata, 1990, p.65). The Pashtuns claim that Qais
Abdurrashid, the apical forefather of all Pashtuns, received Islam directly from
the Prophet Mohammed and was one of his first converts17 (Glatzer, 2000, p.100
and Tapper, 1989, p.241). Pashtuns accept the Sharia besides their customary
legal system though in the past an inclination to preferably use traditional
tribal law (which is transmitted orally) was a rather widespread phenomenon
(Rzehak, 2011, p.16f). On the national level and in urban centers “Sharia law
governed the legal process until 1925” (Ahmed, 2000, p.83). Pashtuns consider
their traditional ways to be their expression of Islam and do not see the two
as contradictory - even as other Muslims may not agree to this perspective18
(Glatzer, 1998, p.92). “To the tribesman, Islam provides specific political and
socioreligious formations within which” his Pashtun identity operates (Ahmed,
1983a, p.141). The basic values of the Pashtuns such as honor and shame (see
chapter 2.2.2) do not contradict Islam, Pashtun tribesmen perceive them as
“in harmony”, “as a logical construct” and therefore do not dichotomize them
(Ahmed, 1983a, p.141). Yet traditional tribal values set some other priorities: in
Islam a battle is to be waged only on the basis of religion and should not serve the
glory of an individual whereas among Pashtuns the latter is a desired implication
(Glatzer, 2000, p.100). Other discrepancies, such as not allowing inheritance
or property to women and taking interest for loans, are admitted frankly and
accounted for as Pashtun “riwaj (custom) as if by such an explanation the
guilt would be extenuated or even exculpated.” (Ahmed, 1984, p.312). This
attitude somewhat reflects the idea of many Pashtuns to be Allah’s favorite
17Folklore has it, that Qais Abdurrashid (Abd al-Rashid) came from Ghur in central
Afghanistan and went to Medina, where he met one of the Prophet Mohammed’s gener-
als, Khalid ibn al-Walid, whose daughter he married after joining the new faith of Islam in a
meeting with the Prophet (Hart, 2001, p.153).
18Arab mercenaries criticizing the religious practice among Pashtuns has resulted in bloody
conflict more than once (Glatzer, 2000, p.100).
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and such minor transgressions could not impair their “Muslimness” in the least
(Ahmed, 1984, p.313). This “complete confidence in” their own “Muslimness”
combined with a “sociologically all-pervasive” brand of Islam “constricts the
role of religious groups” (Ahmed, 1984, p.313). In addition, it rationalizes the
perpetuity of Pashtun traditions containing non-Islamic components. Besides
the Pashtun’s pervading belief in the five foremost pillars of Islam (accepting
God and his Prophet, praying, fasting, to pilgrimage, and to support the poor)
Pashtuns “attach great importance to” jihad “for it emphasizes their martial
tribal tradition and expresses their enthusiasm for Islam.” (Ahmed, 1984, p.314).
Islamic symbols are omnipresent in Pashtun tribal societies. Yet “their reli-
gious meaning in the ecclesiastical sense may not appear relevant or even com-
prehensible” to tribesmen (Ahmed, 1984, p.311). The “social significance” of
these symbols “is established by frequent recurrence.” (Ahmed, 1984, p.311).
The use of religious symbols thereby frequently aims at increasing one’s social
prestige.
Among Durrani Pashtuns the “practice of orthodox Islam is dominated by
the” politically and economically “successful and the privileged” (Tapper, 1984,
p.262). Their religious gatherings proceed relatively sober, “extreme emotion or
ecstasy are never displayed”, women “have no part in mosque-centered rituals
and must pray at home” (Tapper, 1984, p.260f). The Islamic practice of Dur-
rani Pashtuns achieves “both to declare the theory of equality” of all Durrani
Pashtuns “and to stress the reality on inequality” (Tapper, 1984, p.262). The
economically and politically less successful Durrani “pursue ecstatic experiences
associated with Sufism, shrines and spirit possession.” (Tapper, 1984, p.262).
Especially in tribal conflicts the opponents would accuse each other of not truly
following Islam. Particularly rivalries for resources are oftentimes expressed
in the assertion of religious superiority, “whether in terms of religiosity or of
orthodoxy” (Tapper, 1984, p.263).
Going on I will follow Ahmed’s argumentation that Islam and segmentary
Pashtun tribal identity “coalesce and overlap” and present some more detailed
information in this respect in parts II and III of this paper (Ahmed, 1983a,
p.141). It has to be noted though, that some authors perceive bigger tensions
between the Pashtunwali and Islamic law, the Sharia (Caron, 2007, p.319). Nazif
Shahrani in a 2005 publication (see references) and Caron in his paper of 2007
argue that “tribes feared that rigorous Islamic law [. . . ] would interfere with
their tribal practice” (Caron, 2007, p.319). Even though these authors do make
some valid points in this respect I disagree with the stated premise. In my view
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the tribes rather feared the exertion of government control disguised in Islamic
terms (see also Edwards description of Abdur Rahman Khan’s prescriptions
for the accurate practice of religion (Edwards, 1996, p.83)). As shown on the
previous pages I rather adhere to the explanation that Pashtuns exhibit great
flexibility to maneuver (and the ability to rationalize) potential contradictions
between scholarly Islam and traditional tribal values.
Muslim societies exhibit a strong understanding of community, ummah,
“which transcends national and tribal boundaries” and “dominates Muslim po-
litical thinking in cycles every few decades” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.149). The per-
vasion of Islamic symbols in Muslim societies in general and in Pashtun tribal
societies in specific manifests itself in the frequent invocation of religious ra-
tionales by tribesmen on a great variety of occasions, or as Ahmed has put
it: “The strength and ubiquity of Islamic symbols in Muslim society cannot be
challenged.” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.141). What can be and is contested though are
the way these symbols are used and the implicit assertion of theological validity.
There is no central religious authority in sunni Islam and there are also dif-
ferent ways by which religious leadership expresses itself (Janata, 1990, p.65).
Generally speaking there are three main categories: the first category called
ulema, characterized by legal and religious learnedness, usually educated in a
madrassa, represents an “orthodox, bureaucratic, formal, and legalistic tradition
in Islam” comprises maulana, maulvi, qazi and mufti ; the second is constituted
by mystic or unorthodox circles of Sufis, mainly present in “rural areas” and
“shunning worldly pursuits”, and thirdly there are religious leaders who claim
their status based on “religious genealogy and descent” which includes the titles
of pir, shaykh, or ruhani, “sharif or sayyid (descended from the Prophet) and
mian (descended from holy men)” and who “command a vague and generalized
respect, especially if they live up to idealized behavior, which is pacific, dignified
and neutral between warring groups and clans.” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.92f, accen-
tuation added; Canfield, 1988, p.81 and p.90, Lindholm, 1986, p.4). Members
of the first two categories are entitled according to a social function whereas the
third is defined by their holy ancestry (Ahmed, 1983a, p.92, Lindholm, 1986,
p.4). The mullah on the contrary is not easy to place in this taxonomy, mostly
due “to the ambiguity and elasticity surrounding his social role.” (Ahmed, 1983a,
p.93). Most Pashtun villages have their own mullah, and usually they create
their social function in combining different aspects of the aforementioned three
categories. Yet, the term mullah (at least in the Afghan context) does not nec-
essarily entail a higher status: a mullah holds a “junior position in the religious
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hierarchy” and is seen to be “a lesser member of the religious classes” (Algar,
1969, p.264 in Ahmed, 1983a, p.93). Janata would even say that the mullah “is
virtually a servant, and his social status is not much higher than that of the
village barber.” (Janata, 1990, p.66).
The mullah customarily restrains his activities “to the village level of social
and political life”, still he may try to expand his influence into the realm of
politics under certain circumstances and “appears to thrive in crisis” (Ahmed,
1983a, p.93f). This might be caused by the appeal of the original, and for
Muslims maybe the most authentic, model of societal organization in which a
caliph unites “the functions of tribal elder, government spokesman, and religious
leader”, addressing worldly issues as well as such of faith (Ahmed, 1983a, p.149).
Ahmed claims that among eastern Pashtuns a mullah “remains subordinate to
the lineage elders” who “see political activity as their preserve and restrict the
role of the [. . . ] mullah to specific religious functions” such as “to organize and
supervise the local mosque and the rites de passage based on Islamic tradition.”
(Ahmed, 1983a, p.94). Yet is has happened that mullahs would, “on a weak
theological but strong sociological base”, call for jihad against tribal leaders
(Ahmed, 1983a, p.98). Commonly though, Muslims leaders had “no coercive
power of their own to wield” and they “had to rely on their charisma and powers
of persuasion to [. . . ] ingratiate themselves with” political leaders (Edwards,
2002, p.173). Routinely mullahs were paid by local leaders or the government in
order to demonstrate loyalty and to help in mobilizing warriors for the Islamic
cause (Canfield, 1988b, p.93). In times of internal struggle and factionalism
tribal leaders used “their” mullahs “to help calm the storm of discontent” and
“redirect it against” another tribe, the government, ethnic minorities, the British
or Pakistan (Edwards, 2002, p.173). Even though in a strict interpretation jihad
can not be waged against other Muslims the term might be employed by each of
the opposing parties, for instance in inter-sectarian struggles, and can easily be
invoked by simply declaring the opponent takfir and kafir (unbeliever, infidel)
or even shaitan (satan) (Ahmed, 1983a, p.6, p.8, p.98, p.140f). This happened
quite often over the centuries, even before and during the foundation of the state
and continued up until today (Canfield, 1973, p.1521). According to records the
described allocation of roles between mullahs and tribal elders was prevalent at
least up to the end of the twentieth century (compare a large number of sources
cited in (Ahmed, 1983a, p.94)) - whether the social functions and roles are still
distributed in this fashion today will be discussed in chapter 4.1 and chapter
5.1.
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2.2 Pashtun Identities, Ideals and the Pashtunwali
2.2.1 Pashtun Identities
Here again I want to start the chapter by explaining a general approach to
the analysis and description of Pashtun identities before going into detail. First
it is important to question and clarify the use of ‘Pashtun’ as an ethnonym. As
already mentioned in this paper I want to caution against understanding such
an ascription as static or homogeneous, meaning that the ascription of being
Pashtun would hold “the same meaning wherever it is used”, and that it “repre-
sents a ‘real’ unity of origins and culture.” (Tapper, 1988, p.24). Even though
it seems to be common wisdom today that there are profound tribal divisions
among Pashtuns there appears to be a tendency to impute deeply ingrained
characteristics to such an identity. Going on, I intend to shed some light on
diversity, distinctiveness and similarities in various Pashtun identities who, nev-
ertheless, share “the same range of diverse forms” in their political traditions,
“the same forms of economic livelihood, religious beliefs and ethos” in most of
‘Pashtun country’ (Edwards, 1998, p.712). Noticeably, Pashtun identities and
tribal systems have successfully transcended and integrated “the stereotypical
divisions of society, nomad versus sedentary, urban versus rural” as, in gen-
eral, Pashtuns consciously stay Pashtuns “whether nomad or sedentary, urban
or rural19 (Ahmed, 1983a, p.143). In general it is important to remember that
“identities, whether ‘ethnic’ or otherwise, make sense only in social contexts,
and they are essentially negotiable subjects of strategic manipulations” because
social actors “present their selves, in different ways in different contexts” - de-
pending “particularly on power relations, on the policies of the state and on
local hierarchies.” (Tapper, 1988, p.29).
A discussion of the Pashtunwali, the “code of the Pukhtuns” which describes
the ideal Pashtun behavior, and a consideration of its significance today will
follow the deliberations mentioned above (Ahmed, 1983a, p.24). In this chapter
I will mainly focus on anthropologic research from recent decades, depicting
different traditional Pashtun identities as researchers described them before the
possible changes I want to examine might have taken place. This will provide
for a more thorough understanding upon which later events can be interpreted
and will be analyzed.
19Besides the typical nomadic livelihood, quite some nomadic tribes were also active in
trading and were “everyday conductors of the commercial relationships” along the Silk Road
and especially between the economic centers of Kandahar, Kabul and Peshawar (Hanifi, 2008,
p.16).
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At least since the middle of the eighteenth century the idea of ethnic unity
among all Pashtuns has been used to attempt political unity. The proclaimed
oneness included the realms of “religion, genealogy, language, custom, especially
features like Pashtunwali, jirga, seclusion”20 and was a frequent topos, even when
at the same time the Pashtun “tribes were predominantly characterized by en-
demic inter-tribal hostilities and by diffuse political organisation” (Tapper, 1983,
p.43). Later on, in the nineteenth century three main forms of socio-political
organization could be found among Pashtuns: first the autonomous, egalitarian
communal social groups living in fairly isolated mountain valleys with scarce
opportunities to pursue an agricultural and pastoralist livelihood. Likely there
were recurrent shortfalls of provisions which were compensated for “by trading
or raiding or long-distance labour-migration” (Tapper, 1983, p.43). The second
main form could be found in similarly remote areas but living in richer environ-
mental circumstances; fertile valleys with sufficient water supply that allowed to
produce large surpluses through agricultural cultivation. There Pashtuns mani-
fested social stratification, customarily “with a leisured class of martial Pakhtuns
owning the land and dependant groups working it” (Tapper, 1983, p.44). One
of the most famous examples for this structure might be the Yusufzai of Swat,
described by Frederik Barth (see Barth, 1959a). The third form was found pre-
dominantly in territories closer to urban centers or at least susceptible to the
influence of centralized rule administrated from these centers. When farming
allowed for moderate surpluses, the authority of the state produced a feudalistic
form of stratification “involving a chiefly class with limited powers, a broad mass
of tribespeople, and a sizeable substratum of dependants”21 (Tapper, 1983, p.44
and Ahmed, 1983, p.196). For example, Pashtuns in Kandahar Province, the
Durrani as well as the Ghilzai, are structured in a more hierarchical way than
the eastern Pashtuns. “Already during the 18th century a small landowning aris-
tocracy had emerged within each tribe, which managed to seize the economic
resources and control local decision-making processes, while ordinary tribesmen
often ended up as their clients (hamsayagan)” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009,
p.141). Therefore, the tribal cohesion was not only based on a shared tribal
identity, “but also on the access to economic resources, patronage and protec-
20Seclusion is called parda in Pashto (Glatzer, 1998, p.87).
21Katkov differentiated organizational forms of Pashtun tribes between qaumi, rutbavi and
kuchi. The first being egalitarian, there are leaders but they do not have real power and have
to rely on a jirga (see also p.44). The second being hierarchical “with a tendency towards
feudalisation and usurpation of the power of the tribesmen by leaders” (Giustozzi, 2009b,
p.35). The third being “nomadic and very egalitarian” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.35).
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tion” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.140).
For a big majority of Pashtuns “the defining criteria” of their identity “are
not language or religion, which one can change, but recognized descent from the
ancestor of all Pashtuns and the practice of endogamy.”22 (Tapper, 1989, p.238).
One of the foremost attributes of Pashtun values has its foundation in giving
predominant significance to the autonomy of male actors. This autonomy is to
be understood as a sort of self-determination which manifests itself politically
through “one’s escape from influence and vulnerability through kin relations.”
(Barth, 1998, p.132)23. The reason for the importance “of autonomy and inde-
pendence that we find as central features” among groups who “are organized in a
decentralized, segmentary fashion” is the fact that “governance and security” are
“in the hands of each and all” which “both requires and guarantees a wide range
of individual agency” (Salzman, 2004, p.125). During the time of Pashtun dy-
nastic rule (see also p.50) the urban elites and middle classes who were exposed
to central control through their geographical proximity to power centers could
not “exhibit the autonomy and independence that their identity and position
demand.” (Barth, 1998, p.129). Being unable to consummate this important
component of Pashtun identity they “have shown a strong tendency to Persian-
ization in speech and culture, representing [. . . ] a sophisticate’s escape” (Barth,
1998, p.129). Durrani Pashtuns24 who dominated “political and administrative
life” over the centuries claimed “a position of social superiority to members of
all other ethnic groups except Sayyids” - a superiority that even “the poorest
nomad or peasant is able to maintain, at least in the eyes of fellow-Durrani”
(Tapper, 1984, p.257).
Before moving on to discuss Pashtun identities more thoroughly I want to ad-
dress the aforementioned statistical variations concerning cases of Baluch claim-
ing they were indeed Pashtuns in this context (see p.15). As described before,
some former Pashtuns who switched their identity to Baluch would still claim
being Pashtun under certain circumstances. These cases are to be found among
the serfs of some Baluch tribes who abandoned their Pashtun identity because
22For information about the ‘common forefather’ of all Pashtuns see also p.28 and p.38.
Anderson argued that one reason for this endogamy, besides the obvious also described in this
paper, is that “outsiders introduce complications by their own individual extra-community
ties” and that Pashtuns “abhor pluralism in inverse proportion to social distance” (Anderson,
1975, p.591).
23Ahmed accused Barth of overrating the importance of autonomy, but the latter’s stand-
point was corroborated by many writers. In return Ahmed has been criticized to overvalue
“Islamic unity and mechanisms of social control”(Lindholm, 1980, p.350).
24See also p.19 and p.50 for explanation.
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they could not succeed to live Pashtun ideals such as autonomy and uphold
their status as free men while being subordinates to Baluchs. For this reason
the trading of identities is more convenient and provides for more favorable con-
ditions than the costs of a failure to perform as a Pashtun would imply: it would
entail, at the least, ridicule and disrepute among other Pashtuns and function
as a constant reminder of utter failure (Barth, 1998, p.132f). Nevertheless, their
original identity is sometimes invigorated by their Baluch masters as “a kind of
shame identity: the Baluch patrons enjoy the triumph of having Pathan serfs”
in which case the serfs have to admit their true origin, yet the Baluch are not
denying the restraint that “the ‘Pathan’ serfs do not have access to Pathan fora
and would not have their identity confirmed by Pathans.” (Barth, 1998, p.133).
This process is not only interesting as a special case or exception, but it also
shows that the Pashtun identity maintains its character because a large num-
ber of actors alters their ethnic label due to a failure to perform as Pashtuns
(measured by Pashtun standards), and only seldom they keep the Pashtun label
under such disadvantageous circumstances (Barth, 1998, p.134).
2.2.2 The Pashtunwali as an idealized code of conduct among Pash-
tuns
The Pashtunwali is often cited as the longstanding traditional code of con-
duct, the ideal honorable Pashtun behavior, regulating social interactions and
setting standards for various aspects of life. The act of doing Pashtu as op-
posed to only speaking Pashto “is what constitutes the core of the” Pashtunwali
(Hart, 2001, p.156). The Pashtunwali has been held sacred and transmitted
orally for centuries, thus representing an ethnic self-portrait. Since the 1950‘s
Afghan writers and poets who were searching for “guiding principles for a mod-
ern Afghan nation” produced written accounts of the Pashtunwali (Rzehak,
2011, p.1). In modern publications Pashtunwali is commonly described in con-
nection with the prevailing war25 (Rzehak, 2011, p.3). There are some older
written sources in which first attempts to determine standards of Pashtun be-
havior can be found. One of them was written in 1815 by Mountstuart Elphin-
stone, a writer, researcher and officer for the East India Company, who, in his
25For example in: Major Richard Strickland: “The way of the Pashtun: Pashtunwali”, Cana-
dian Army Journal 2007, p.44-55. John H. Cathell: “Human geography in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan region: Undermining the Taleban using traditional Pashtun social structures”, Naval
War College 2009 (online). Craig Cordell Naumann, John Richards Fellow: “The Pashtun-
wali’s Relevance as a Tool for Solving the ‘Afghan Crisis” ’, American Institute of Afghan
Studies 2008. All from (Rzehak, 2011, p.3).
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somewhat sympathetic depiction, painted an idealized picture of Pashtuns, com-
paring them “with Scottish clans and with Greek-Roman republicans” (Glatzer,
1998, p.85)26.
Another, even earlier account was written by the “Pashtun poet Khushhal
Khan Khattak (1613-1689) [. . . ] in Pashto prose” which listed “twenty abil-
ities (hunaruna) and twenty virtues (khislatuna) which a Pashtun man must
own to become worthy to wear a turban”27 (Rzehak, 2011, p.3f). Among these
values are bravery, respect for the elders, consultation, ambitiousness and mod-
esty, among the abilities are hunting, playing chess, poetry, making music and
painting (Rzehak, 2011, p.4).
It is important to understand that the virtues and standards depict an ideal
and might not inevitably coincide with actual behavior, or correspond with
Western interpretations of the terms (Rzehak, 2011, p.3). At this point it is also
of avail to remember Barth’s statements on groups maintaining their boundaries
through the promotion of conformity and about how group members constantly
reaffirm their membership by acting in terms of common values and standards
(see also p.17). There are different interpretations concerning the extent of vari-
ation in Pashtunwali from one tribe to another, one obvious variation being the
amount of blood money which has to be paid for certain offenses. Yet this does
not necessarily imply structural differences (Rzehak, 2011, p.2). The Pashtun-
wali is an ethnocentric concept and encompasses tribal law, code of honor and,
in a broader sense, the whole range of customs and traditions (Glatzer, 2000,
p.94).
However, not all Pashtuns are familiar with the word Pashtunwali or the
idea that there is a system of values and standards which profoundly differen-
tiates them from others (Glatzer, 2000, p.93). Bernt Glatzer argues that it is
less well known in the west and northwest of Afghanistan, even among Durrani
who speak exceptionally “pure” form of Pashto (Glatzer, 2000, p.93). Neverthe-
less at least two different Pashtun tribes not knowing about the Pashtunwali
would express the same values and standards enshrined in this code when asked
about what it means to be Pashtun (Glatzer, 2000, p.93). Amongst other things
(like faith in Islam and commitment to “the tribal spirit”), the central concept
26See also: Mountstuart Elphinstone: “An Account Of The Kingdom Of Caubul, And Its
Dependencies In Persia, Tartary, And India.” (Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, New Delhi,
1998, originally published in 1815.)
27Khushhal Khan Khattak’s writings are also the oldest discoveries of textualized Pashto
language (Hanifi, 2008, p.11).
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and term of gheyratman28, which unites all noble and honorable attributes of a
Pashtun was of great importance also to these tribes (Glatzer, 2000, p.93). Tra-
ditionally the ideals of the Pashtunwali were reproduced through story-telling in
which archetypal, heroic role models personify these ideals, through play-fights
between fathers and their three to ten year old sons, through encouraging play-
fights among young boys and through the presence of kids in jirgas, where the
portrayal of such ideals was particularly important (Glatzer, 2000, p.97).
The basic values perpetuated through these norms (such as honor, shame,
pride, masculinity, battle and war) are rooted in and pervade the genealogical
organization which structures thousands of patrilineal descendant groups, all of
whom invoke the origin from one single forefather (Glatzer, 2000, p.94). The
central concepts comprise nang29 (honor, dignity, bravery, audacity), tora or
turá (courage) and sharm (shame, disgrace) - also meaning that a nangialai
brings fame and glory to his tribe and someone called a benanga, which means
‘dishonorable’ and is of course a serious insult, loses his social status and can
only restore nang through the death of the offender, revenge which is consid-
ered adequately reciprocal or the public humiliation of the offender(Glatzer,
2000, p.94, p.98). Rzehak brings forward the argument that such honor based
cultures commonly have their basis in nomadic peoples “who have no recourse
to law enforcement or government when thy traverse geographically remote ar-
eas in search of pastures, carry their most valuable property with them, risk
having it stolen [. . . ]”30 (Rzehak, 2011, p.5). He substantiates this claim by
explaining that to nomads private land ownership was alien, and that, to the
contrary, nomadic groups claimed communal traditional rights to use (as op-
posed to possess) a certain pasture for a particular time of the year. Therefore
it was necessary to redistribute the land within the groups according to certain
rules. Rzehak’s statement implies that Pashtuns conserved this practice for a
longer period of time also in settled groups. “No particular household had an
28Gheyrat or ghairat means “1. dignity, self-esteem, pride, ambitiousness; 2. zeal, eagerness,
passion; 3. bravery, courage, audacity; 4. indignation, anger; 5. modesty.” (Rzehak, 2011,
p.16). See also Alfred Janata: “Ghairatman - der gute Paschtune.” (Afghanistan Journal
Vol.2, Nr.3, 1975, p.83-97).
29The Pashtunwali reflects two different kinds “of socio-economic organisational settings
[. . . ]: the qalang group amongst sedentary tribes where large, irrigated private landholdings
exist and which, as a result, is socially stronger stratified” (Ruttig, 2010, p.7). Qalang is the
word for the rent or tax paid to the landowner. The relationship between client and patron
is one of mutual obligations. And “the nang group amongst pastoral hill Pashtuns which are
socially more egalitarian” (Ruttig, 2010, p.7). A Pashtun proverb says: “Honour (nang) ate
up the mountains; taxes (qalang) ate up the plains” (Goodhand, 2005, p.196).
30I am not entirely convinced whether this is a claim which can be validated by anthropologic
data, nevertheless Rzehak’s further reasoning seems somewhat plausible.
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individual claim to a particular parcel of land” (Ahmed, 1980a, p.36f). They
would rather be redistributed annually, sometimes also in cycles of several years,
in the aforementioned process called wesh (Ahmed, 1980a, p.36f). Wesh ampli-
fies the rivalries between land “owning” neighbors also because the “traditional
re-allotments followed the segmentary scheme of unilineal descent”, thus exacer-
bating rivalries between collateral agnates, specifically the tarboorwali (see also
p.25) (Barth, 1959b, p.108).
This procedure could be based on different kinds of reasoning: the allocation
of land could be accounted for by the number of members of a given household,
by “the military strength of a household [. . . ], or according to genealogical links”
(Rzehak, 2011, p.6). This practice was upheld until the end of the nineteenth
century, in some parts of the country until the middle of the twentieth century
and is seen by Rzehak as a cause for private ownership of land still being heavily
restricted and organized through patrilineal descent groups (Rzehak, 2011, p.6).
His argument seems to be that processes like this redistribution were important
in shaping the concept of ideal behavior and a code of honor, so that members
of a group would merit participation. Since they are organized in patrilineal de-
scent groups, honor or nang is also of great importance in Pashtun tribal groups
when it comes to genealogy. An individual can only find enduring security and
help within the lineage or the tribe, which is why a life “outside the tribal struc-
ture is almost unimaginable because a person without a genealogical tree is a
person without a descent group, and [. . . ] without allies or supporter” (Rze-
hak, 2011, p.9). As an ideal concept a Pashtun should be able to name all his
forefathers back to “Qais Abdurrashid, the common ancestor of all Pashtuns”31,
usually though a Pashtun knows his ancestors “for about seven or eight gener-
ations as a minimum” and turns to the knowledge of elder men when deeper
genealogical knowledge is required (Rzehak, 2011, p.8). Traditionally, Pashtuns
would review their genealogical background in a first encounter. Finding com-
mon ancestors would then turn their relation into one of reciprocal obligation
and assistance (Rzehak, 2011, p.9). If fitting the purpose of the concrete actors,
a common ancestor can also be invented or denied. However, Nancy Tapper
described some divergence to this behavior among Durrani tribes: only a few
people in each subtribe would carry knowledge of “pedigrees and skeleton ge-
nealogies extending some six to ten generations back”, and “normally there is
31The belief in a common ancestor is generally shared among Pashtuns though not all of
them know his (alleged) name, some also know him under the name of Khaled Baba or Daru
Nika or some other names (Glatzer, 1983, p.220).
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little call for this kind of information and little interest in it” with most individ-
uals conscious about their genealogical tree only “two or three generations back”
(Tapper, 1991, p.45). The “descent ideology” has more importance for them in
the classification of their own ethnic group and the political alliances they forge.
The fact that it is not so important on a lower level of organization might be
caused by the scattering of Durrani groups “and their mobility throughout the
country” (Tapper, 1991, p.46).
Pashtunwali also defines the position of a woman through patrilineal de-
scent and differentiates clearly whether a relationship is based on descent or on
marriage. Among other things women are excluded from the apportionment of
inheritance, which is why many Pashtuns prefer to marry within the patrilin-
eage, usually producing arranged cross-cousin marriages (Rzehak, 2011, p.10).
A woman remains in their father’s descent group after marrying, yet without re-
taining any “legal rights in her natal family”, even though “authority over her is
transferred from her father (or guardian) to her husband.” (Barth, 1959a, p.39).
When a woman’s honor is impaired “both her husband and her blood relatives
can take vengeance” (Rzehak, 2011, p.11). About 80% of all marriages among
Durrani are bride-price marriages, implying that the wife-taker holds a stronger
position than the wive-giver, reinforced by virilocality and the practical absence
of divorce. In order to resolve this contradiction to the basic notion of equality
among Pashtuns the agnates of the wife have the right “to repossess her body
for burial” which is at first enigmatic since “there are no compelling affective or
religious reasons why a woman should be buried beside her own agnates rather
than with her children” (Tapper, 1991, p.53). Usually, when a wife dies she is
“buried in the section of the village cemetery used by her husband’s patriline”,
but actual local customs are quite diverse (Barth, 1959a, p.39). Yet to transfer
a woman’s remains to her natal origins is a generally acknowledged reverence
to her descent group and can best be “understood as the final ritual episode of
marriage” (Tapper, 1991, p.53).
Further central terms of Pashtunwali terms sharm (shame) and tor (which
in a literal translation means black and is also used as invisible or to describe
women) are mainly connected to the control of women through men and the
maintenance of female honor. Concerning women, a Pashtun man sees himself
responsible for the honor of his “wife or wives, daughters, and his unmarried or
widowed sisters”, but sometimes namus, the defense of female honor, can encom-
pass all female associates of a household (Rzehak, 2011, p.9). The protection
and strict control of women (namus, which can also be equated with homeland)
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is justified through the allegation that women are generally unreasonable and
prone to a lack of self-control, especially with regard to sexual activity (Glatzer,
2000, p.95). Glatzer asserts that the fear of a bad reputation and gossip among
fellow tribesmen and neighbors surmount the fear of actual inaccurate demeanor
of women. Hiding and corralling them helps to avoid such chatter in the first
place (Glatzer, 2000, p.95). This is also backed up by Rzehak who states that for
Pashtuns a person’s demeanor “is honourable or shameful when it is honourable
or shameful in the eyes of other people” and that “seclusion is seen as the best
way to defend a female’s reputation” since a “female who is almost invisible to
the eyes of other people cannot disgrace herself in the eyes of other people.”
(Rzehak, 2011, p.9f). As a consequence the guiding principle of any behavior is
the question how it might be judged by others. If a woman has not been faithful,
her husband feels obligated to reconstitute his honor through instantly killing
her and her paramour. Divorces almost never occur and are rejected, but in the
rare cases that they come about, it is due to the husband not being able to kill
his adulterous wife and her lover, “but that doesn’t free him from his shame”
and is “an admission that he wasn’t man (nar) enough”(Tapper, 1991, p.214).
Occasionally infidelity and other misdemeanor can be hushed up to avoid blood
feuds, following the maxim “that ‘a shame is not a shame as long as nobody is
aware of it’.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.10).
Among Durrani Pashtuns for instance, men and women agree on the in-
feriority of women, seeing them as imperfect and foolish, and their “supposed
helplessness and fearful attitude to life are explicitly thought to be disabling,
while their bodily functions make them unclean.” (Tapper, 1991, p.52). Accord-
ing to Nancy Tapper these views are based “almost entirely on religious grounds”
and, through perpetuating the idea of a demonic potential and ungodly nature
of women, also provide the head of the household (mashar) with the “literal
powers of life and death [. . . ] over the women of that household as well as to
debar women from all formal control of produce and capital goods” (Tapper,
1991, p.52). Yet there is also another aspect to the control of women and the
interdependence of this control with shame and honor: namely the knowledge
of women about their capacity “not merely to put pressure on their menfolk
but actually to ‘ruin’ them” through subversive actions like purposefully behav-
ing in “dishonoring” ways which bring shame upon the household (Pitt-Rivers,
1977, p.80 in Tapper, 1991, p.23). These subversive acts can encompass flirting,
adultery or general disrespect for the male head of the household. This usually
only happens when women consider a man to be weak in character or of poor
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social and economic influence (Tapper, 1991, p.24f).
A household usually does have a female head too (generally the spouse of
the male head) who is in authority to organize internal labour division among
the women of the household and who “may even participate with the men in dis-
cussions of more far-reaching decisions about economic and political activities.”
(Tapper, 1991, p.212). Within the “nuclear family, men and women confront
one another in a continuous struggle for dominance” (Lindholm, 1981, p.148).
Newly wedded wives try to maintain their lineage honor by gaining control in
the new household, the husbands “task is to subdue the wife, of failing that,
to humiliate her” through taking a second wife and “thereby shaming the first
and all her lineage”32 (Lindholm, 1981, p.148). The husbands “are permitted
and encouraged to beat their wives regularly” and solely “if bones are broken is
a woman allowed to flee to her family” (Lindholm, 1981, p.148). Still, even in
this case she has to return after some time and sometimes a woman reacts to
humiliation and violence and “may vindicate herself by poisoning her husband”
(Lindholm, 1981, p.148). Cases of husbands who murder their wives are rare,
because her lineage would seek revenge, but if a woman acted dishonorable “her
own patriline will reject and even shoot her” (Lindholm, 1981, p.148.).
Nancy Tapper has shown that that “different Pashtun peoples from Swat to
Sistan would seem to use the same ideology of control to define and support
ostensibly” the “very different social structures” they might live in (Tapper,
1991, p.23). There are insular cases though among nomads and Pashtuns in
the north of the country which deem a strict confinement of women weakness:
they consider themselves as being even more manly for not having to lock up
the women in order to dominate them33 (Tapper, 1991 in Glatzer, 2000, p.95).
In short, the honor of men also depends on their ability to control women and
their behavior (Glatzer, 2000, p.95).
Further core values are badal (revenge or ‘exchange’), melmastia (hospitality,
generosity), nanawatee (which signifies the “generosity to a defeated adversary
supplicating for peace”), to adhere to the jirga and tarboorwali, the already men-
tioned cousin-rivalry (Ahmed, 1983a, p.24). Being accused of greediness “can
seriously damage a reputation of honor” as it is “considered antisocial and de-
structive” (Grima, 2004, p.35). Allegations of greed “are often used to denigrate
32There are quite some variations to this behavior and its perceptions among Pashtuns, this
particular description depicts especially eastern Pashtuns.
33Yet sometimes older women are highly respected and can use their appreciation as hon-
orable members of a tribe to reconcile a blood-feud peacefully (Rzehak, 2011, p.10).
41
and harm people” (Grima, 2004, p.35). Also turá (being a warrior, in a literal
translation: sword) is an important aspect of nang, meaning that a turialai em-
bodies the features of turá through individual heroic deeds such as fighting for
his personal honor and autonomy, for his family and for his clan (Glatzer, 2000,
p.96). “In the concept of turá it is a holy duty to oppose an enemy face-to-face
and fight until the last breath” (Rzehak, 2011, p.11). Flight from combat is con-
sidered a great dishonor and brings about the same shame to a Pashtun as being
betrayed by his wife (Rzehak, 2011, p.11). The concept of turá is supplemented
by aql, the notion of rationality and social responsibility. Both aspects of nang
(turá and aql) are attributed to different ages of a Pashtun: a young man is
rather expected to display turá, reacting aggressively at the smallest instigation,
the elders act rather on the basis of aql and have to be respected and obeyed
by the young men - particularly concerning the decisions of the jirga (Glatzer,
2000, p.97)34. The demand for honorable and mannerly comportment toward
seniors regulates the interactions between tribal leaders and the young as well
as between “fathers and their sons, between brothers, cousins, etc.” (Rzehak,
2011, p.12). Senior in this case does not always mean someone who is older in
age, but can refer to status obtained through prestige, knowledge, leadership
skills, one’s marital status or whether one keeps one’s own household (Rzehak,
2011, p.12).
To unite the aspects of turá and aql is a precondition for becoming an elder
or a tribal leader. Depending on social functions there are two different kinds
of tribal leaders. First there are khans or maliks, respected and honorable men
whose words carry weight in jirgas and whose importance is also measured by
the number of followers who regularly sit in their hujra (guesthouse) and who
would support them in case of conflict35. Being a khan or malik also implies
generosity, hospitality (as a special form of generosity), economic success and
the willingness to let guests and wards have part in this success (Glatzer, 2000,
p.99). It also requires “considerable economic resources. Followers must be
34This obedience towards elders “does not contradict the egalitarian principle”, the elders
are understood as representing “the collective will of the clan/tribe” and have to make sure
that the basis for their decisions, the traditional values and customs, “are understood by the
younger as just” (Glatzer, 1998, p.88). It is a question of honor for the younger generation
to show “restraint, sobriety, subservience, and obedience” in the presence of the elder (Grima,
2004, p.37). This applies also, for example, in the presence of an older brother or, even for
adult men, in the presence of their fathers.
35Among the Durrani in the Kandahar area khan is attributed to “any landowner, however
small the holding” and is customarily attached as a polite form of address to the name of an
older man, the Ghilzai however “reserve the term for more singular individuals” (Anderson,
1983, p.133).
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feasted for their loyalty from time to time.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.13).
According to custom the rules of Pashtunwali include treating a guest with
special honors for three days not only in a khan’s house, but also in an ordinary
household. After that period of time they are treated like everyone else in the
household. To share a meal is an “expression of equality, and the degree to
which one is fed [. . . ] is a rough but public measure of alliance to the host” and
can also be used to end hostilities or enmities (Anderson, 1983, p.134). This
act “is morally loaded” and to “have ‘eaten another’s salt” ’ makes any possible
future infraction or offense against the host doubly condemnable (Anderson,
1983, p.134).
Guests are obliged to “give the host the opportunity to show generosity” and
“can leave the host’s house only with the host’s permission.” (Rzehak, 2011,
p.15). Almost every house provides an extra room for guests “which is strictly
separated from the house’s family part.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.16). A host has
to protect his guest and is obliged to confer asylum, no matter who the other
party is and what the reason for the guests’ persecution might be. Noticeably,
a Pashtun could not even deny asylum to his enemy if solicited, though it might
not be a frequent course of action for a persecuted man to ask his enemy for
asylum (except if he is haunted by even bigger problems and the asylum granting
enemy has an interest in his survival) (Rzehak, 2011, p.16).
A khan is also called upon to mediate in conflicts, to serve as a speaker
for the interests of his followers and to represent his tribal group or village in
consultations with other tribal groups or government agencies (Rzehak, 2011,
p.12). In a plurality of cases the status of a khan or malik is inherited and is con-
nected to land ownership and economic power. Yet khanship does not represent
“a clear-cut or structurally given position” but rather “an on-going achievement”
(Anderson, 1983, p.133). It needs “continuous reaffirmation” through the ‘right’
demeanor and a demonstration of the “ability to attract followers, mainly by
offering economic advantages” (Glatzer, 1983, p.224). Being a khan does not
imply exercising direct power as a leader, and the actual way by which leader-
ship is “exercised by khans is as temporal and as ambiguous as the ephemeral
realisations of tribal structure that are their actual subjects” (Anderson, 1983,
p.134). Commonly, decisions are founded in consultation with followers, also
when co-ordinating the appropriation of pastures or the usage of an irrigation
system (Rzehak, 2011, p.13).
The second kind of tribal leaders are elders whose standing and authority
are based solely on “personal attributes and on the knowledge and experience
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they have gained during their long lives.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.13). They are highly
respected and considered to be wise men, so-called spinzhiri (sing.: spinzhirai),
which is translated as “white beards” or “white-bearded men” (Rzehak, 2011,
p.13). In order to become a spinzhirai, economic strength is less important.
They are counselors for all of life’s situations and possess a profound knowledge
of the Pasthun ways and customs. The spinzhiri hold “numerous privileges that
enable them to act as intermediaries in cases of conflict.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.13).
As mentioned before, the requirement for agreement through council deci-
sions has ben institutionalized in Pashtun tribal structures through the jirga.
In broader terms any get-together by Pashtun men which aims at discussing
and solving problems of shared interest can be called a jirga. Most frequently
such a gathering is convoked spontaneously, whereupon the group of participat-
ing actors is constituted by all people affected by a certain problem. (Rzehak,
2011, p.13). When the jirga is held on the level of the village, all men who have
established their own household and hold at least a small piece of land have the
explicit right to participate36. The egalitarian principle of a jirga also “forces
effective leaders to build a consensus in support of their decisions” (Barfield,
1990, p.162). The jirga can take on an advising role, it can function as a con-
flict resolution mechanism through providing a forum for peace talks, and it can
handle criminal acts as a court. “In all cases, decisions are made by consensus”,
which implies that deliberations, until “there is no longer any opposition to a
particular position”, can last very long (Rzehak, 2011, p.14). If no agreement
can be reached, the jirga is recessed until a new jirga is called in - in case the
problem still exists. It is a question of honor to respect the decisions of a jirga.
An infringement of this obligation can lead to a tribal penalty (nagha) which,
in serious cases, can include burning down the offender’s house or expelling him
from the village or tribe (Rzehak, 2011, p.14).
In the following I will discuss some rules and modes of compensation pro-
cessed by jirgas in order to further elucidate the Pashtun concept of honor and
the attempts of its restoration following an offense. The word badal, nowadays
36In some regions (i.e. Paktia) the jirgas are not longer open to everyone, only elders can
participate, yet they are still called jirgas. Many Pashtun tribes sustain their own militias
or ‘tribal police’ (arbaki, lashkar) whose functioning traditionally rely on the understanding
of the generational roles mentioned above. Their duties include the protection of the elders
while in a closed jirga and the enforcement of the decisions determined therein (Rzehak, 2011,
p.13f). Members of a lashkar participate on a voluntary basis and are not paid any salaries but
have the right to a share of the captured booty (Ahmed, 2000, p.100). One of the questions in
chapter 7 will be wether the traditional system of compliance from the younger to the older
generations on which jirgas rely, is still intact.
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often translated as revenge or retaliation, originally stood for exchange. In some
Afghan written records it is clearly laid out that ‘good’ acts as well as ‘bad’ acts
necessitate appropriate responses (Rzehak, 2011, p.14). For instance it includes
the obligation to thank for any courtesy or help provided and to reciprocate
“when the opportunity arises”. Not compensating would be considered sinful
and, interestingly, “the feeling of indebtedness to someone who has done you a
favor is considered unmanly and cowardly” (Rzehak, 2011, p.14). On this basis
countless networks of mutually obliged actors are created, meaning that bene-
factors would sometimes after years collect a favor, payment or help in some
kind37. If someone’s honor is infringed upon or physical harm has occurred,
reciprocation is intended to restore the status quo ante in order to restore one’s
honor. Usually this is achieved by applying the principle “an eye for an eye and
a tooth for a tooth”, which in turn can lead to “a cycle of retaliatory violence”
or a so-called blood feud38. (Rzehak, 2011, p.15). According to Rzehak the
Pashtunwali regulates retaliation in a way that allows or demands for the patri-
lineal kin of a wronged, wounded or killed person to administrate revenge on the
offender or his patrilineal relatives, thus recreating a kind of balance which is a
precondition for peace talks between enemy parties (Rzehak, 2011, p.15). These
conflicts can, of course, also occur within a patrilineage and Pashtuns “do not
consider violence between near patrilineal relatives to be abnormal” (Lindholm,
1981, p.150). The revenge itself does not necessarily involve courageous acts
of fighting, but is in many cases “accomplished by stealth or betrayal” (Lind-
holm, 1981, p.150). The courage that is associated with such a vengeance is not
rooted in the killing of the offender, but in the acceptance of possibly ruinous
and dangerous retaliation from the offenders affiliates (Lindholm, 1981, p.150).
Nevertheless, such a revenge does not have to be taken instantly, it can be
postponed and the responsibility for taking vengeance can actually be trans-
ferred to the next generation. Sometimes these suspended feuds “explode with
unpredictable violence” (Dupree, 1984, p.270). To illustrate this, Rzehak cites
“a popular proverb” which “says: [. . . ] ‘A Pashtun took his revenge after one
hundred years and he said that he was in a hurry.” ’ (Rzehak, 2011, p.15).
Sometimes feuds may also be sustained over “several generations, and current
37This frequently causes confusion, especially in Western perception, concerning the topic
of corruption: very often acts that are interpreted as corruption are not based on the intent
of personal enrichment but on the obligation to reciprocate (Rzehak, 2011, p.15).
38The name blood feud does not imply that such feuds inevitably include bloodshed but is
based on the fact that the dispute is conducted “by kin groups which are related by blood,
i.e. descent groups of different genealogical depth.”(Rzehak, 2011, p.15).
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participants may have forgotten the original cause” (Dupree, 1984, p.270).
The compensations for most delicts include money that has to be paid for
“moral harm”, this money is also called sharm (shame). Money can also be paid
for offenses which curtailed the physical integrity of an individual in order to
avert bloodshed which then is called khunbaha (blood money). The amount of
blood money that has to be paid is usually calculated on the basis of local bride
prices: if a Pashtun man has been killed, the killer or his relatives typically
have to pay double the local average bride price, a unit which “is called one
khun (literally ‘blood’) or one nek (literally [. . . ] ‘good man’)”, to avoid revenge.
(Rzehak, 2011, p.18). The underlying idea is that the money allows the family of
the victim to pay for a girl/bride to marry into the family, who then gives birth
to a son who in turn would replace the killed individual (Rzehak, 2011, p.18f).
As an alternative is it also possible for the tribal group associated with the
offender to “give one or several marriageable girls to the victim’s family instead
of paying money.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.19). The Saripul Durrani for instance
would, in theory, compensate for a killed man by giving seven women to the
qaum of the victim. In practice though the killer might offer two girls and “then
take the Koran to the victim’s house and ask to be freed of the obligation to
give more”, which is, when combined with additional monetary compensations,
frequently accepted (Tapper, 1991, p.48). If the victim did not belong to the
Durrani however, no girls will be given in compensation but only money: the
Durrani ascribe their women superiority, higher status and value as non-Durrani
women and men (Tapper, 1991, p.48 and p.54).
A Pashtun woman being killed demands for the payment of ½ khun which
equates the average bride price. Killing highly esteemed elders requires the
payment of larger amounts of blood money. Several other factors in the killing
can contribute to a negotiable increase of the price: the victim being unarmed
or defenseless, the victim being mutilated after its death or the killer stealing
the victim’s weapon are such components. Once “blood money has been paid
[. . . ], the blood feud must be stopped.”39 (Rzehak, 2011, p.19).
In its totality the Pashtunwali is a quite complex system which evolves over
time and takes different shapes in different places (Ruttig, 2010, p.4). Being
unwritten it is preserved and transmitted by spinzhiri and the jirgadar (those
who have the knowledge about the jirga) (Ruttig, 2010, p.5). The differing local
versions of the Pashtunwali are called nirkh, which is also the word for ‘price’,
39For many eastern Pashtuns blood money “or even the donation of a woman, is never
adequate compensation for death. Blood demands blood.” (Lindholm, 1981, p.150).
46
referring to the compensation that has to be paid in order to settle blood feuds.
When distinct versions of the Pashtunwali manifest in an inter-tribal conflict,
the parties first agree on whose nirkh to apply (Ruttig, 2010, p.7). Furthermore,
the actual judgment about the shame a specific action brings upon the actor is
highly contextual. An act usually seen as shameful might not be considered as
such if it was the reaction to an even more shameful act, it was unavoidable or
brought about by suffering and hardship (Grima, 2004, p.40).
It is not easy to definitively say how important the Pashtunwali might be in
Afghanistan today. Its usage and implementation may vary greatly regionally
as well as depending on context. Some examples for the utilization of the Pash-
tunwali in recent years (see chapter III) will help to elucidate questions about
its significance today. It is important to remember that the Pashtunwali is set
to be an ideal which people strive to reach but sometimes may not even come
close. Or as Frederik Barth puts it:
“It is of course perfectly feasible to distinguish between a people’s
model of their social system and their aggregate pattern of prag-
matic behaviour, and indeed quite necessary not to confuse the two.”
(Barth, 1998, p.29).
This implies that the right course of action for the creation of anthropological
knowledge is not to dichotomize ‘ideal’ and ‘actual behavior’ as opposing blocs,
but to investigate the interdependencies of both (Barth, 1998, p.29). Also other
value systems and different interpretations of Islam influence the multifaceted
Pashtun tribes in different ways. Some answers to the question how these influ-
ences affect traditional tribal structures should be found in chapter III.
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Part II
Foreign Interventions, The Soviet
Occupation, Tribal Warfare,
Migration & Exile
3 A Brief Look into Afghanistan’s History
Afghanistan in its borders today occupies an area total of about 650.000
square kilometers, sharing its longest border with Pakistan (2430km) an its
shortest with China (76km). It geographically includes low basins and plains in
the north (where the lowest elevation at the Amu Darya or Oxus is about 260m),
south and west. Mountainous areas are dominant in central, northeastern and
eastern Afghanistan with elevations of up to well over 7000 meters (Wakhan
Corridor; Noshak: 7485m) (Rathjens, 1986, p.15). In ancient history semi-
nomadic Indo-Iranians populated large areas, with the earliest archaeological
artifacts proving urban settlements dating back as far as 3000 BCE. Later on the
Persian Empires incorporated the area. Alexander the Great briefly occupied it,
followed by the Seleucid Empire. King Ashoka of India then brought Buddhism
to the region, again followed by several centuries of Persian, Hellenistic and
Indian conquests40. This “history of invasion and immigration” also resulted
in a “diverse ethnolinguistic heritage”, with Dari and Pashto being the main
languages nowadays there are several dozen other languages, sometimes only
spoken by a few thousand people41 (Canfield, 1988b, p.89).
The region became then known as Khorasan42, though its size varied greatly
in different descriptions and was also depending on which groups used the term.
It mainly included eastern regions of todays Iran, Balkh, Ghazni and Herat in
40In this long record of imperial “conquest, from Achaemenid, Bactrian, Kushan, Sassanid,
Umayyad, and Abbasid, to Ghaznavid, Mongol, Timurid, Safavid and Mughal [. . . ] Pashtuns
commonly fought or intrigued with both sides, even when the opponent was a Pashtun regime.”
(Hager, 1983, p.93, Hyman, 2002, p.301).
41Dari and Pashto are Indo-European languages from the Iranian sub-family. Further
prevalent languages are Uzbek and Turkmen and minor languages include Balochi, Nuris-
tani, Brahui, Kyrgyz, Hindko, Pashayi and many others.
42Pashto-speaking populations customarily referred to the region as Pakhtunkhwa or Roh,
southern Afghanistan was called Zabulistan and the area between the Indus and the Hindu
Kush carried the name of Kabulistan(Schetter, 2005, p.55).
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todays Afghanistan, Bukhara and Samarkand in todays Uzbekistan and bor-
dered Hindustan in the east with the stretch between Kabul and Kandahar
grossly defining this border. The Islamization started from the 7th century on
and Khorasan, after being mainly Buddhist, Zoroastrian and Hindu, acquired an
important role as a religious and cultural center in the Muslim world during the
Islamic Golden Age43. The term Afghan was first used in Persian texts around
the year 1000CE and can also be found in “Delhi Sultanate (c. 1100-1300) his-
toriography when both Afghans and Turks were primary actors as militarily
potent slave troops who could and would also rule in the mold of other medieval
Islamic mamluk populations” (Hanifi, 2008, p.10). Afghan referred to all the
inhabitants of the area but was widely interchangeably with Pashtun44.
In the beginning of the 13th century Genghis Khan forcefully conquered
the region, destroying major cities, towards the end of the 14th century Timur
founded the Timurid dynasty during which architecture and literature flour-
ished. Then for about 200 years the area was divided among three to four king-
doms (Khanates). A dominant role was held by the shiite Safavid Empire, with
its center in Isfahan, which claimed sovereignty over big swaths of what is mod-
ern Afghanistan. In actuality big parts of the Safavid Empire were autonomous
and at the beginning of the 18th century many sunni tribal groups revolted
which resulted in the Ghilzai making “themselves independent at Kandahar in
1709 and the Abdali followed by taking control of Herat in 1715” (Tapper, 1983,
p.12). At the same time, “raids and incursions by Baluches in the south-east,
Uzbeks and Turkmens in the north-east, and Lazgis and Kurds in the north-
west” strongly increased (Tapper, 1983, p.12). Mahmud Ghilzai, son of the
founder of the Hotaki dynasty Mirwais Khan Hotak, also known as Mirwais
Ghilzai, gained control of Isfahan in 1722. His victory against the Safavids in
“a rapid military campaign, aided by sheer good luck and the enemy’s incompe-
tence [. . . ] brought about the demise of this once powerful dynasty” (Barfield,
2004, p.269). After seven years Mirwais Ghilzai was defeated by Tahmasp Quli,
later known as Nadir Shah, who “restored nominal Safavid rule under a puppet
Shah”, reconquered every territory lost to Afghans, Ottomans and Russians and
devastated several provinces causing “much of the settled population to emi-
43The Islamic Golden Age is the historical era between 750 CE and 1250 CE. During this
time, architecture, engineering, scientific knowledge, philosophy and arts flourished in the
centers of the Islamic world.
44Also in the following centuries Afghan was habitually used synonymous with Pashtun
and other ethnic groups were called Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara and so on, when a distinction was
intended by the speaker (Hyman, 2002, p.302)
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grate” (Tapper, 1983, p.12). His power was based on the “military discipline” of
his followers “and a common interest in plunder” (Tapper, 1983, p.12).
3.1 The Beginnings of the Afghan State
After Nadir Shah’s assassination in 1747 the empire quickly fell apart, the
eastern half of it was held by Ahmad Khan Abdali (later called: Ahmad Shah
Durrani), one of Nadir Shah’s generals. “The Abdali were the most important
Afghan tribal group” composed of several different tribes45 (Tapper, 1983, p.13).
The “most powerful and numerous” element of this tribal confederation were the
Barakzai, whose leader was Hajji Jamal Khan (of the Muhammadzai branch).
He agreed in a jirga to elect Ahmad Khan Abdali, who was a member of the “less
powerful but more aristocratic” Sadozai branch of the Popolzai tribe, the Afghan
leader (Tapper, 1983, p.13). The installation of his kingdom is regarded as the
founding of modern Afghanistan, even though his factual position was rather
that of a primus inter pares who, in a feudalistic and tribal government, had to
consult with tribal leaders in what rather “resembled a confederation of tribes
and khanates than a centralised monarchy.” (Tapper, 1983, p.14). The new ruler
established Kandahar as the kingdom’s capital (Hyman, 2002, p.301). Ahmad
Khan Abdali “could rely on the military and political strength of the tribes [. . . ]
as long as he did not offend their feelings and interests” (Rzehak, 2011, p.6).
Other writers have put the relationship between the king and local “leaders,
potentates, tribal leaders and governors” in more blunt terms, saying the latter
“certainly acknowledged” Ahmad Khan Abdali’s “rule when he was present; but
as soon as his back was turned they would again behave as though themselves
were entirely sovereign.” (Schetter, 2005, p.55). In fact the Pashtun tribes
were granted various privileges, such as tax exemptions and the right to self-
government (Rzehak, 2011, p.6). Ahmad Shah changed the name of the Abdali
to Durrani and managed to sustain tribal unity by creating revenue surpluses
through conquering Kashmir, Sindh, the Sikh Maratha Empire in Punjab, Delhi,
and several other regions46 and thereby establishing an Afghan empire. His son
Timur Shah became king in 1773, moved the capital from Kandahar to Kabul
and transformed the city into the political center of the Afghanistan (Hanifi,
2008, p.1f). He was followed by his own son Zaman Shah in 1793, who, like his
father and grandfather, did not manage to centralize government despite several
45Most importantly the Nurzai, Ishaqzai, Alizai, Atskzai, Barakzai, Popolzai and Alikozai
(Tapper, 1983, p.16).
46Inter alia the Iranian provinces Khorasan and Kohistan.
50
attempts. The alliance between Barakzai and Sadozai broke over these attempts
in the year 1800. A son of Hajji Jamal Khan, Painda Khan, then “leader of the
powerful Muhammadzai Barakzai, met his death for plotting to remove Zaman
Shah”, which in turn caused Painda Khan’s son Fatih Khan to unseat Zaman
Shah and the Muhammadzai to gain control of the government (Tapper, 1983,
p.14). “’Afghanistan thus entered the nineteenth century a politically disunited,
ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, tribal-feudal state.” ’ (Gregorian in
Tapper, 1983, p.14)47. The intense rivalry between the “Sadozai Popolzai and
the Muhammadzai Barakzai branches of the Durrani” continued for decades
(Tapper, 1983, p.31). Additionally, there were internal struggles among the
Muhammadzai, who comprised about 30.000 families at the time. Sometimes
this internal struggle for power even took the form of a civil war with a highly
complex alternation of varying alliances, puppet leaders (sometimes also Sadozai
supported by Muhammadzai) , assassinations and executions as well as exilation
to and return from India of several leaders (Noelle, 1997, p.7f). These rivalries
were even an issue during the British engagement in Afghanistan as part of The
Great Game48 against the Russian Empire. “In 1809 Mountstuart Elphinstone
made the first official colonial contact with” Timur Shah’s “son Shah Shuja” at
Peshawar, which then was the Durrani winter capital 49 (Hanifi, 2008, p.1).
The British and Russian Empires quickly realized that “’advance through
Afghanistan means hard fighting with Afghans by whomever it is undertaken” ’
(Curzon, 1892, p.236 in Hager, 1983, p.101). Therefore both empires consid-
ered Afghanistan to be of great importance as a buffer state between them and
tried to influence the state and the tribal leaders with benefits such as subsidies
(Hager, 1983, p.104). The tribes however did not perceive themselves as play-
ing the Russian or the British game but “simply playing their own game” which
47The population in the Durrani kingdom around the year 1800 is estimated to have counted
about “14 million, of which no more than five million dwelt within the present frontiers of
Afghanistan” while half of them “were Pashto-speaking tribespeople”, the other groups were
Hazaras, Kafirs, Aymaqs, Turkmens, Uzbeks, Baluches and Tajiks. (Tapper, 1983, p.16).
48The Russian Empire wanted to gain access to the southern seas and control the land
route to India. The British Empire wanted to protect its ample Asian domains against those
advances. In 1864 Prince Gorkachov, who was the Russian Chancellor, stated the necessity
and explicit goal to secure the borders, international trade and Russian influence through
the subjugation of ‘anarchic’ nomadic tribes, “who make ‘the worst neighbours possible” ’,
by the more civilized and thus superior Russian state, progressing its civilization through
“commercial relations” (Hager, 1983, p.103f). Russia took Tashkent in 1865, Samarkand in
1868 and Bokhara became a “subsidiary ally” (Hager, 1983, p.104).
49Kabul, Peshawar and Kandahar are “ancient market” places “between one and two thou-
sand years of age” and are connected through an ancient network of trade routes, generally
known as the Silk Road(Hanifi, 2008, p.2). In 1849, with “the colonial creation of the Punjab
province”, Peshawar “came under formal British India rule” (Hanifi, 2008, p.6).
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“was certainly played with the brilliance of born tacticians, and enabled them to
remain independent at a crucial period” (Ahmed, 1983b, p.193). Tribal warriors
were able to match heavy artillery “with dated but deadly .303 rifles, could stop
and destroy entire battalions sent by the imperial powers” and caused military
planers of the empires to despair over the tribes’ chaotic, individualistic, unco-
ordinated and unforeseeable approach to battle (Ahmed, 1983b, p.197). Since
praise for the virtue of tribal warfare was also a means to embellish many a
defeat inflicted upon an empire, the following source should be qualified with
caution50 (more information about the workings of tribal warfare will be pro-
vided in chapter 4.1). Still a British officer engaged in fighting Pashtun tribes
provided an interesting account:
“Attacking the Afghan tribes is like making swords thrust into wa-
ter. You meet with no resistance but you also do no injury. . . Each
separate tribe is, as it were an independent center of life, which re-
quires a separate and special operation for its extinction. . . The
only way in which we could hope to enforce our authority through-
out Afghanistan would be a simultaneous occupation of the entire
country.” (Dacosta, 1891, p.125 in Hager, 1983, p.112).
Considering the difficult terrain and the tribesmen expertise in guerrilla warfare
such a task was estimated to require at least one million ground troops, which
was an infeasible approach51(Hager, 1983, p.112). Eventually, the Russian and
the British empires’ struggle for influence in Asia also determined the territorial
boundaries of the Muhammadzai emirate (Hager, 1983, p.101).
Dost Muhammad Khan, a grandson of Hajji Jamal Khan, had begun to
slowly consolidate the Afghan provinces and to expand his rule from 1826 on to
1839 (Tapper, 1983, p.32). During the First Anglo Afghan War (1839 - 42) the
British occupied Kabul in 1839. Soon though “they discovered to their dismay”
that “securing the capital tended to inflame rather than behead the resistance”
50Many colonial writers overly romanticized the ‘noble, courageous Pashtun warrior’. Fewer
but evenly popular writers attributed “all that is sinister, cruel and corrupt in the subconti-
nent” to Pashtuns (Lindholm, 1980, p.350).
51Further British accounts pictured the Pashtuns as “’perhaps the best [. . . ] natural shots
in the world’ and ‘the country they inhabit [as] the most difficult on the face of the globe’
[. . . ] concluding that the Pashtun tribesman is ‘on his own ground probably the finest minor
tactician in the world” ’ (Hager, 1983, p.112). Other accounts decry the cruelty of the Pashtuns.
They are recommending soldiers who were left behind wounded to kill themselves because
after battle Pashtun women would come forward, hack off their genitals, “cram them in their
mouths, the lips of which will be sewn over them.” (Dupree, 1984, p.275).
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(Edwards, 2002, p.174). They unsuccessfully attempted to reinstall the Sadozai
Shah Shuja, who had already been ousted to Indian exile by the Muhammadzai
in 1809 and whom the British already had supported financially in a 1832 mili-
tary campaign against Dost Muhammad Khan and the Muhammadzais (Noelle,
1997, introduction, p.15 and p.43). Dost Muhammad Khan had also tried to
gain support from the British, especially for his raids against the Sikh in 1834
and 1835. When his attempts were turned down he transitionally strengthened
his contacts with Iran and Russia (Noelle, 1997, p.43). Following an event-
ful period at the beginning of the First Anglo Afghan War with many battles,
defections and changing alliances he went to Bukhara with about 2000 of his
loyal followers where he was de facto imprisoned by Nasrullah Khan, the emir
of Bukhara (Noelle, 1997, p.44). After fleeing he reentered the political scene
in Afghanistan and united with some eastern tribal leaders, but gave up and
surrendered to the British after some heavy battles not only with them but also
with Sadozai Durrani rivals - even though he decisively won the last big battle
of Parwan on November 2nd, 1840. Researchers do not agree about the reasons
for his surrender, but Noelle states that he might not have believed to be able to
unite enough tribes into an enduring alliance “beyond links of kinship” in order
to present a “widespread and sustained resistance strong enough to remove the
British and Shah Shuja’ from power” (Noelle, 1997, p.45). The British decided
to cut subsidies to Durranis, Ghilzais and the ulama in Kabul by 200.000 rupees
in order to reduce the costs of their endeavor. This caused major revolt across
large areas. The British reaction oscillated between panic and pure denial and
might have contributed to their fading willingness to engage in internal Afghan
affairs (Noelle, 1997, p.49).
Dost Muhammad Khan was eventually released and emerged, after a pro-
longed period of civil war between Muhammadzai and Sadozai, with the “new
role as Defender of the Faith against the infidel invaders” (Tapper, 1983, p.33).
He also justified his opposition to Shah Shuja on religious grounds, portraying
“his rival as a puppet of unbelievers” and “extricated a fatwa from the ulama
of Kabul which denied the legitimacy of Shah Shuja’s claims to power” (Noelle,
1997, p.43). Prior to the encounter with the British, “Islamic reservations about
the so-called unbelievers had been quite unclear for many Pashtuns” but through
their experience of the colonial aggressors and the danger of being conquered
“their struggle for independence turned into a struggle for their faith” (Rzehak,
2011, p.10). After many ups and downs on January 6th of 1842 the British
decided to retreat from Kabul, leaving only some hostages behind, and moved
53
about 16,000 mostly Indian troops and civilians back to their garrison in Jalal-
abad. Almost all of them were killed by the eastern Ghilzai (who controlled
the mountains between Kabul and Gandamak) in a several day long winterly
onslaught (Noelle, 1997, p.49). Only one British officer, Dr. Brydon, survived
and managed to return to the besieged garrison in Jalalabad52. After this dev-
astating defeat of the British, Dost Muhammad Khan ruled again from 1843
to 1863 and “succeeded with British assistance in reunifying the Afghan realm”
(Tapper, 1983, p.33). He died in 1869 and another civil war ensued. The same
year Russia and Great Britain started negotiations about the borders of their
Asian territories in St.Petersburg. They came to a successful conclusion in 1873,
thus creating Afghanistan’s borders without the knowledge of Afghans and lim-
iting Russia’s military reach to Afghanistan’s neighbors north of the Amu Darya
(Hager, 1983, p.105). “The frontiers thus defined were purely strategic and did
not correspond to any ethnic or historical boundary.” (Roy, 1986, p.17). This
agreement shifted the contest between the two empires from being focused on
territory and military to diplomacy and the attempts to influence the tribes
within the new state (Hager, 1983, p.105). Afghans allowed the Russians to
open a representation in Kabul and refused the same to the British, which
prompted the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878 - 1880). Great Britain, still
wary after their unforgotten defeat, used better trained army soldiers this time,
and installed Abdur Rahman Khan (later also known as “The Iron Emir”), a
grandson of Dost Muhammad Khan, in power53. The most respected religious
leaders of the Kandahar ulema issued a fatwa “urging the population to rise
against Abdur Rahman”, the British puppet, but Abdur Rahman swiftly de-
feated those who obeyed the fatwa in battle (Ghani, 1978, p.273).
“Hated by many as tyrant” he “incurred the wrath of his subjects for his
brutality” (Edwards, 2002, p.19, p.179). Abdur Rahman “nevertheless forged
the basis of governance in Afghanistan.” (Edwards, 2002, p.19). Further-
more, Afghanistan’s foreign affairs would be managed by the British, “while
Afghans proceeded to deny both empires influence or even access to its internal
52The British started a punitive expedition in fall of 1842, burning the Kabul bazaar and
liberating some British prisoners which were held in Bamyan. Subsequently, they retreated
back to British India (Hyman, 2002, p.304).
53Between the enthronement of Abdur Rahman Khan and death of Dost Muhammad Khan,
three of the latter sons had held the throne. Amir Sher Ali Khan, who established the first
postal mail service in the country ruled from 1863-1866 and from 1868-1879, his brothers Amir
Mohammed Afzal Khan and Amir Mohammed Azam Khan from 1866-1868. Abdur Rahman
Khan had resided in Samarkand from 1867 to 1878 where he also received a Russian pension
(Hanifi, 2008, p.7).
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affairs” (Hager, 1983, p.105). The considerable annual subsidies paid by the
British (₤120.000 in the beginning, later raised to ₤180.000) to Abdur Rahman
Khan allowed him to strengthen central government and build a potent mili-
tary (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.98). Parts of the subsidies were “recycled back
into British Indian [. . . ] hands through” Abdur Rahman Khan’s “purchase of
heavy industrial equipment and technical expertise” (Hanifi, 2008, p.6). This
underlined his intention to build an industrial complex modeled on the industri-
alization in Europe which was inspired by “mercantilist economic policies [. . . ]
associated with modern absolutist states” in the West (Hanifi, 2008, p.6).
By the end of the century “The Iron Emir” had installed comparatively expe-
dient provincial administrations and governorships which “were strong enough
to exert a significant force upon the affairs of the rural populations.”54 (Can-
field, 1988b, p.92 and Edwards, 1996, p.84). Furthermore, he fought four wars
to subjugate opposing groups, which was seen by some authors as a continu-
ation of the conflict between Shiites and Sunnis (see also Safavids versus the
Ghilzai, p.49) (Canfield, 1988b, p.90). Abdur Rahman Khan actively sought
support from religious authorities and accused his opponents of heresy. The
conflict along sectarian lines became most visible in his third war against the
Shiite Hazara (1891 - 1893): he had “won support of essentially all the Sunni
authorities; the Hazaras, on their side, had gained the support of all the Shi’ite
authorities”, including substantial support from Iran 55 (Canfield, 1988b, p.90).
This sectarian conflict had, for the first time, united most of the Emir’s Sunni
subjects behind him (Canfield, 1973, p.1520). Besides the intense revival of
sectarian conflict, the nineteenth century had also brought about a heritage of
xenophobia “which was defined in Islamic terms.” (Canfield, 1988b, p.90). The
struggle against the menacing foreign powers (Britain and Russia) was defined
by many, especially by the Afghan government, “as clashes between Muslim be-
lievers and infidel outsiders” (Canfield, 1988b, p.91). This usage of religion as
uniting factor “drew large numbers of warriors from varying tribal backgrounds,
and the Afghanistan peoples became known for their fanatical Muslim zeal”
(Canfield, 1988b, p.91f) (see also: the role of Islam in transcending tribal orders
on p.71)56. In order to change the ethnic composition of some dominantly non-
54Abdur Rahman Khan provided military contingents at the disposal of governors and
drew provincial and sub-provincial boundaries corresponding with the dispersion of tribes and
their subsegments. Thereby he made specific local communities accountable to the respective
government unit (Canfield, 1988b, p.92).
55The sectarian struggle is still prevalent today and manifests “in the discriminating prac-
tices of the Sunnis against the Hazaras.” (Canfield, 1988b, p.90).
56In 1897 Sir Winston Churchill, then a young cavalry officer, joined the British campaign
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Pashtun areas, Abdur Rahman Khan began to forcibly resettle many Pashtun
tribes in those regions, especially in the north (Edwards, 2002, p.175).
The path of using subsidies in order to strengthen the military and the cen-
tral government was continued during Abdur Rahman Khan son’s (Habibullah
Khan) reign from 1901 to 1919. Some of the institutions they established still
existed in the 1970’s57 (Hager, 1983, p.105 and Canfield, 1988, p.92). Habibul-
lah Khan was assassinated during a hunting trip. His third son Amanullah
Khan (1919 - 1929) controlled the army and was thus able to imprison family
members loyal to his elder brother who had also claimed his right to succession.
Shortly after his enthronement he saw his chance to gain full independence from
Great Britain, sent troops to the eastern border58, crossed it at several occasions
and engaged in battles. This took the British by surprise and thus caused the
Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919. They were still weakened from World War
I and again fully engaged in their contest with the Russian Empire since their
entente broke following the Russian Revolution of 1917. Great Britain reacted
with aerial bombardment and achieved a tactical victory which allowed them to
dictate the conditions of the following armistice (Rawalpindi Agreement). Yet
they had to grant independence to Afghanistan, where the end of the war was
rather perceived as an Afghan victory.
Amanullah Khan was inspired by Western technology and progress and
“intended to turn Afghanistan into a modern state in the European sense.”
(Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.99). 59. He built factories, schools for boys and girls,
abolished the strict dress-code for women and created the first written constitu-
tion of Afghanistan which emulated European ideas of equal rights. Amanullah
generally tried to exploit his initial popularity by modernizing the country. He
had earned the respect of a “vast majority of the Afghans, who honored his anti-
under General Bindon Blood against the “Mad Mullah” Saidullah of Swat. The latter had
gathered a following and promised to start “a holy war in which he would be aided by super-
natural forces.” (Edwards, 1996, p.177). When Churchill heard about the following uprisings
along the Durand Line during furlough to England from his Bangalore regiment, “within a
matter of hours” he “booked return passage” (Edwards, 1996, p.175). Corroborating his ear-
lier proclaimed stance that, especially in the light of “the Diamond Jubilee marking” Queen
Victoria’s “sixtieth year on the throne”, the “British people [. . . ] must continue to pursue”
the path of the Empire and carry out the “mission of bearing peace, civilisation and good
government to the uttermost ends of the earth.” (Edwards, 1996, p.175). Edwards provided
not only a brilliant analysis of the events at the time, but also of the characters involved and
the later writings of Churchill about the campaign. See also (Caron, 2007, p.317).
57The “number of provincial governments increased from four at the turn of the century to
twenty-eight in 1970.” (Canfield, 1988b, p.93).
58A more detailed description of this border is provided in chapter 3.2.
59He even travelled to Europe later on in 1927 which, in fact, might not have helped his
popularity among traditionalists.
56
British colonial stance and his victory over the British in the third Anglo-Afghan
War” (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.99).
Yet, already at the national jirga of 1924, which was held in order to approve
the new constitution, he “received notice of the discontent with his policies” and
was forced to amend the new legal code (Tapper, 1983, p.36).
“Amanullah sought a revolution from above through his comprehensive plans
for change; his modernising legislation was perceived as impinging on tribal
and religious jurisdiction” (Tapper, 1983, p.36). Through gaining independence
he had also lost the subsidies from the British. He was not able to replace
them by other sources of revenue and thus could neither satisfy the financial
needs of his clients nor retain “military superiority over the tribes” (Hager,
1983, p.105, Shahrani, 1990, p.43, Tapper, 1983, p.36). As a consequence of
these circumstances and the fact that Amanullah had angered traditionalist
tribal leaders through his modern ways, he “was overthrown as a result of tribal
rebellions” in 1929 (Hager, 1983, p.105)60.
There was one more consequential event during Amanullah’s grandfather’s
(Abdur Rahman Khan’s) reign which should be mentioned at this point: namely
the drawing of the eastern Afghan border along the so-called Durand Line.
3.2 The Durand Line
Sir Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of the British colonial government of
India, wanted to create a set of various administrative approaches to the tribal
areas in the borderland. Since Afghanistan was already considered a buffer state
vis a vis the Russian Empire, the British wanted to create a buffer to this buffer
(Ahmed, 1983b, p.194). They planned to let the tribes which were furthest
away from the British colonial administrative centers govern themselves. The
closer the tribes were to these centers, more and more layers of control and
bureaucratic reglementations would be laid upon them (Ahmed, 1983b, p.194).
“Britain was not so much interested in setting Afghanistan’s eastern boundary as
in reorganizing its own administration of what would later become the Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP)” which “was designed to provide a separate unit of
administration for British India’s Pashtun population” (Barfield, 2007, p.4).
60However, he was not deposed by Pashtuns (they just did not come to his aid), but by a
Tajik bandit, Amir Habibullah II, who shortly ruled in Kabul but was soon removed through
and executed by tribal forces led by Nadir Khan (Tapper, 1983, p.37).
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In 1893 Sir Mortimer Durand wrenched an agreement of Abdur Rahman
Khan to this administrative border and guaranteed rich subsidies in return
(Barfield, 2007, p.2). The Durand Line, about 2440 kilometers long, would
cut ‘Pashtun country’ more or less in half61. It is probably safe to assume
that Abdur Rahman Khan did not intend this line to become an international
border between nation states but rather a partition of administrative responsi-
bilities62. The Durand Agreement was signed in Kabul in November of 1893 and
proclaimed under point 2: “’The Government of India will at no time exercise
interference in the territories lying beyond this Line on the side of Afghanistan,
and his Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories
lying beyond this Line on the side of India” ’ (Ahmed, 1983b, p.194). Never-
theless the treaty was regularly ignored by both sides. Keeping in mind that
Kabul was only 80 kilometers from the tribal areas of the Indian side, British
India could always deny involvement in tribal cross border raids, even when
they were planned and paid for by their very own political agents. The British
thus instigated troubles for Kabul along and across the Durand Line in many
cases (Ahmed, 1983b, p.195). In addition, the actual status of the Durand Line
also remained unclear because of the British perception that their dealings with
Afghans were indeed internal colonial affairs as opposed to international ones
(Barfield, 2007, p.4). Conditions in the tribal areas were also of strategic impor-
tance to Great Britain in the Great Game with Russia: tribes along the border
had held a decisive “role in determining who was to hold power in Afghanistan”
but proved to be “a mixed asset to the British” which “kept them anxious and
alert.” (Ahmed, 1983b, p.195).
Rooted in their lasting cultural, political, economic and kinship relations,
the Pashtuns who lived in the regions along the Durand Line viewed this ar-
bitrary division “as illegitimate” (Barfield, 2007, p.2). Afghanistan de facto
concurred with British India to the Durand Line as its border when the coun-
try reached full independence after the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. Yet
they fundamentally rejected the borders validity when Pakistan was founded
in 1947. “Afghanistan’s most radical objection was that the Pashtun regions
should not have had to choose between joining India or Pakistan, but should
have been offered the additional options of becoming an independent state or
61It was plotted along “a topographic ridgeline that could be held at strongpoints blocking
key mountain passes” (Cullather, 2002, p.516).
62I would speculate that Pashtun leaders just did not care much about the British drawing
some lines on paper, knowing about the conditions on the ground and about the limited
influence the British had on their fellow Pashtuns in the tribal areas.
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joining with Afghanistan.” (Barfield, 2007, p.2). Furthermore, Afghans held
the view that compacts signed with British India would, after the British gave
up their engagements in South Asia, naturally be destined to lose their validity
(Cullather, 2002, p.519). Even though they might not have shared many other
political views, all “Afghan regimes in Kabul (monarchist, republican, commu-
nist, Islamist, and democratic) have [. . . ] maintained the policy of refusing to
grant de jure recognition to the existing border with Pakistan” (Barfield, 2007,
p.2f). These arguments have further complicated the already strained relations
between the two countries over the last 65 years and, especially between the
1950s and the 1970s, have “brought both countries several times to the brink of
war” (Schetter, 2005, p.59).
On the ground the Durand Line is far less apparent than political maps
might lead us to believe. It runs through rocky, mountainous areas mostly
inhabited by subsistence farmers in remotely dispersed villages. Since govern-
ment authority has mostly been “non-existent in the area of the line”, “since it
is poorly demarcated in most places, and not demarcated at all in others” the
“local populations have never paid much attention to it” and “cross the border
at will and do not treat it as a boundary.” (Barfield, 2007, p.3).
Barfield argues that the underlying modern day conflict is in fact caused by
a variety of social, economic and political problems that affect both countries
(Barfield, 2007, p.6). Furthermore, the fact that in the last ten years the area
had become a sanctuary for Islamist non-state actors who want to overthrow
both governments in Kabul and Islamabad and the intensification of violence
has considerably increased instability in the region. In recent years Pashtun na-
tionalism seems to become less important in Afghanistan but to be flourishing
in Pakistan’s NWFP: the call for the creation of Pashtunistan appears to be
driven not least by the fact that Pashtuns in Pakistan “are a minority group
in a much larger population” and see themselves as “disadvantaged politically”
whereas Afghan Pashtuns constitute the “dominant ethnic group that controlled
the government there for more than two centuries” (Barfield, 2007, p.8). The
earlier Afghan nationalism was originally invigorated by “newly-emerging Pash-
tun intellectual circles” which were “influenced by a German National Socialist
ideology, which gained momentum in Afghanistan during the 1930s and the
early 1940s” (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.100). Based on this ideology also the
Afghan press described Pashtuns as being “the “Aryans of the East”, as “the sole
civilized nation” amidst a “sea of barbarian people” ”. (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004,
p.100).
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The more recent Pashtun ethno-nationalist assertions are directed not only
against Islamabad but also against radical Islamists who “have undermined eth-
nic and tribal unity through their emphasis on a global pan-Islamic identity”
which conflicts the Pashtun nationalists’ notion “that Pashtun identity is rooted
in traditions older than Islam.” (Barfield, 2007, p.8).
Advocates of the creation of a Pashtun nation see the Indus as being its
natural eastern boundary, a claim that would carve out “more than half of
Pakistan’s territory.” (Barfield, 2007, p.18). Pakistan has claimed legal title to
the lands east of the line since its very foundation, stating the prerogative as a
legal successor of British India. Therefore Pakistan is not inclinable to negotiate
the border at all, although, like the British, they never prevailed to impose any
direct governmental authority or national state laws “in the old Tribal Agencies,
now renamed the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)”63 (Barfield,
2007, p.4). In short: the fact that Pakistan is unable to exercise state power
over the FATA region or its people further complicates the border issue since
“the recognition of a state’s legal title to a territory assumes it has both the
will and the ability to exert its authority over it.” (Barfield, 2007, p.5). On the
other hand, locals seem to be somewhat satisfied with the border issue not being
resolved since this disaccord facilitates their repudiation of state authority in
general - no matter where it is intended to be exercised from (Barfield, 2007,
p.6).
3.3 Preliminary Events to the Soviet Intervention
Throughout the decades leading up to the Soviet invasion Afghanistan was
ruled by members of the Muhammadzai branch of the Barakzai who were re-
lated to Dost Mohammed Khan (1826 - 1839 and 1843 - 1863). Nadir Shah
(1929 - 1933)64, a successful commander during the Third Anglo-Afghan War,
proclaimed a new constitution in 1931, defining Afghanistan as a constitutional
monarchy. He founded the first Afghan university in Kabul in 1931/32, invested
in infrastructure and continued some of Amanullah’s reforms. His influence was
based on the tribes who first enabled his ascendency to the throne and on the
“urban classes” who were “most interested in the development of a secular state”
(Tapper, 1983, p.37). Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1933 and succeeded by
63They include “seven semi-autonomous agencies previously created by the British (Bajaur,
Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, South Waziristan, and North Waziristan) as well as
the NWFP tribal areas adjoining Peshawar (Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan) (Barfield,
2007, p.4).
64His great grandfather was Dost Mohammed Khan’s brother.
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his 19-year-old son Zahir Shah whose reign lasted until a successful coup against
him in 1973 removed him from power65. He was ousted by his first cousin and
brother-in-law Muhammad Daoud Khan who had served as secretary of defense,
ambassador to France, commander of the Afghan armed forces and prime minis-
ter (1953 - 1963) (Shahrani, 2002, p.719). The coup took place while Zahir Shah
received medical treatment in Italy. Muhammad Daoud ended the monarchy,
proclaimed Afghanistan to be a republic and himself to be its president. King
Zahir Shah, officially resigned in order to avoid a bloody civil war66.
To explain these events, which will turn out to set the parameters for the So-
viet involvement in Afghanistan, let me go back in time once more: Afghanistan
joined the United Nations in 1946 and due to the British withdrawal from In-
dia after the Second World War, Afghans sought to gain economic assistance
from other sources and turned to the United States, “who reluctantly became
involved” (Tapper, 1983, p.37f). Daoud, holding influential positions also be-
fore becoming prime minister, tended to rely less on tribal diplomacy in order to
control tribes but rather on modern weapons and a strengthening of the armed
forces. He tried to spur revolts in western Pakistan, contesting the Durand Line
and promoting a greater Pashtunistan, attempts which all in all failed. After
some fruitless efforts to gain military aid from the United States he turned to
the Soviet Union67. They willingly provided not only military equipment but
also advisors and training programs for the armed forces and built a strong
influence particularly “in the tank corps and the air force” which would “grow
and eventually surface as political power in 1978” (Tapper, 1983, p.38). Even
though his alignment with the Soviet Union was dubious to many (except for
very meagre pro-Soviet leftist groups) he was widely respected by Afghans for
his accomplishments “in attracting subsidies and aid for public projects” and
for his ability to preserve public order, notwithstanding the sometimes brutal
repression he employed (Tapper, 1983, p.38). In 1963 he had to leave power: Za-
hir Shah wanted to ease tensions with Pakistan and decided to sacrifice Daoud,
65Born in 1915 Zahir Shah was the last king of Afghanistan. He died in 2007 after reentering
Afghan politics in 2002. He had spent 29 years in exile in Italy and was considered to be a
rival candidate to the US-backed Hamid Karzai, ready to be appointed king again by a loya
jirga, or to lead the nation as president. Though highly respected by many he could not garner
enough support to really threaten Karzai’s rise to power.
66Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah and Daoud Khan formed “the so-called Musahiban-dynasty”
(Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.100).
67The Great Game had swapped actors and turned into the Cold War, now the US and the
Soviet Union battled for influence throughout the world. The US provided agricultural aid
since the Truman era, a policy that was intensified, especially for Helmand province under
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (Cullather, 2002, p.530).
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the outspoken and militarily active opponent to the Durand Line as Pakistan’s
western border. The following decade was strongly influenced by Zahir Shah’s
new constitution, “marking a shift of power from the monarch to the urban elite,
together with an accommodation to traditional tribal and rural leadership in the
elected parliament.” (Tapper, 1983, p.38). The king actively sought to establish
a stronger involvement of the United States in order to counterbalance grow-
ing Soviet advances. Bureaucratic inefficiencies, increasing corruption and the
nonperformance of food aid to central and north-western parts of the country
which were stricken by droughts and subsequent famine (1970 - 1972) did not
suffice to create major political opposition to Zahir Shah. It was the political
left which had used the new freedoms provided by Zahir Shah’s constitution to
build a powerful organization. By these means it was able to pass on ample
subsidies received from the Soviets and to maintain its strong influence in the
armed forces. Yet, the left’s power was unproportionally sparsely reflected in
other government institutions or the parliament, where it held a numerically
fairly negligible amount of seats. With its leverage expanding, the left managed
to install Daoud as president in the almost bloodless 1973 overthrow, which is
described by Tapper as more of a palace coup than a revolution (Tapper, 1983,
p.39). The political climate was tense: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had become Pak-
istani prime minister the same year (after already being president since 1971)
and Pakistan had lost the Indo-Pakistani winter war of 197168. This embarrass-
ing defeat might have contributed to the aggressive posturing of Bhutto along
the Durand Line and coincided with renewed Afghan calls for the creation of
a Pashtunistan, abnegating the lawfulness of the border and its engagement in
covert operations in the NWFP - which, as mentioned above, matched with
Daoud’s long held position on the topic (Tapper, 1983, p.39). The frontier issue
taking center stage in a foreign policy conflict also facilitated the Soviet Union
portraying itself as Afghanistan’s staunchest ally, countering the strong relation
between Bhutto and US-President Nixon. Soon though Daoud attempted to
reduce his satellization from the Soviets and dependency on the Afghan left by
starting negotiations with Bhutto. Their first of several meetings in Kabul and
Pakistan was facilitated and negotiated by Shah Reza Pahlavi (Wahidi-Wardak,
68Pakistan had started the war with a preemptive strike against Indian airbases in the so-
called ‘Operation Chengiz Khan’. The war lasted only for 13 days and resulted in 2 to 3 million
dead civilians, 8 to 10 million people fleeing to India and the secession of eastern Pakistan,
called Bangladesh from then on. Pakistan’s population was reduced by almost 50%, one third
of the military was imprisoned by India and the Pakistani surrender had become even more
humiliating due to the relative ease with which India had so outright defeated them.
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1990, p.97). The Russians and Indians were wary of the rapprochement between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The former particularly because Daoud tried to get
rid of communist Parchamis in influential positions at the time (Wahidi-Wardak,
1990, p.98). Shortly before arriving at an agreement Bhutto was overthrown by
Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq in 197769.
Daoud attempted to Pashtunize Afghanistan. For example he “prohibited
the use of ethnic surnames and ethnonymes, and put an end to a modest plurilin-
gualism on the national radio, where only Pashtu and Dari were to be used”
(Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 2000, p.421). Minority groups were regu-
larly exposed to suppressive government authorities. Yet in the 1970’s some eas-
ing of this policies acknowledged the right to cultural self-expression for Uzbeks
and Baluchs for a brief period of time (Tapper, 1988, p.26). Daoud hoped to
achieve something like a ‘national integration’ of Afghanistan’s “heterogeneous
populations” based on the concept that “economic and political development
would bring the withering of cultural, regional and tribal distinctions.” (Tap-
per, 1988, p.25). At the same time he was “avoiding direct political involvement
at local levels” and, as his predecessors, “tried to create a consensus [. . . ] with
the Pashtun tribal chiefs, the ulema and leaders of the various non-tribal groups”
(Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.100).
It is important to remember that in Afghanistan “the state’s finances re-
mained primarily dependent upon foreign subsidies” (Hager, 1983, p.106). Daoud
therefore tried to reach out to Americans again but “post-Vietnam, post-Watergate
America gave no diplomatic priority to Afghanistan and made little effort to
counter growing Soviet influence.” (Tapper, 1983, p.39)70. This would change
in 1979 under President Jimmy Carter, especially through strategies developed
by his still famous national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (Prados, 2002,
p.467). Until then though, Daoud turned to the American proxy in the region,
Shah Reza Pahlavi, who was willing to assist in curbing the left’s influence
and allocate some of Iran’s oil wealth to this cause. Soon the Persian Shah
was “forced to cut back expenditure” (Tapper, 1983, p.39). In early 1978 Iran
was already caught up in the beginnings of its own revolution-to-come. Being
abandoned by the Shah amidst worsening political and economic circumstances
in Afghanistan further isolated Daoud internationally and within the country.
69After Zia-ul-Haq had gained control over the court judging Bhutto in a homicide case,
the latter, while still very popular among Pakistanis and thus a potential danger to the new
leaders, was sentenced to death and executed in April 1979.
70Henry Kissinger’s priorities were apparently set on latin and middle America as well as
East-Timor.
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At the end of April 1978, as a reaction to mass demonstrations incited by the
communist people’s party (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan; PDPA),
Muhammad Daoud decided to try to curtail the left on his own. This caused
“the armed forces, led by the Soviet-dominated tank corps and air force” to
strike against him in the so-called Saur Revolution71, killing Daoud and his en-
tire family within their Kabul palace and thus bringing to an end nearly 250
years of Durrani rule.
4 The Soviet Intervention, 1978 - 1989
For the last 250 years Afghanistan “has known hardly any periods of peace”,
but this new conflict resulted “in an unprecedented level of violence” (Monsutti,
2010, p.55). Afghanistan was now officially called the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan (DRA). The new government was formed by the PDPA which
consisted mainly of a small urban elite which was soon entangled in internal
rivalries. The party might have had 10.000 members at the most, “roughly
comparable to a smaller border tribe” and “no more than 3,000 troops were
actually engaged in fighting on both sides during the two-day coup.” (Hager,
1983, p.110). The part of the armed forces loyal to the PDPA was, from a mil-
itary organizational point of view, clearly not able to control the country and
was soon reinforced by about 6000 Soviet military and civilian advisors (Hager,
1983, p.110). The two main opposing factions inside the PDPA were formed by
rather radical students and non-Durrani Pashtuns of the so-called Khalqi fac-
tion, claiming a ‘true proletarian revolution’ under the lead of Nur Muhammad
Taraki and Hafizullah Amin on the one side. On the other side there was the
Parchami faction, headed by Babrak Karmal and constituted by “middle-class
intellectual Tajiks and Persian-speaking Pashtuns” who “followed their Soviet
mentors’ line in labeling the revolution ‘national democratic’.” (Tapper, 1983,
p.40)72. They split the most important posts among them. Amin became prime
minister and Taraki president, and Karmal was neutralized through his nomi-
nation as ambassador to Prague.
71It was called Saur Revolution because it took place in the lunar month of Saur (Taurus)
which is the second month of the Iranian calendar, 21st of April - 21st of May (Gossman,
2001, p.9).
72There were also some minor factions or ‘sects’ like the Setami Milli, who kidnapped
the US-ambassador to Kabul, Adolph Dubs, in 1979 in order to free their political leader
Badruddin Bahes. The government refused to negotiate and Dubs was killed in the Kabul
Hotel where he was held. Setami Milli was marginalized for some years but their militias
later played an important role in fighting Ahmad Shah Mahsud in the north (Prados, 2002,
p.467).
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According to Richard Tapper some commentators perceived this Afghan rev-
olution as another manifestation of an enduring conflict between Durrani and
Ghilzai. Many members of the new cabinet where Ghilzai, as well as Taraki and
Amin, a fact which was also “used to canvas support in the Ghilzai homeland
between Kandahar and Ghazni” (Tapper, 1983, p.40). There is some evidence
though that the alleged tribal conflict was not a dominant factor: even though
also these new actors would assign numerous family members to important posts
(which by the way brought forward mutual charges of nepotism which was con-
sidered inconsistent with a socialist agenda). Their almost entirely urban po-
litical base73 ideologically “rejected tribal organisation as backward or ‘feudal” ’
(Hager, 1983, p.108). Government officials, always dressed in Western, modern
clothes “did not hesitate to express their feelings of superiority” and considered
the “traditionally dressed, turban-wearing residents of rural Afghanistan” to be
an embarrassment in their “backward” ways (Barfield, 1981, p.161).
The revolution enjoyed substantial popular approval at its very start, fueled
by peasants and laborers working for suppressive Pashtun landlords becoming
increasingly cognizant of common class interests. The communist party be-
gan an extensive propaganda operation aimed at casting “traditional khans and
religious leaders as ‘feudal’ lords responsible for keeping the Afghan masses en-
slaved and impoverished”74 (Edwards, 1998, p.716). Until then “objective class
positions (based on occupation or relation to the means of production) had not
commanded “loyalties stronger than those to qaum, watan, or mazhab” (Tapper,
1989, p.237). The new government put some reforms in place, pursuing secu-
larization, “land reform, cancellation of rural debt, and abolition of brideprice”
as well as an emphasis on education, building schools for boys and girls, raising
the age for marriages and many other changes they hoped would prove pop-
ular75 (Tapper, 1983, p.40). PDPA-leaders, notably Taraki, avoided to speak
73There are some reliable numbers from 1986 indicating that 69% of the 111,000 party
members were from Kabul (Giustozzi, 2000, p.11).
74One reason why this strategy might not have worked out is that “it was common for the
wealthy [. . . ] to reinvest their profits in [. . . ] maintaining a cohort of allies and followers”
(Edwards, 1998, p.717). The wealthy khans were obliged by tradition to redistribute parts
of their wealth, for example through maintaining a guesthouse for the village, “various ritual
acts of redistribution” and through supporting allies in need (Edwards, 1998, p.718). Being
a khan itself already implies generosity “and so long they fulfilled societal expectations [. . . ]
few begrudged them their good fortune” (Edwards, 1998, p.718). See also p.42 and p.43 for
more information.
75David B. Edwards argues that a “far more radical” innovation than these policies was the
notion “that kinship didn’t matter, that literally anyone could lead the nation.” (Edwards,
2002, p.22). The pedigrees of the new leadership were unknown to most Afghans. “In a society
where family background mattered a great deal” and was constitutive for a man’s identity this
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of ‘communism’ since it was viewed to be irreconcilable with Islam and prefer-
ably used the label ‘socialism’ and “paid lip-service to both Islam and tribal
values” in order to attenuate the growing alienation with key players (Hager,
1983, p.108). Otherwise the government was “fatally ignorant of affairs in the
countryside” and of tribal power balances(Tapper, 1983, p.39). “Despite offers
of free land and the government’s promise to cancel outstanding debts” the ru-
ral populations grew increasingly dissatisfied with the new leaders and “village
after village initiated attacks against government offices, schools, and military
posts” (Edwards, 1998, p.716). What is seen as women’s rights issues nowa-
days was perceived by tribesmen as an infringement on their namus (see also:
p.39)76. More specifically, Glatzer stated his sources would claim not opposing
girl schools or education for women per se, but objected to the force applied
in the implementation and decried the latter as contradicting their obligation
to protect female and household honor (Glatzer, 2000, p.95). Or as Glatzer
put it: “the state’s transgression of the line between the public and the private
(namus) meant war.” (Glatzer, 1998, p.5). Ironically, the PDPA and their So-
viet patrons had calculated on expanding their social base by enabling female
emancipation77 (Giustozzi, 2000, p.20).
Due to the unapologetic fashion displayed while introducing these reforms,
the exceeding brutality in the communist’s handling of opponents and due to the
increasing Soviet presence, resistance augmented. The old monarchistic, urban
elites on the contrary “were more likely to flee to the West than to engage in
resistance.” (Barnett, 1995, p.185). Though notoriously disunited, opposition
groups formed in urban centers as well as in rural areas all over the country
(Tapper, 1983, p.40). Coming from different backgrounds they pursued quite
distinct goals: the frontier tribes of the Afghan-Pakistan border received ex-
tensive coverage in Western media, fighting in the name of Islam and with the
ambition to restore Pashtun dominance (Tapper, 1983, p.41). Other Pashtun
tribes have sought to accommodate with the regime and displayed a rather am-
biguous attitude in face of the new rulers in Kabul. Despite some of the fiercest
incertitude was a major change (Edwards, 2002, p.22).
76According to Edwards the highlighting of women’s rights as a main issue instantly after
coming to power was one of the biggest strategic errors of the regime. “The education, empow-
erment, and politicization of women promised to be a multigenerational struggle.” (Edwards,
2002, p.52)
77The number of girls and women in schools and workforce increased during the first five
years of Soviet occupation. Primary school enrollment rates for females rose from 8% to 14%
and in secondary schools from 2% to 5%. Male enrollment rates fell from 44% to 27% in
primary schools and from 13% to 11% in secondary schools. In 1986 about “270,000 women
held jobs, compared to only 5,000 in 1978” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.21).
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Islamic opposition groups, namely Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks received consid-
erable aid from several Muslim countries and especially (since 1979) from Iran,
according to Tapper, there was not a great appetite within Afghanistan to estab-
lish an Islamic Republic (Tapper, 1983, p.41). Yet the explicit goal to roll back
the Soviet atheism was an important rallying cry 78. Edwards interpreted these
events in a slightly different way. He disagreed with Tapper and Ahmed who
said the presence of menacing, foreign, infidel intruders had caused the occur-
rence of an “atavistic” Islamic spirit (Edwards, 1998, p.719). Instead he stated
that conversations with his informants lead him to believe that “a deep sense of
dread and uncertainty” was “generated by the sudden appearance of helicopters,
MiG jets, and artillery barrages.” (Edwards, 1998, p.719). The modern mili-
tary hardware and the “realities of high-tech modern warfare” caused a “crisis in
confidence” (Edwards, 1998, p.719). Old but still strong ideals of heroism and
behavior in battle did not make sense anymore. “Islam helped to fill this void”
and particularly “the promise of immortality and eternal paradise” resonated
forcefully among fighters (Edwards, 1998, p.719).
In 1979 a tribal rebellion started and spread from Nuristan, “one of the least
accessible regions of Afghanistan” in the northeast of Kabul, and “spread to
neighbouring Pashtun tribes and other parts of the country, eventually forc-
ing the PDPA to call in substantial reinforcements of Soviet troops.” (Hager,
1983, p.110). Meanwhile, the government was embroiled in extensive infighting.
Over the years several thousand officials of the rivaling parties were arrested
and later reports accounted that “gunfights have taken place in high-level gov-
ernment and party meetings” (Collins, 1990, p.182). Assassination attempts
and intrigues involving the factions’ competition for Leonid Brezhnev’s and the
Moscow Politburo’s support were the order of the day. This climate resulted in
Taraki being assassinated “by his former disciple and successor Hafizullah Amin”
in October 197979 (Edwards, 2002, p.18). Finally Amin, who had asked for sup-
78For instance the Shiite Hazara were strongly supported by Iran but not “doctrinally com-
mitted to” Khomeini (Tapper, 1983, p.41). There were many more opposition groups, such
as maoist union members, supported by China, Baluchs, Brahuis and others which I can not
fully list or describe in this paper.
79Taraki had just come back from a trip to Cuba and the Soviet Union, where he had met
Brezhnev. Amin had been afraid for a while, that Taraki would conspire against him. When
an informant within the Taraki camp, Sayyid Daud Tarun, told Amin that Brezhnev had
agreed to form a new coalition between Taraki and Karmal, which would have meant the
ouster of Amin, the latter saw the time come for a political killing. Shortly after Taraki’s
return to Kabul, Amin was summoned to a meeting at the Politburo in a Kabul palace. The
suspicious Amin agreed to go there only after Soviet advisers and the Soviet ambassador had
assured him it was safe. It turned out to be a trap anyway, Amin escaped an intense gun
battle, returned with some units of the armed forces and the Interior ministry and managed to
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port through Soviet armed forces, and 200 of his personal guards were killed by
Spetsnaz, the Soviet special forces, during Operation Storm-333 at the end of
December 1979. Soviet ground forces had begun to move into Afghanistan from
the north, with an initial force level of 80.000 soldiers. It was soon raised to
100.000 by massive air transportation of military hardware and troops directly
to Kabul. Later on troop levels would be raised to 120.000 Soviet army troops
(complemented by 40.000 Afghans), supported by “another 50.000 air force and
support troops in the southern part of the Soviet Union” (Collins, 1990, p.183).
Babrak Karmal was called back to Afghanistan and installed as president
and prime minister while resistance increased and the communists’ Afghan and
Soviet troops fully engaged in war against the mujahedin guerrilla (Centlivres
und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.71). Karmal had the circumstances of Taraki’s
death published, resulting in the latter achieving the status of a ‘martyr’ for the
revolution and Amin being described as ‘hangman’ (Edwards, 2002, p.56). In
this “very first period of the Soviet intervention a sense of relief prevailed among
the Afghan population, as at least the bloody dictatorship of Amin had ended”
(Giustozzi, 2000, p.10). Still, the resistance across most parts of the population
was soon to increase.
The US administration under President Carter had already been alarmed
about the developments of the recent months and had started funding and
equipping mujahedin groups by July of 1979, a program in which they would
invest billions of dollars over the next decade. The secret CIA program to fund,
train and arm mujahedin was called Operation Cyclone and was intensified
under President Reagan80. Estimates about the total cost range from 4 billion
to 40 billion dollars. The CIA even provided (more than two thousand) Stinger
secretly arrest Taraki. The Soviet ambassador, Mr. Puzanov was warned to leave the country
and was later replaced by Moscow with Mr. Tabeyev (Wahidi-Wardak, 1990, p.101). Amin
spread rumors that Taraki was seriously ill, soon thereafter newspapers reported he had died
after long suffering. Sayyid Daud Tarun disappeared as well, besides informations about his
burial in a family graveyard nothing is known about the circumstances (Edwards, 2002, p.56).
Some sources claim, Tarum was killed when he threw himself in front of Amin to protect him
from gunfire during the ambush at the palace (Wahidi-Wardak, 1990, p.101). An account of
the officer who was charged with killing Taraki, Lieutenant Muhammad Iqbal, can be found in
Edward’s 2002 publication which depicts the murder in great detail. Nevertheless, the Soviets
wanted to pursue their plan of a coalition with Karmal, which meant they had to get rid of
Amin (Edwards, 2002, p.56). Amin was still convinced that the major concentration of Soviet
military forces at the northern border was “nothing to worry about as the Soviets were good
friends of Afghanistan” (Wahidi-Wardak, 1990, p.102).
80The Reagan Doctrine “increased US support of anticommunist insurgencies against Soviet-
backed regimes in various parts of the Third World”, the president referred to the mujahedin
mainly as “freedom fighters” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.342).
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missiles81 and cooperated with MI6 and SAS from Britain, with Saudi Arabia,
but first and foremost with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) - which
also provided training facilities82. Over 100.000 mujahedin were trained that
way. General Zia ul-Haq “was more than eager to oblige the Americans, not only
to obtain US economic aid but also to bolster the legitimacy of his military rule”
after ousting the “democratically elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto”
(Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.343). In addition, Pakistan was now locked
between enemy powers along its two longest borders (more than 2400 km with
Afghanistan and over 2900 km with India), and confronted with an adversarial or
even hostile Shiite Iran. Therefore the control of the Afghan resistance was also
in Pakistan’s geostrategic interest not only as fighters who would cause trouble
for any enemy but also increasing their leverage in diplomatic confrontations83
(Matinuddin, 1990, p.220, and Kepel, 2002, p.3, p.11). Saudi Arabia is said
to have contributed at least 3 billion dollars, coming up to their reputation of
being “lavish funders of anti-leftist forces around the globe” (Hirschkind und
Mahmood, 2002, p.342). The whole effort was lead by a Cold War mentality
which aimed at harassing and containing the Soviets at all cost (Hirschkind
und Mahmood, 2002, p.342). “While the war was waged in Afghanistan, it
was in fact an international conflict between superpowers which ended with the
collapse of the Soviet Union” (Rzehak, 2011, p.21). The Islamic groups had been
very successful “in gaining foreign support or recognition” and subsequently “no
foreign power [. . . ] supported secular or nationalist leaders.” (?, p.193). The
constant flow of aid and resources to Islamist groups might have contributed to
the growing identification and alignment of resistance fighters which formerly
did not care so much about religious ideology, with those groups. “Pressures
of the war also led some commanders who had been traditionalists to defect
to the Islamist parties.” (Barnett, 1995, p.228). Several attempts by Pashtun-
dominated monarchists and secular nationalists to establish a Loya Jirga (see
81Americans later grew alarmed by the extremism that they had helped to create and arm
and tried to get the missiles back. They invested 65 million dollars and got about 200 of them
back (Prados, 2002, p.471).
82Besides Pakistan’s geostrategic interest, many observers viewed its engagement in the
insurgency as part of a larger ‘proxy war’ between Sunni Pakistan and Shiite Iran (Shahrani,
2002, p.716).
83The Soviets, aware of and discontent with Pakistan’s role, threatened that there could be a
military confrontation if Zia ul-Haq’s government continues its support of the mujahedin. Mr.
Kapitsa, then Deputy Foreign Minister said that “if they continue to support the ‘bandits’,
Pakistan will be taught such a lesson that it will not forget it for a hundred years” (Matinuddin,
1990, p.227). At the same time the Soviets financed “individual tribal people to sow the seed of
hatred among the refugees and the people of Pakistan” and to have infiltrated refugee camps
as well as Pakistani security forces (Weinbaum, 1990, p.205, p.211).
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p.81 for explanation) in Pakistani exile failed and ultimately “dissolved when
the Saudi religious establishment prevailed upon King Fahd to maintain support
only for the Islamist groups”84 (Barnett, 1995, p.195). The internationalization
of the conflict gave mujahedin the feeling to be “global players” of tremendous
importance (Rzehak, 2011, p.21). For more information about the implications
of this massive influx of military and economic aid to Islamists see also chapter
4.3.
The PDPA-government continued to lose legitimacy among more and more
tribes. Especially the presence of foreign troops provoked strong reactions
among the Afghan population (Giustozzi, 2000, p.10). Yet, not only the fact
that the PDPA had called in foreign troops contributed to the resistance, par-
ticularly the “unprecedented destruction in the tribal areas” forced local popu-
lations to react (Hager, 1983, p.109). Additionally, the regime in Kabul had to
rely increasingly on the Soviet troops, since its own army was “being depleted
by defections and desertions, besides the attrition of war.” (Hager, 1983, p.109).
Especially the officer class of the army suffered massive desertions. “For they
were more nationalist than Islamist” most officers “had been comparatively loyal
so long as” they received their orders from an Afghan government(Roy, 1986,
p.119). They strongly opposed the invasion and could not stand “the idea that
in the future they would have to be advised by arrogant Soviet officers.” (Roy,
1986, p.119).
There are indications that the Soviet leadership initially attempted to achieve
political accommodation with influential tribes. However, their “perceived hos-
tility to Islam” and their failure to emulate British strategies which combined
“occasional show of force in punitive expeditions, subsidies and tribal politics
conducted through political agents” and which maintained “a tolerable modus
vivendi with the tribes on their side of the Durand line for nearly a century”
prohibited a constructive rapprochement (Hager, 1983, p.109). Especially the
brutality and “ruthlessness with which the Soviet military” acted and which
“seemed aimed at rapid pacification” (compare the modern shock and awe - strat-
egy) would backfire “badly in a protracted conflict with tribesmen, for whom
the blood feud is a cultural imperative.” (Hager, 1983, p.114).
84Wealthy Arabs were impressed by Afghan Islamic leaders such as Abdur Rasul Sayyaf,
who sympathized with Wahhabism, and were “eager to bankroll the Afghan jihad” with their
oil money(Edwards, 2002, p.154). Inter alia they used the Saudi Red Crescent to channel
funds to Afghan and Pakistani Islamists. Later on economic support for the “nonmilitary
needs of the fighters” especially from Norway, Denmark, Sweden and France increased, and
“the USAID effort ultimately dwarfed the others.” (Barnett, 1995, p.231f).
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The jihad now proclaimed not only by Afghans but by most Muslim coun-
tries, no matter if Sunni or Shiite, facilitated the traditional role Islam performs
in “transcending the tribal order” (Hager, 1983, p.113). Yet, “the bulk of the ji-
hadi movement was initially represented by local notables, naturally disinclined
to accept the ideologisation of jihad as Islamic revolution, sponsored by the
Islamists” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.43).
The Afghan jihad soon became the banner of a newly formed transnational
political Islam. Muslim fighters from many Arab countries joined the cause.
Despite “their intense devotion to Islam, Afghans, by and large, had no great
fondness for Arabs” and their cooperation in jihad did not change that (Ed-
wards, 2002, p.156). They were perceived as “overbearing and insensitive” to
tribal traditions and loyalties such as respecting elders or being considerate
of civilian populations in combat zones (Edwards, 2002, p.156). Furthermore,
the Arab mujahedin were ill-reputed among Afghans for being extraordinar-
ily ruthless and they were seen as “zealots who had come to Afghanistan to
prove a point and build their movement” but “had no particular affection or
respect for the people living in the country where they were fighting” (Edwards,
2002, p.156). Afghans portrayed a strong preference “for homegrown versions
of Islamic radicalism” and rejected religio-political influence of foreign Islamic
ideologues, “particularly those branded as Wahhabis” (Edwards, 2002, p.157).
Among Pashtuns the ideology of jihad, functioning as a lubricant for the
temporal display of outward unity, quite effectively protected tribal organiza-
tions from being penetrated and manipulated by the communists’ intelligence
services which attempted to use traditional rivalries between qaum (see p.23
for definition) to turn tribes on each other (Roy, 1986, p.178). The official
Islamic terminology also superseded the traditional terminology of the Pash-
tunwali. Since it was no more a battle of only Pashtuns, the fighters were not
called arbaki or turialai (see also p.44 and p.42) anymore (Glatzer, 2000, p.100).
Instead they called themselves mujahedin (literally: ‘those who fight the jihad ’).
Not only the fighters who were killed, and who in Islamic view became mar-
tyrs, obtained religious titles such as shahid (‘the one who attested to his faith’)
but also refugees and their hosts housing them were called muhajer (like the
prophet during his emigration to Medina) and ansar (like the prophet’s friends
in Medina) (Glatzer, 2000, p.100). Even though the shahid is promised to enter
paradise without disquisition of his sins, the Pashtun mujahedin preferred to
portray themselves as ghazi (victorious fighters and conquerors for Islam) be-
cause their traditional concept of turá (being a warrior, courage, sword, see also
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p.42) rather corresponds with being confident of victory than with self-sacrifice
(Glatzer, 2000, p.101). The jihad, as a holy war for Islam, has “to be conducted
irrespective of success” and represents, according to Prophet Mohammed’s words
in the Koran, the highest stage of being a Muslim, which “only the best of them
attain”(Ahmed, 1983a, p.94 and p.97). Evidence for the growing politicization
of Islam was produced by Muslim leaders from many countries, one of the most
powerful, Ayatollah Khomeini, stated in view of the Afghan war that “today
Islam is confronting the super-powers” (Hager, 1983, p.113). Notwithstanding
this growing influence of a potentially uniting Islamic political ideology, the Is-
lamists were split in various rivaling factions. The “challenging geography of the
country [. . . ] made command and control of insurgent groups difficult” (Gius-
tozzi, 2009b, p.43). The Islamist parties were able to improve control over the
battle groups associated with them with the “introduction of long-range radios
in the early 1980s” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.43).
The factional struggle within the ruling PDPA continued despite the Moscow
Politburo’s calls for unity (Giustozzi, 2000, p.81). The Khalq and Parcham
factions were competing for influence especially in the security sector since this
granted “control over means of violence” (Kipping, 2010, p.10). With the Khalqi
dominating the army and police, the Parchami (led by Karmal and later his
successor Najibullah) decided to build a security force they could control exclu-
sively: under the patronage of the KGB they established “the notorious secret
service KhAD (Khedamat-e ettela’at-e doulat or ‘State Information Service’)”
which “progressively grew to become the most effective and feared security force
of the regime”85 (Kipping, 2010, p.10). The KhAD not only controlled potential
opposition in urban centers but it likewise “infiltrated mujahedin groups, pro-
vided military intelligence, and directly participated in fighting” in a way that
caused mujahedin groups to fear “KhAD more than they feared the Soviet army”
(Kipping, 2010, p.10). In its function as a “political police”, the KhAD activities
led to the arrest of at least “150,000 people before 1990” and the execution of
more than 8,000 until 1988 (Giustozzi, 2000, p.99). The Parcham-faction of the
PDPA did not even shy away from derailing the Soviets numerous attempts to
“decisively strengthen the Afghan army” in order to prohibit a growing influence
of their rivaling faction, the Khalq (Kipping, 2010, p.10). The Afghan army’s
infantry divisions were mere “paper entities: the different subunits did not have
any contact among each other and not contact existed between them and the
85In its best times it was estimated to be at a force level of 40.000 men (Collins, 1990,
p.182).
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divisional command either” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.77). In short, the Afghan army
suffered from a “high degree of internal disorganization [. . . ] coupled with low
morale” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.76). Therefore the Afghan “military operations were
particularly ineffective before 1983” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.71). Nevertheless, the
Afghan army was somewhat recovering and “the military situation stabilised
aroung 1983 and remained relatively unchanged until the Soviet withdrawal”
(Kipping, 2010, p.7).
The implication of an effective counter-insurgency strategy “in such a large
and rugged country was in itself a difficult task” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.76). At
the time, “neither the Karmal government nor the Soviets had the skills or
the ground knowledge to deal successfully with the grassroots”, tribal uprisings
(Giustozzi, 2000, p.120). The original strategy of the Soviets “seems to have
been to cleanse district by district with more or less massive military sweeps,
a tactic of doubtful appropriateness to guerrilla wars” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.71).
This decision was based in the fact that a permanent presence in the countryside
would have required enormous manpower and would have implied not only a
heavy financial burden but also an immense strain on the military. The strategy
did not work out. After the Soviets moved out of a district, the insurgents would
come back in and take power again. Until that moment about half of the foreign
troops had been “busy with garrison duties and with the protection of economic
assets” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.71). These circumstances soon led to a change in
strategy. The Soviet leadership then engaged in a so-called “enclave strategy”,
concentrating their military and civilian capacities on urban population cen-
ters (Kipping, 2010, p.15). Contemporaneously, they tried to strengthen their
influence by financing and arming local militias in rural areas, totaling an esti-
mated maximum number of 200,000 men countrywide (Giustozzi, 2000, p.199).
These militias proved to be quite unreliable though, oftentimes acting indepen-
dently and ignoring orders from the regime. Soon the “payments were stopped
and the militias were asked to return the weapons, but they refused to comply”
(Giustozzi, 2000, p.199). Many militiamen then joined the mujahedin resistance
movement which was directed by Islamist parties in Pakistani exile (see p.89 for
more information) (Giustozzi, 2000, p.199).
It is not clear though whether this approach was a “genuine strategy” or
simply an adaption to limited resources (Kipping, 2010, p.2 and p.10). Yet,
whatever the Soviet and Afghan military activities achieved “depended mostly
on the sheer display of brute force and on the attrition which derived from it”
(Giustozzi, 2000, p.72).
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The socialist regime controlled about 20% of the Afghan territory during
the day. At night their grip “shrunk to the 25 largest cities, the main trans-
port routes, and industrial areas” (Kipping, 2010, p.7). A little bit more than
30% of the territory were contested and the mujahedin controlled about 50%
of Afghanistan. This translated to about 5,500 villages out of 35,500 being
controlled by the regime (Giustozzi, 2000, p.17). These villages were mostly
those which were located close to “the main towns and roads” (Giustozzi, 2000,
p.17). “Thus, by far the largest part of the territory stayed beyond control of
the government.” (Kipping, 2010, p.7). Already by February 1980 most of the
roads throughout the country were under control of the resistance (Giustozzi,
2000, p.10). This lack of control over large areas also expressed itself in a steep
decline of tax revenue. Until 1978, the government had taken in about 280
million Afghanis in tax revenue per year. The amount had fallen to 16 million
Afghanis in 1981, which is why “the government was not even able to pay its
provincial employees” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.10).
The government tried to secure order in cities and maintain support from
urban populations by applying “generous social policies”, subsidizing “energy
and water supply, health services, public transport”, as well as a very popu-
lar “coupon system” providing “access to subsidised food and consumer goods
from state-run cooperatives” and by providing “public housing for government
employees” (Kipping, 2010, p.8). To relieve some of the military strain of the
government and the Soviets, the PDPA sought to accommodate with muja-
hedin leaders by producing so-called ‘protocols’: this policy consisted of cease-
fire agreements “and a commitment by the respective mujahedin commanders
to deny other mujahedin groups” which “were still fighting access to their terri-
tory.” (Kipping, 2010, p.9). In exchange the government provided money, “mili-
tary hardware and granted de facto autonomy to the respective area.” (Kipping,
2010, p.9). This practice was amplified under Mohammad Najibullah’s leader-
ship who had succeeded Babrak Karmal in 1986 and who established it as a
main pillar of his ‘Policy of National Reconciliation’. By the summer of 1988
the commanders of about “50,000 mujahedin fighters had signed” those proto-
cols and “commanders of another 60,000 fighters were about to sign”86 (Kipping,
2010, p.9). The combination of this accommodation, rich social subsidies and
86After the Soviet withdrawal Najibullah continued this policy which contributed to the
fact that his regime could stay in power after the Soviet withdrawal. By the turn of the year
1991/92 about three quarters of commanders had signed on to this approach (Kipping, 2010,
p.9).
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“high military expenditures” enabled the regime to “consolidate [. . . ] in the ur-
ban areas”, though at the cost of relinquishing the control of a substantial part
of the Afghan territory (Kipping, 2010, p.9).
The nations supporting the mujahedin (most notably the USA, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Pakistan) relied to a great extent on Pakistan to function as
an intermediary. Pakistan had not fully established its new military rule, was
wary of its own inner potential for uprisings and the inconstancy of US-support.
They allowed the stream of weapons to take its route but imposed “a quantitative
and qualitative limit” on them. This meant that weapons “must not exceed a
certain calibre (14.5mm for machine-guns and 82 mm for mortars) and were
limited to “a ceiling [. . . ] on the degree of technological sophistication” - which
barred certain kinds of missiles and state-of-the-art, modern weaponry (Roy,
1986, p.122). Whether the usage of this dated accouterment necessarily implied
a big disadvantage for the mujahedin could be disputed: most of these arms
were robust, battle-tested, easy to use (requiring virtually no training), handle
and repair and ammunition was more easily accessible due to their widespread
circulation.
4.1 Traditional tribal warfare and its adaption under the
influence of the Soviet occupation
During the two months after the Soviet invasion there was virtually no armed
resistance in the rural areas of Afghanistan. The Soviets first targeted urban
centers and parts of the national army still loyal to the old order and the regime-
to-be did not immediately establish its most oppressive functions. Also the fact
that the occupation had taken place in the middle of winter contributed to the
lack of armed resistance. Even if, as mentioned, urban resistance declined from
1980 on, in “the provinces, the whole country joined the resistance except for
a few pockets of supporters of the regime” (Roy, 1986, p.118). Babrak Karmal
was generally perceived as a Soviet puppet, which spurred strong nationalist
feelings even among people who had not become actively involved until that
point. In February of 1980 the Russians started their first offensive against the
resistance in order to keep supply routes open and Afghanistan entered “the
classic spiral of repression followed by more resistance” (Roy, 1986, p.119).
At that time, “while the Afghan tribes had still been able to teach careless
British imperialists a lesson or two [. . . ], during the 1978-1989 war the military
inadequacy of tribal warfare became obvious” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.49). The
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resistance of the Pashtun tribes was characterized by its organizational form,
namely that of tribal warfare87. “It is a people’s war in which every adult is an
active member and the framework of military activity is that of civil society.”
(Roy, 1986, p.176). The army of the government proved to be unable to deal
with the “mass uprising of fighting men” which followed each of its intrusions into
the tribal areas (Roy, 1986, p.177). Tribal warriors were part-time soldiers who
returned to their villages for harvest and family visits. This explains the regular
explosion of violence during ‘fighting season’, usually the time window between
winter and harvest, “followed by the break-up of the battle formations (lashkar)
as the troops disappear back into the countryside”88 (Roy, 1986, p.176).
In some ways tribal warfare is also a kind of symbolic warfare that has to
be distinguished from other military activity. It is not necessarily the goal of
warring tribesmen to accomplish a specific strategic military objective, but to
find a stage for exhibiting their prowess, “to obtain glory and the recognition
of the prerogatives of the tribal group.” (Roy, 1986, p.177). This explains the
somewhat “bizarre displays” of tribesmen in front of enemy military compounds,
“taking pot-shots at a post that” they are “not actually trying to capture” (Roy,
1986, p.177). Tribal warfare is used as a warning, “a means of dissuasion and is
carried out against a background of constant negotiation.” (Roy, 1986, p.177).
Military activity, to the contrary, is clearly aimed at gaining booty89 and comes
only second to the main purposes of tribal warfare. Traditional tribal warfare
had the function of channelling “potential in-group violence over property rights
and mate-preference toward out-group elements, usually neighboring tribes or
subtribes within a tribe” (Dupree, 1984, p.270). Or in other words, this kind
of warfare helped “drain off the sexually oriented, culturally induced, in-group
aggressions” in a “seasonal process of externalising internal aggression” (Dupree,
1984, p.270). This “simply means shooting the hell out of strangers rather than
one’s kinsmen.” (Dupree, 1984, p.270). The aforementioned codes of honor and
shame as well as badal (revenge or “exchange”, reciprocity; see also p.39 and
p.41) demand for an approximately equal amount of “blood spilled and property
looted” on both sides and therefore allows either party to claim victory (Dupree,
1984, p.272). Dupree further stated that in combination with female infanti-
87Other ethnic groups like the Hazara, in contrast, tended to imitate a regular army in their
organized resistance (Roy, 1986, p.176).
88For more information on lashkar see also p.25 and p.44. Some more insights on tribal
warfare are already mentioned on p.25.
89Customarily out-group fightings and feuds involved “zan (women), zar (literally gold,
symbolizing portable property), and zamin (land, and other immovable property, including
water rights)” (Dupree, 1984, p.269).
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cide the tribal warfare functioned as a population control mechanism (Dupree,
1984, p.281). He also stressed that tribal warfare had an “entertainment as-
pect”. During periods of relative leisure, namely the off-times from agricultural
or herding activities from late fall until spring, widespread boredom set in, es-
pecially in very remote areas. These long periods of inactivity, monotony and
ennui contributed to the tribesmen’s inclination to embark in bellicose endeav-
ors (Dupree, 1984, p.267 and p.281). Typically this kind of warfare produced
only a limited number of casualties. “Enough are killed, however, to keep ev-
eryone’s adrenalin up, and contesting groups remain emotionally tuned for the
next round.” (Dupree, 1984, p.270).
Tribal warfare was confronted with internal obstacles when it came to ‘ad-
equately’ responding to Soviet aggression, namely the forms of tribal societal
organization, which, as we will find out in this chapter, also proved to be the
tribes biggest asset. In order to wage war against an occupier like the Sovi-
ets, tribes had to act on a regional or even national level, as opposed to them
traditionally being tied to the local level. Yet, only few organized resistance
movements “extended beyond the immediate” qaum (see p.23 for definition) and
were able to establish supra-regional “political or military leadership” (Barnett,
1995, p.195). Normally armed tribal groups would not leave their own territory
except for “attacking ‘detribalised’ targets, such as large bazaars which are not
situated in any specific tribal territory, and which are not run by any clearly
recognisable group.“ (Roy, 1986, p.173). These limitations are predefined by
the concept of qaum with its potential to contribute to internal tribal disunity.
There are for instance numerous possibilities for misapprehension if an armed
tribal group becomes active in the territory of another tribe. They might be
perceived as members of a rivaling qaum rather than of the ummah (see p.30
for definition). Furthermore, it is not possible to sustain a tribal army under
weapons for longer periods of time. As soon as the actual fighting against a
common enemy was over “the traditional rivalries between” different qaum sur-
faced. Most lashkar (see p.25 and p.44 for definition) avoided these rivalries and
further internal struggle through a swift post-battle disintegration and simply
going back home. Traditionally there was a “clear separation” between civil and
military tasks. A lashkar would not interfere in social matters of its village and
as soon as a fighter returned home he did so as a member of his family and not
as “a representative of the resistance movement” or a distinct warring party90
90Also in the long history of Afghan regime changes the reintegration of urbanized govern-
ment officials in their original rural and tribal communities mostly went about “smoothly and
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(Roy, 1986, p.179).
The tribes operated within a dichotomized framework which clearly defined
the time for peace and the time for war as well as the place for battle (sangar)
and the “place of sanctuary (the village)” (Roy, 1986, p.177). The way Pashtuns
traditionally approached war generally implied that villages are safe and battles
are waged far away from the civil society which keeps going about its business.
It was imperative to them that “women and children are left alone, farming and
trading continue as if nothing has happened.” (Roy, 1986, p.177). The Soviets of
course did not care much about this “precise space-time framework” (Roy, 1986,
p.176). If they decided to become active at all, they rather engaged in an all out
war, burning harvests and carpet-bombing villages which not only constrained
replenishment of supplies of the resistance fighters but also had a devastating
effect on their morale. This caused many of the Pashtun tribes which were
unable to adapt to flee the country. Those who were able to spare their villages
of Soviet attacks usually did so by retreating fighters into remote mountain areas
which they subsequently held under their control. In general though, traditional
Pashtun tribal warfare was not well suited to compete against an enemy army
engaging in this kind of modern warfare.
The response to this military challenge was the establishment of ‘permanent
battle groups’. “The ideology of tribal warfare” with its emphasis on booty or
individual heroism, was replaced by the ideology of jihad. In the beginning some
mujahedin “heard various leaders in Peshawar declare jihad over the BBC or on
tape cassettes, but they had few organizational links to these voices.” (Barnett,
1995, p.195, see also Guistozzi, 200, p.121). Yet those ties would grow and
intensify over time. The battle groups were still mainly organized along the
lines of tribal loyalties, but exhibited some distinct features to the traditional
tribal warfare (beyond being permanent).
The new demands in warfare and the battle groups brought about a military
class of full-time fighters, as opposed to the usual part-timers, called “specialists
in violence” by Giustozzi (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.47). “This phenomenon of full
time combatants was key to both the formation of a military class and the fu-
ture ‘political economy’ of Afghanistan, as they would not smoothly re-integrate
as the part-timers could” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.47). Prolonged insecurity consoli-
dated the new permanent military leaders as wealthy families sought protection
against cash payments and even “longer-term alliances, such as marriage strate-
without too many ideological misgivings” (Ruttig, 2010, p.9).
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gies” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.47). Many of these local military leaders would later
turn from venerated mujahedin to feared warlords and dictators of petty “em-
pires”.
The permanent battle groups usually consisted of thirty to fifty members
and “a reserve double the size” which could “be mobilised at a moment’s notice”
(Roy, 1986, p.176). These groups were usually linked to a local base and the
“network of local bases” was “very close-knit”, encompassing a minimum of 4000
bases countrywide (Roy, 1986, p.176). They mostly acted autonomously and
did not need any coordination beyond their immediate level of organization.
“The ubiquity of this bases” was “the true strength of the resistance movement
in the country” (Roy, 1986, p.176). Its members were mainly of a poor peasant
origin and in their headquarters they enjoyed a lifestyle superior to what they
were used to before (especially richer diets, frequently including meat) (Roy,
1986, p.174). Group members could take a leave to visit their family and/or to
till their fields, but had to take care for a replacement, normally a brother or an-
other close family member. The battle group’s leader was “usually older than the
soldiers under his command”, but his leadership would be limited to his military
role (Roy, 1986, p.174)91. In other domains officers and ordinary soldiers were
mostly equals. Most of these permanent battle groups did not engage in actual
battle that often. This led to widespread boredom in bases far from the front
lines or those who were “unable to fight outside their own communal territory”
due to tribal organization (Roy, 1986, p.174). Everyday routine was somewhat
offset by the better livelihood attained through joining the group and daily col-
lective prayer frequently was the only activity. Yet, Roy stated at the time that
“they are always ready and their morale is high” and that there “is never any
shortage of recruits” and battle groups “are forced to refuse some volunteers
because there are not enough weapons to go round.” (Roy, 1986, p.174). Bases
closer to Soviet troops engaged in daily patrols and “routine ambushes”, but real
skirmishes would be uncommon (Roy, 1986, p.174). Islam had such a central
role in everyday life of ordinary Afghans and mujahedin, that the would pause
and “break off from fighting to pray” (Ahmed, 2000, p.82). Those mujahedin
habitually exhibited an increasing level of professionalism and sophistication in
their approach to battle as opposed to their counterparts in remote, tranquil
areas. The latter were considered “rather amateurish” and the most significant
event in their routine seemed to be “the selection of night sentries” (Roy, 1986,
91Except for Shiites who, as Roy put it, “as usual, are keen on hierarchy” (Roy, 1986, p.174).
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p.175). Roy found that even though “some bases are better organised than oth-
ers [. . . ] the dominant impression one gets is of a reliance upon improvisation
and a generally relaxed attitude.” (Roy, 1986, p.184). Commanders of bases
under “increased military pressure” formed “ad hoc coalitions within localities”,
alliances and forums which they called shura92 (Barnett, 1995, p.229). There
were basically two different types of shuras. First the councils of comman-
ders, which determined conjoint military activities and discussed political and
economic issues. “Military action would then be organized through traditional
organizational structures, such as the tribal lashkar (army)”93 (Edwards, 1998,
p.718). Secondly the councils of the ulema (see p.30 for definition) which “func-
tioned sometimes as a judicial committee or department of the commanders’
shura, and sometimes as a separate organization.” (Barnett, 1995, p.229).
Due to these adaptive changes traditional leaders, the khans, lost influence
in favor of commanders (qumandán) and of the ulema as a religious force which
promulgated jihad. Furthermore, jihad “was opposed to” the khans’ “economic
interest in stability” and they were wary of the growing influence of “their re-
ligious rivals for leadership”94 (Barnett, 1995, p.187). The ulema were able to
combine politic Islamist ideology with the cohesive forces of tribal loyalty and
thus ensured the cooperation of armed groups. This resulted in a decline of the
rivalries between khans and different qaum, which had been “the primary channel
by which government influence was” exerted on tribes (Roy, 1986, p.178). Com-
manders exhibited different and much needed leadership qualities than khans.
Access to weapons, money and food became a prerequisite to leadership, as well
as access to foreign militaries and organizations mainly from Pakistan and Iran
(Rzehak, 2011, p.13). Many traditional khans could not provide that, fled to
92The usage of the term shura instead of jirga even in Pashtun dominated tribal areas was
evidence for the increasing Islamization of politics (Barnett, 1995, p.229). Contrary to the
egalitarian jirga, the shura is normally “convened by new strongmen” and it only “gives advice
to a leader who then decides whether to make use of it or not” (Ruttig, 2010, p.8). Besides the
decline of egalitarianism also population growth had an impact on this process: the increasing
population had made “it physically impossible that, as traditions demand, all males gather
in a jirga” (Ruttig, 2010, p.9). With an annual increase of 3.5 per cent, Afghanistan “has
one of the highest levels of demographic growth in the world” (Monsutti, 2010, p.56). The
United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) estimates that the population in
Afghanistan will triple until 2050, growing from 32.3 million to 97.3 million (Monsutti, 2010,
p.56).
93For more information about the tribal militias or lashkar see also p.25 and p.44. For a
detailed description of the inner workings of a lashkar, a jirga or shura, their struggles and
organizational mechanisms at the time, as well as interviews with mujahedin see Edward’s
2002 publication, listed in the references and available online.
94Contemporaneously, the Soviet counterinsurgency strategy involved the destruction of
“local resources, control of which was a primary source [. . . ] of the khans’ power.” (Barnett,
1995, p.227).
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Pakistan and left their positions to the new generation of leaders (Glatzer, 2000,
p.99). Furthermore, the new leaders “had to be physically able to march long
distances on foot, because the fronts were constantly moving” which was an-
other reason for the tribes’ elders frequently not being able to perform this role
(Glatzer, 1998, p.9). As the khans also the qumandán were mostly perceived as
primus inter pares, though people respected their combat experience and their
tactical and logistical knowledge. Probably every mujahedin saw himself on the
way to become qumandán, so that, in absence of a military hierarchy to rely
on, the commanders constantly had to prove their superior skills and abilities in
order not to be replaced (Glatzer, 2000, p.99). Shortly after the start of the So-
viet invasion traditional tribal leaders who had fled to Pakistan “tried to revive
the Pashtun-based traditions of Afghan national identity and resistance, such
as the Loya Jirga”, a jirga on a national level95(Barnett, 1995, p.193, accentu-
ation added). However, Afghan Islamists and members of non-Pashtun groups
successfully opposed such an approach (Barnett, 1995, p.193).
The permanent battle groups also served a political purpose. Even when
their bases were “militarily insignificant” they provided a “visible symbol of the
resistance for the local people” (Roy, 1986, p.176). Every so often, battle groups
would find “a modus vivendi with government posts: the latter provide food and
ammunition and are very careful not to get involved in any sorties” (Roy, 1986,
p.175). The mujahedin would return the favor by only staging “symbolic attacks
which make it possible for the commander of the post to justify the expenditure
of ammunition which he has, in fact, handed over to the resistance”96 (Roy, 1986,
p.175). Encounters with Soviet troops were very different and the mujahedin
would normally avoid direct confrontations with them97. The bases of the per-
manent battle groups rarely suffered Soviet counterattacks. The Russians shied
away from using helicopters because of the bases’ prevalent anti-aircraft arma-
ment and preferred “either to use precision bombing, or to engage in a massive
operation” (Roy, 1986, p.175). The tribal fighters did not have the means to
confront the Soviet army once it started a bigger operation including armored
vehicles and helicopters. Resistance fighters were swiftly alarmed about the
imminence of a Soviet attack prompting them to abandon their bases and to
95“The institution of the Loya Jirga developed out of the state’s attempt to modify Pashtun
tribal traditions in order to create a tribal-nationalist legitimation for state power.” (?, p.193).
96Sometimes also Soviet soldiers would trade “military equipment, ammunition or weapons”
in exchange for drugs (Collins, 1990, p.186).
97Only at some locations, such as Kandahar, there was “a real exchange of fire from fixed
locations” (Roy, 1986, p.175).
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disperse in the surrounding terrain - only to regroup once the offensive was
finished. Therefore it was “the civilians who” had to “bear the brunt of Soviet
counter-attacks.” (Roy, 1986, p.175). The regrouping usually happened along
kinship ties and not along political alliances.
Tactically the battle groups relied heavily on ambushes98. Within their
territory the more active bases would stage “attacks against government posts
or on vehicles traveling along the road” (Roy, 1986, p.175). Decisions about the
operations were usually made in a democratic way and only in the last minute.
Since the mujahedin knew the terrain and attacks would usually follow the same
scheme, there was no necessity for training or “preliminary instructions” and
improvisation was “the order of the day” (Roy, 1986, p.175). The battle groups in
the proximity of towns also targeted enemy patrols, police posts, administrative
buildings and government groups (Roy, 1986, p.175). The routine ambushes
were usually carried out by one or two groups who planted roadside bombs
or mines a long a road after informants from villages spread the news about
enemy military convoys. One or two fighters equipped with RPGs (usually
a Russian RPG-7; Rocket-Propelled Grenade) move in on the road while the
other fighters provide cover. Once the first vehicle is blown up by the mine,
one or two anti-tank grenades per fighter are launched at the first and/or last
vehicle of the convoy. Immediately after the RPGs are fired the fighters retreat
back to their group which provided cover during the operation, then “everyone
withdraws in no particular order and without taking many precautions” (Roy,
1986, p.183). This procedure proved to be quite effective mainly because of
the somewhat unwieldy nature of Soviet military hardware and because of the
Soviet soldiers tendency not “to take any military initiative, preferring to wait
inside their transport vehicles until reinforcements arrive” (Roy, 1986, p.183).
Apparently the Soviet forces “had no effective counter-ambush drills” and often
even preferred “to let the resistance have the vehicles that they” had “disabled
and move the rest of the convoy to safety” (Collins, 1990, p.187). Many of
the initially deployed Soviet troops were “poorly trained and in some cases
politically unreliable” central Asian reservists, which were replaced after the
Soviet leadership had identified them as a risk (Collins, 1990, p.186). Yet, also
the regular Soviet troops lacked morale and suffered from “widespread discontent
[. . . ], a condition aggravated by the terror and boredom of combat operations,
poor pay and the availability of drugs” as well as disease “and poor sanitation”
98They were also “harassing government posts” and used “political terrorism” (terur) in the
cities (Roy, 1986, p.183).
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which may have “caused more casualties than the resistance” in the first years
of the engagement (Collins, 1990, p.186).
Among the resistance there were not many well-trained, specialized groups
for other tasks such as sabotage or terrorism against government officials (which
was, in order to avoid blood-feud, only carried out when that person did not
have family ties to locals or a fatwa allowed to do so). The egalitarian attitude
implied that every member should be able to carry out every task, which also
has had the effect of a broader rotation of personnel actively engaged in fighting
by providing a bigger pool of available actors. “By Afghan thinking it is better
to have twelve groups fighting once a year than one group fighting” twelve times
a year (Roy, 1986, p.184).
The “normal course” revolts took though, usually was a “mass uprising pre-
ceded by preaching and followed by an attack on the government post of the
principal town of the district” (Roy, 1986 in Barnett, 1995, p.187). These at-
tacks were frequently successful but they involved significant blood shed and
casualties on both sides. Subsequently, “the communist activists were executed,
non-communist soldiers and officials allowed to go” and uprisings spread in the
region as far as there were tribal loyalties (Roy 1986 in Barnett, 1995, p.187).
“When the frontier of the territory of the” qaum “was reached, the dynamic
phase was over” because most fighters did not attempt to mingle in the affairs
of neighboring groups (Roy, 1986 in Barnett, 1995, p.187).
Again the Pashtuns’ individualistic, decentralized and sometimes chaotically
unorganized approach to battle posed significant problems for Soviet military
strategists: not only were the Pashtuns’ operations unpredictable, but when one
mujahedin commander was eliminated several others would be able to take his
place (Glatzer, 2000, p.100). Mujahedin groups would often split, regroup and
change alignments with other groups as they saw fit their own interests best and,
in general, exhibit an astounding flexibility and mobility, geographically as well
as politically. In this context Canfield (contented for anthropology having kept
these findings from the Soviets by simply not investigating the subject at the
time) states that one of the great failures of the Soviet strategists was to heavily
underestimate “the scope and strength of the implicit and potential coalitions
of the rural populations.” (Canfield, 1988b, p.100).
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4.2 Migration, exile and changes in Pashtun tribal society
The ethnic and social fabric of Afghanistan was subjected to profound changes
due to the Soviet invasion. About 6 of the 18 million Afghans fled to Pakistan
and Iran99, 75% of them were women and children, and 3 million Afghans were
displaced within the country (Monsutti, 2010, p.47, Kipping, 2010, p.7, Schet-
ter, 2005, p.60, Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002, p.345, Kushkaki, 1990, p.115,
Matinuddin, 1990, p.221, Weinbaum, 1990, p.195). The Pakistani NWFP was
the main goal of Afghan refugees. About 70% of all Afghan refugees in Pak-
istan lived in the NWFP where they represented “one in six members of the
local population”, while in some districts they outnumbered the native popu-
lation (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.72). Since more than 80%
of the refugees in Pakistan were Pashtuns, this “ethnically selective migratory
flow has had an impact on the ethnic composition of Afghanistan as well as of
Pakistan” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.73). Referring to Pak-
istani statistics the country received more than one million refugees by July
1980, two million by May 1981 and three million by summer 1983 (Centlivres
und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.72). Most refugees did not come from the cities
under direct government control. They rather came from the circumjacent ru-
ral areas which oftentimes were the actual combat zones, which were stricken
by insecurity and famine and which suffered “the destruction of the very con-
ditions necessary for survival”(Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.74).
In particular “the wealthy members of rural society were [. . . ] more likely than
the poor to seek refuge in Pakistan, apparently because they could afford the
costs of the journey.” (Barnett, 1995, p.227). Not only the intensification of
direct aerial bombardments, which were aimed either at the mujahedin directly
or at the civilian populations which were considered to support the resistance,
contributed to the flow of refugees. Also the compulsory military service for all
men between sixteen and forty-five years of age and the “destruction of crops in
the field or in threshing areas and the machine-gun massacre of flocks and herds
in regions not under Kabul’s control”, the latter depriving people of their liveli-
hoods, were important causes for the enormous migratory flow100 (Centlivres
99About 4 million fled to Pakistan, the rest fled mainly to Iran but some also to Australia,
the United States and Europe. Pakistan had a population of about 80 million at the time,
compared to its 180 million today. Considering urbanization in Afghanistan at the time (about
5 million people of the remaining 12 million lived in cities) this translated to about a little
less than half the population being under the socialist government’s authority. See also p.74
for details about the division of influence between government and resistance.
100Until “1986 yields decreased by about 50 percent for dry-land wheat and 33 percent for
irrigated wheat, while at least one third of the land was abandoned. The numbers of sheep,
84
und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.75).
Islamic ideology and Pashtun traditional values contributed to the mecha-
nisms at play between the refugees and the receiving host population. As men-
tioned before, the refugees and their hosts were honored by receiving religious
titles (See also p.71). The former were called muhajer (like the prophet during
his emigration to Medina), the latter ansar (like the prophet’s friends in Med-
ina) (Glatzer, 2000, p.100). Yet, the mujahedin enjoyed a significantly higher
status than the muhajer, which is why many refugees preferred to call them-
selves mujahedin “even if they have not been engaged in resistance for years.”
(Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.86). Furthermore, the Pashtunwali,
as a code of honor, allowed for “a person or group” to “ask for hospitality and as-
sistance from a neighbouring group during temporary conflict.”101 (Centlivres
und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.74). Many of the refugees indeed considered
themselves to be “temporary guests in Pakistan, and, according to tribal law
such a status does not render them internees or defenceless” (Centlivres und
Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.87). Therefore they saw no need to disarm, to the
contrary, this implied they would also fight to defend their hosts from any ag-
gression.
The massive inflow of people caused some foreseeable problems, such as anger
over wage dumping through refugees which could afford to accept a smaller pay
due to receiving aid and free housing (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988,
p.89). Some contention arose because of the “more than 3 million head of live-
stock” the refugees had taken with them (Azhar, 1990, p.105). Their “uncon-
trolled grazing has ruined the sparse grazing grounds” and the “destruction of
forests used by refugees as firewood” angered locals (Azhar, 1990, p.105). Nev-
ertheless it seems that there were no major conflicts between the two groups
and many locals were able to profit from the increased business opportunities
and government contracts. The common language, religion and culture of the
Pashtuns of both sides of the Durand Line surely facilitated their coexistence
under these demanding circumstances (Boesen, 1990, p.161). Many refugees
were brought to so-called Afghan refugee villages102, first equipped with tents
from the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). Then in-
goats, and cattle declined by from one-half to two-thirds.” (Barnett, 1995, p.227).
101It is obvious though that the number of refugees and the duration of their stay by far
“exceeded the norm of tribal hospitality” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.74).
102The refugee camps were also infiltrated by the Afghan secret service KhAD in an at-
tempt of the communists to gather intelligence and identify possible targets in Afghanistan
(Weinbaum, 1990, p.199).
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habitants began “building earth houses with materials found on site” until most
of these camps looked “like large villages composed of earth houses” (Centlivres
und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.75). Most of these houses were surrounded by
earth walls for privacy and seclusion of women (Pedersen, 1990, p.156). These
villages were quite extensive, counting between 5,000 and 12,000 people, and
thus much bigger than the Afghan villages most refugees came from. When the
lands on which these camps were built were not state-owned, the government of
Pakistan compensated the owners (tribes or great land owners) through devel-
opment programs rather than paying rent (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont,
1988, p.75). Alimentation was provided by the UNHCR and the World Food
Programme (WFP), ensuring a diet with “a minimum of calories and protein”
for each refugee (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.76).
Islam and Pashtun traditions were ubiquitous and amplified, and people
struggled to re-establish their former ways of life at their best. Driven by “ideo-
logical commitment”, the refugees adopted “an appearance judged true to Islamic
tradition: turban, beard and kamiz o shalwar (shirt and trousers)” in opposition
“to the European suits and unbearded (though moustached) young citizens who
have rallied round the regime in Kabul.” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont,
1988, p.77). One of the first acts of the Pashtuns in their designated villages was
to reinforce the seclusion (parda) of women and thereby, according to Pashtun
values, take back their honor103 (Boesen, 1990, p.163). This was achieved by
erecting mud walls around the area designated to women in the earth houses
or at least installing some cloths or screen to prevent strangers from intruding
with their gaze. Many Pashtuns would refuse to expose their wives, daughters
and sisters to “visiting experts or foreigners” and “functionaries charged with
administering the village” and also rejected schools for girls104 (Centlivres und
103Traditionally, a Pashtun man calls out prior to entering his home “to see if any women
are visiting, in which case he will not enter” (Grima, 2004, p.37).
104In 1986 there were 555 schools (255 of them were tents) for about 100,000 children (out
1.4 million of school age) (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.88, Kushkaki, 1990,
p.119). Only fifty schools were for girls, they were restricted to the primary level and a total
of 6.214 girls attended school by 1986. There were about 3000 teachers. Almost 2/3 of them
were Afghans, most of them had no training (Kushkaki, 1990, p.119). For a lack of sanctions,
attendance was generally low. Many young boys had to contribute to the families’ livelihood,
too. There was “an especially strong antipathy” towards “secular schools” which were thought
to be “responsible for the rise of Marxism and ideologies” which facilitated the overthrow of
1978 (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.88, Kushkaki, 1990, p.119). Edwards argues
that the low attendance levels were caused by the fact that “these schools had more to do
with social control than with education, and few who attended them had their life chances
expanded as a result” (Edwards, 2002, p.170).
About the same number of pupils (100,000) officially attended religious schools, the so-
called madrassas. In total these numbers would surpass by far the levels of education in pre-
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Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.80). Also only very few boys went to school, many
of the educated elite had fled to Western countries and the refugees were “raising
a generation of illiterate and uneducated youth” (Kushkaki, 1990, p.118).
The refugees followed the course of the war through radio programs (BBC,
Voice of America, Afghan, Pakistani and Chinese radio stations reporting in
Dari), while mujahedin visited their families in the camps after a campaign as
they pleased. Qumandán, who transported weapons and supplies to Afghanistan,
reported from the combat zones (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.81).
Yet, the traditional tribal structures were no longer in place. Either they were
“destroyed or else could no longer offer the security they had provided in the
past.” (Schetter, 2005, p.60). Pashtuns tried to regroup with their families
and people from the same qaum (see p.23 for definition), but many of them
were torn apart, men died, were still in combat or were working in Pakistani
cities105. Wherever the regroupment of people along family lines worked, the
common “experience of war and exile” strengthened relations between relatives
who would otherwise not have had entertained ties as close. For example a
family head at the time would “not only welcome his brothers, their wives and
children [. . . ] but also his daughters and his sisters with their husbands, and
his widowed sisters and daughters.” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988,
p.82). Contradicting Pashtun custom, married or widowed female relatives were
no longer obliged or expected to live with their husband’s family.
Some anthropologists have argued that the massive exilation of large pro-
portions of the Afghan people “has not always had the traumatic dimension
which humanitarian agencies and the media tend to attribute to it” and that a
“longterm historical perspective leads” them “to relativize its exceptional char-
acter” (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). The main underlying argument consists of tak-
ing into account the long history “of mobility in all its forms” prevalent in
Afghanistan (nomadism, labor migration, pilgrimage, resettlements etc.) (Mon-
sutti, 2010, p.47). The migratory movements of Afghans to neighboring coun-
tries as well as to North America, Europe, the Arab Gulf, Iran and to Australia
revolutionary Afghanistan, yet absenteeism was significant also in the latter kind of schools.
In Afghanistan schools were rare in rural areas. At that time illiteracy rates ranged between
80% and 90% of the population. At the turn of the century this had not changed much,
about 90% of women and 60% of men were illiterate (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.345,
Goodson, 2005, p.93).
105They profited though from an “extraordinarily efficient” oral information network, “func-
tioning between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the one hand, and between various refugee
villages at the other”: driven by “the desire to be together” as “part of the struggle for sur-
vival and the preservation of” one’s identity, everyone knew the whereabouts of their relatives
(Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.81).
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is not exclusively a reaction to poverty and insecurity (Monsutti, 2010, p.47).
Monsutti argues that the “war has been an opportunity for a deep redefini-
tion of social organization rather than the cause of a massive but reversible
exile.” (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). The social groups which constituted under these
changed circumstances were no longer structured by common residence “but
by links of solidarity and mutual assistance which cross international borders.”
(Monsutti, 2010, p.47). Monsutti goes on to explain that the spatial spread-
ing and “economic diversification” stem from kinship ties and permit groups
“to spread risk” (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). Therefore “mobility is often a planned
strategy” (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). The refugees entertain very strong relations to
their home country and frequently share “a collective memory, vision, or myth
about their homeland - its physical location, history, and achievements” (Safran,
1991, p.83 in Monsutti, 2010, p.48). Most refugees return to Afghanistan from
time to time and “almost all family groups have at least one of their members
abroad” (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). Refugees usually do not return to Afghanistan
for permanent residence, they also do not live through “a process of integration in
the host country”, but their “movement is continuous and a truly transnational
community is ultimately created.” (Monsutti, 2010, p.48). The conclusions
Monsutti derives are that mobility can be seen as a structural feature of the
Afghan’s “way of life, it is not mere coercion or imposed by external circum-
stances” and that the strategies Afghans employ “blur the distinction between
forced and voluntary migration.” (Monsutti, 2010, p.48).
After the fall of the Najibullah regime about 3 million of the total 6 million
refugees returned to Afghanistan. The flow of returnees slowed drastically when
the Taliban emerged as a military force and in the following years Afghans fled
to Pakistan and Iran in massive numbers again (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2001).
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4.3 Cold War strategies, foreign money, and the growing
influence of Islam and its political repercussions
The political organization of the refugees was dominated by seven big Islamic
parties (the ‘Peshawar Seven’), each of which commanded several warring par-
ties and militias inside Afghanistan from their offices in the Pakistani city of
Peshawar106 (Ruttig, 2010, p.11). “Initially the ceiling was established at six
parties, but later, under Arab pressure, it was raised to seven to accommo-
date Professor Sayyaf’s Ittihad ” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.44, accentuation added).
The parties were in competition for influence, money and weapons from Pak-
istan, Saudi Arabia and some Western nations and entangled in intense internal
rivalries and sometimes even feuds dating back to their time in Afghanistan
(Edwards, 2002, p.140). At the same time more than hundred smaller parties,
some of them nationalist or with a regional, ethnic or tribal background had
opened offices in Peshawar. In 1981 the Pakistani government decided that
only Islamic parties would be allowed “to receive assistance from Pakistan and
other international donors, and all refugees would have to receive a membership
card from one of these parties in order to live in registered camps and receive
tents, rations and further assistance” (Edwards, 2002, p.155). This further un-
dermined the importance of tribal organizations and more moderate political
groups. Already from 1979 on about 75% of US financial support was provided
“to the most extremist of these opposition groups” (Hirschkind und Mahmood,
2002, p.343). The explicit goal of the United States was to “set a Vietnam-like
deathtrap for the Soviet forces” (Kepel, 2002, p.8).
A group of widely respected Muslim clerics who called themselves ulama
dayun convinced the leaders of the Islamic parties to unite, reminding them
of the Prophet Mohammed’s words “that if two Muslims met sword in hand
with the intention of killing one another both would be condemned to eternal
damnation” (Edwards, 2002, p.155). Hence the ‘Islamic Union of Afghanistan
Mujahidin’ was founded107. Even though the infighting would continue on dif-
ferent levels and in varying intensity, those groups formed the backbone of the
106Ironically, Islam was so important to Afghans that even communist ministers in Kabul
would pray in their offices (Ahmed, 2000, p.82). Lindholm argues that the strong Pashtun
presence also shaped the Pakistani party system as a whole (Lindholm, 2001).
107Due to personal animosities the alliance was soon left by three of the parties which formed
their own alliance which was also called ‘Islamic Union of Afghanistan Mujahidin’. Four years
later, in 1985, they reunited after being pressured to do so by Saudi and Pakistani supporters,
yet a “persistent pattern of discord in the jihad” lingered on (Edwards, 2002, p.155 and p.158).
Edwards compared the difficulty of the task of uniting the “Peshawar parties” to “merging a
U.S. political party with a religious sect and a Mafia family” (Edwards, 2002, p.158).
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Islamic resistance. Edwards explains this factionalism by describing them as
being not only political parties, but hybrids which included other levels of orga-
nization beyond the political, depending on the background of their respective
leaders. They had distinct views of their leaders and the roles they should
play as well as how decisions should be made, or as Edwards calls it, conflict-
ing “corporate cultures” (Edwards, 2002, p.158). “Add to these differences in
educational backgrounds, ethnicity, and language, generational divisions, the
ambitiousness of the leaders, as well as the interference of outside powers, and
it becomes more apparent why alliances in Peshawar were continually breaking
up” (Edwards, 2002, p.158).
At the beginning the main factions were Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e
Islami, Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-e Islami and another faction of Hezb
formed when Yunus Khalis split from Hekmatyar to found his own Islamist
group (Barnett, 1995, p.192). Hekmatyar, “a man known for throwing acid in
the faces of women who refused to wear the veil” (Hirschkind und Mahmood,
2002, p.343), received up to 50% of the total US funding108 and temporarily
up to “90 per cent of the military aid from ISI” (Ahmed, 2000, p.91). Abdur
Rasul Sayyaf’s organization Ittihad (see also p.70 and p.95) developed substan-
tial leverage through the robust financial backing by Saudi Arabia, even though
it did not command many loyal fighters in Afghanistan. His supporters were
“a mix of disgruntled Islamists and fundamentalists, who had left other par-
ties, and of mercenary groups attracted by the abundance of Arab money on
offer” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.45). Furthermore, the influential mullah Mawlawi
Jalaluddin Haqqani, who received substantial support from the CIA and Arab
countries and had been a supporter of Osama bin Laden already in the 1980s,
waged his own jihad109 . The enormous influx of weaponry through the US
108When asked about why the US would only support extremist Islamist mujahedin, and es-
pecially Hekmatyar, “a CIA official in Pakistan explained, ‘Fanatics fight better” ’ (Hirschkind
und Mahmood, 2002, p.343).
109The Haqqani network is still active today. Jalaluddin Haqqani formally accepts Mullah
Omar, the former leader of the Taliban regime, as the leader of the movement but acts
independently or at least “semi-autonomous” (Ruttig, 2010, p.7). His family and clan network
are commonly described as a radical Muslim Mafia. His son Sirajuddin Haqqani is believed
to be a leader of the Quetta-shura, a regrouped unit of the former Taliban leadership. They
engage in terrorism, kidnapping, extortion, smuggling, drug trafficking, assassinations, public
executions and mass beheadings in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. One of their most recent
coordinated attacks occurred on 16th of April 2012, when they staged simultaneous assaults
at seven different locations, mainly heavily secured NATO and government buildings in at
least five different cities, as part of their so-called ‘spring offensive’. The Haqqani network is
widely believed to be a ‘strategic asset’ of the Pakistani intelligence service ISI in the Afghan
theater and to be closely aligned with Al-Quaeda. Their base is a save haven in the Pakistani
town of Miranshah, where they maintain their own courts, tax authorities and madrassas
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- ISI - mujahedin connection “turned the region into one of the most heavily
armed areas in the world” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.344). “In fact,
the over abundance of munitions may well have had the perverse effect of remov-
ing any incentive for the jihadists to develop their political organisation and set
the trajectory of the movement towards warlordism at the expense of political
legitimacy” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.48).
Creating further sources of revenue the mujahedin required populations in
‘liberated’ areas to grow poppy (Papaver somniferum) and thereby support
the resistance. “Under CIA and Pakistani protection, Pakistan military and
Afghan” mujahedin “opened heroin labs on the border between the two coun-
tries” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.344, Kreutzmann, 2007, p.609). In
1981 Afghanistan supplied more than 60% of the US demand for illegal opiates,
mostly heroin (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.344). In the following years
the mujahedin would be able to increase production to 80% or even 90% of
the worldwide demand110(UNODC u. a., 2009, p.16, p.36, Goodson 2005, p.92,
Peters, 2009, p.7, Kreutzmann, 2007, p.608) .
In 1987 rumors had spread about a possible withdrawal of the Soviets. The
rumors were reinforced by the Soviet government under Gorbachev, which had
started to reevaluated “the basic direction of future Soviet foreign policy”111
(Collins, 1990, p.177). By summer 1988, a quarter of the 120.000 Soviet troops
had departed and aspirations for and end of the war were high (Collins, 1990,
p.177). Field commanders, sick of the disunity of their Islamic party leaders, had
“a passionate desire for greater structural unity amongst” themselves (Ahmed,
2000, p.96). Ismael Khan112 organized several meetings of field commanders, the
(Eric Schmitt, 2012, and New York Times 2012). Jalaluddin Haqqani became minister under
the Taliban regime but did not wield much power and was intentionally excluded from decision-
making by Mullah Omar (Ruttig, 2010, p.14).
110The number of heroin addicts rose dramatically, not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
but also in Iran and throughout Central Asia and Russia. Crimes related to drug-trafficking
increased dramatically as well (UNODC u. a., 2011). Under Taliban rule the overall Opium
production first increased in order to then dramatically decrease in the last two years before
the US intervention. Three years after the US invasion from 2001 Afghanistan again produced
87% of the world’s opium and accounted for at least 40% of the country’s GDP (Goodson,
2005, p.92, Goodson, 2004, p.17). Today about 3.3 million Afghans “derive an income from
poppy” (growers, harvesters, traffickers etc.) (Goodhand, 2005, p.207). For more information
about poppy cultivation under the Taliban regime see p.101.
111This reassessment was in part forced upon the leadership since other measures, such as to
gain “concessions from Pakistan, increase the firepower and effectiveness of Soviet forces and
re-energize their leadership”, had failed (Collins, 1990, p.190).
112Ismael Khan (born in 1946) was a powerful mujahedin commander and became a key ally
in Ahmad Shah Massoud’s and general Dostum’s Northern Alliance against the Taliban. After
the fall of the Taliban he became governor of Herat and later served as minister for water and
energy in Hamid Karzai’s administration. His son, Mirwais Sadiq, Minister for Civil Aviation
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first of which in Ghor province was attended by more than 1.200 commanders
(Ahmed, 2000, p.96). “They adopted 20 resolutions of which the most important
was the demand that they, rather than the Peshawar leaders, dictate the political
movement” (Ahmed, 2000, p.96). Ethnic and personal animosities as well as the
competition and urge to be first and seize the capital Kabul debilitated their
agreement and the usual factionalism prevailed (Ahmed, 2000, p.96).
Professor Bauhauddin Majrooh, who had been a dean at the University
of Kabul and professor of philosophy and literature during Zahir Shah’s reign
(while his father, Shamsuddin Majrooh, served as minister of justice), and who
then operated a rather neutral news outlet, a bulletin113 for Afghan refugees,
demanded a return of the king in order to achieve peace114. This should only be
an interim step. Zahir Shah, still in Italy since his ouster in 1973, was seen by
many as the only person who could unite the Afghans. He was not aligned with
any party and “the abuses of his own regime were not only long ago [. . . ] but
also trivial compared with what had happened since.” (Edwards, 2002, p.165).
When Majrooh collected data about the political preferences of Afghans in 106
of the 249 Afghan refugee villages, 72% of the 2000 respondents favored Zahir
Shah. 0.45% named one of the resistance parties’ leaders from Peshawar and
12.5% favored a purely Islamic state (Edwards, 2002, p.165). Of course the
explanatory power of such a survey might be very limited. Nevertheless, the
level of support for the former king “combined with the direct rebuke of the
resistance leaders, indicated that the majority of Afghans remained unmoved
by the Islamic political rhetoric with which they had been relentlessly assailed”
for almost ten years (Edwards, 2002, p.165). The support for Zahir Shah may
have been rooted in a “nostalgic” memory of a brighter past, when government
did not interfere in local issues and people’s affairs or maybe the refugees were
just tired of intrigues and infighting among the Peshawar parties. Zahir Shah
“broke his usual silence on exile political affairs” and gave an interview to the
BBC in which he declared to be willing “to serve the Afghan people if called
on to do so” (Edwards, 2002, p.165). He asserted that he would not attempt
under Karzai, was killed in 2004 (Goodson, 2005, p.91).
113Magazines were extremely important to Islamic parties such as Hezb-e Islami too. They
used them to spread their propaganda. Through the use of “bright graphics” and “photographs
of martyrs, magazines have also attempted to broaden the party’s reach to the illiterate
masses that had previously been immune to the blandishments and persuasions of their written
publications” (Edwards, 1995, p.181).
114It was not so much that he supported Zahir Shah as a qualified leader or person, but
rather as someone the Afghan people could rally around and who, with public support behind
him, could control the various factions of the Islamists and prevent a civil war.
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to restore the monarchy. All the major radical Islamic parties strictly opposed
such a course of action, proclaiming they would not even accept Zahir Shah if
he was democratically elected. They demanded the institution of an Islamic
state “and that the head of state should be selected by a council of qualified
Islamic scholars and leaders from among those who had played an active part
in the jihad.” (Edwards, 2002, p.165). The point of this explanation is to show
that the radical Islamic parties prevailed in shaping the public discussions about
Afghanistan’s future. They pushed aside more moderate interest groups, as well
as the majority of the refugees115 (Edwards, 2002, p.165). Yet, they failed to
“produce reality-based theories of change”, a realistic offer to ordinary people,
based on facts on the ground, in which direction future developments should
lead them (Ahmed, 2000, p.87). This lack of a comprehensive set of theories
“is a widespread phenomenon in the Muslim world” (Ahmed, 2000, p.87). The
“french scholar Olivier Roy has dubbed it ‘the failure of political Islam”’ (Ahmed,
2000, p.87).
The infighting and factionalism among Islamists increased even more after
the Soviets had left Afghanistan in February 1989, as various parties competed
for dominance in “what was expected to be a short endgame to the war”116
(Edwards, 2002, p.168, Edwards, 1998, p.721, Anderson, 1990, p.256). With
the Soviet withdrawal also the resistance’s foreign funding dried up more and
more and the Islamic parties lost their political influence again. Especially the
US, becoming wary of what they had helped to produce, quickly terminated
all aid (Kepel, 2002, p.217). To the astonishment of not only Afghans but also
foreign observers, the Najibullah regime in Kabul managed to cling to power
for three more years, despite the emerging of a bitter civil war. The disunity of
the resistance definitely facilitated this accomplishment and once “again it was
Afghan facing off against Afghan, without any outsiders interposing themselves”
(Edwards, 1998, p.721) Najibullah capitalized on this split. Still receiving ample
funds from Moscow, he further augmented factionalism by providing financial
assistance to local militias in exchange for friendly behavior towards Kabul. Is-
lamabad tried to counter these efforts and sustain its influence by allocating
115The Islamists were not that satisfied with Majrooh publicly challenging their claim to
power. Especially his public statements that many commanders, even of the Islamist’s par-
ties, supported Zahir Shah could prove potentially dangerous to them. Hence Majrooh was
assassinated in his house in Peshawar shortly after these incidents.
116I will not go into much further detail on the differences between the numerous Afghan
Islamic parties, coalitions, its leaders and their struggles. I take the liberty to refer the more
profoundly interested reader to David B. Edward’s exceedingly instructive and detailed pub-
lication “Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad.” of the year 2002 (see references).
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significant bribes to party leaders and commanders but was heavily outspent.
Contemporaneously, a massive reduction of foreign financial contributions to the
Islamic parties after the Soviets’ withdrawal contributed to the local units and
lashkar being “increasingly disconnected from central control”, and they “inten-
sified their attacks against one another” (Edwards, 2002, p.168 and Edwards,
1998, p.721, Anderson, 1990, p.254). The local military leaders had become “ad-
dicted to the plentiful resources” and the power that came with them (Giustozzi,
2009b, p.48). Many local commanders turning to other sources to finance their
troops simply engaged in criminal behavior, taking possession of the resources
they needed wherever they found them. In local terms this time is known as
“topakeyano daurai, the time of the gunmen” and “in people’s eyes, the once
venerated mujahidin, the warriors of God, had become simply men with guns,
intent on their own selfish goals” (Edwards, 2002, p.168).
In the course of the last decade the relation of Islam and political lead-
ership had fundamentally changed. In the past, religious leaders had derived
their power from their association with powerful tribal leaders or the kings in
Kabul. They had never really had significant influence solely based on their
religious bona fides but to endear themselves to tribal strongmen or the royal
court, which both kept jealous watch over their political spheres of power (see
also p.31). Since taking refuge in Pakistan the mullahs, clerics and other reli-
gious figures “gained leverage from the patronage of Pakistan, the United States,
Saudi Arabia, and China, and they were successful as long as they had mas-
sive infusions of financial and military assistance from these sources” (Edwards,
2002, p.173). The religious leaders became “equally potential agents of disrup-
tion and injustice” and “effectively negated the possibility that religion could act
as a force of moderation and peace”, a role which it often had held in previous
centuries (Edwards, 1998, p.722).
On paper the seven major Islamic parties established a common interim
government which was supposed to take power in Jalalabad as an alternative
capital to Kabul. Yet their offensive failed to dislodge the government army
and this failure “exacerbated frictions within the resistance coalition” (Edwards,
2002, p.168, Anderson, 1990, p.254).
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Part III
Militant Political Islam, Tribal
Structures & The Taliban - A
Generational & Structural Divide?
5 Civil War, the Origins and the Rise of the Tal-
iban
In April 1992 the socialist Najibullah regime in Kabul fell and soon a brutal
civil war ensued. Arrangements between the Parchami, Ahmad Shah Massoud
(“Rabbani’s deputy and strongman in Panjshir Valley” who had the status of a
folk hero among his followers) and General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a powerful
warlord and leader of Uzbek militias in northern Afghanistan, permitted Mas-
soud to take Kabul in an almost bloodless coup “and assume the role of defense
minister and strongman of the new government” (Edwards, 2002, p.168). How-
ever, his “inability to compromise with Pashtun commanders [. . . ] badly dented
his political reputation” and Massoud “was never to regain the trust of the Pash-
tuns, until after the Taliban had conquered the north in 1998” (Ahmed, 2000,
p.96). Beginning in the last two years of Najibullah’s rule and further aggravat-
ing until the Taliban conquered most of the country, Afghanistan had “collapsed
into hundreds of petty empires [. . . ] which were ruled by a myriad of warlords”
(Schetter, 2005, p.60). By the end of the 1980s there were about 6,000 local
military leaders “each with a complement of full-time fighters ranging from four
to hundreds” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.47).
The Islamic parties agreed to rotate the presidency and important posts
among them periodically. This agreement, and with it peace, were “predictably
short-lived as leaders refused to relinquish their formal posts at the end of their
allotted turns, and each tried to improve his military position at the expense
of the others.” (Edwards, 2002, p.168). Extensive fights ensued between the
main opponents, Ahmad Shah Massoud, Hekmatyar’sHezb-e Islami and the still
Saudi-financed Ittihad of Sayyaf117. Thus, the country was drawn into civil war.
117Ahmad Shah Massoud was a member of Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-e Islami. Rab-
bani and Sayyaf had both been professors at Kabul university. Sayyaf was imprisoned after
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Relentless rocket attacks in Kabul caused many civilians to flee the city. A fragile
agreement between the factions installed Rabbani as president and Hekmatyar
as prime minister in the winter of 1993. The feud between Hekmatyar and
Rabbani was “proved to be one of the defining fault lines of the Afghan jihad and
the subsequent civil war” (Edwards, 2002, p.140). The younger Hekmatyar was
influenced by the political confrontations which dominated Kabul University at
the end of the 1960s. Rabbani was focused on studying and only got involved in
politics after his return from Egypt, where he had been exposed to the Muslim
Brotherhood. He was “more open to compromise”, travelled to other countries,
learned other languages and had “wider experience in and awareness of a world
larger than Afghanistan” (Edwards, 2002, p.141).
At the same time ethnic tensions rose, mainly for the not unsubstantiated
fear of Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks that the institution of an Islamic republic
under the current power brokers would again lead to Pashtun domination and
suppression of their minorities. Yet, the leaders of the Islamic parties “were as
willing as ever to make opportunistic deals across ethnic boundaries” in order
“to exploit vulnerabilities of their rivals” (Edwards, 2002, p.169). In February
1993, Massoud and Sayyaf joined forces to attack the Shiite Hazaras who had a
stronghold in western Kabul. In January 1994, Hekmatyar and Dostum began
an offensive to oust President Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud. This attack
continued with varying intensity for the whole year and caused tens of thousands
to flee the capital. It was “halted only when Hekmatyar himself was forced by
the emergent Taliban militia to flee” from his camp in “Charasiab and set up
a new base at Sarobi, on the road between Kabul and Jalalabad” 118(Edwards,
2002, p.169). The rapid advances of the Taliban who had started their offensive
from Kandahar and soon reached the outer districts of Kabul prompted an-
other “power-sharing agreement” between Massoud, Rabbani and Hekmatyar.
The Taliban quickly secured vast areas of the country, which permitted them to
gather further resources and suffered their first major military defeat when they
attempted to take Kabul in March 1995 (Harpviken, 1997, p.280). After taking
Herat the same year, in the last quarter of 1996 the Taliban took Kabul and
forced all the leaders of the Islamic political parties “to flee for their lives”119
Daoud’s coup d’état and released only when the communists took power. “It is believed
that he escaped execution because he was a Kharoti Ghilzai and cousin of Hafizullah Amin;
these connections kept him alive long enough to benefit from Babrak’s gesture of clemency”
(Babrak Karmal had declared a general amnesty after being installed in Kabul by the Soviets)
(Edwards, 2002, p.154).
118Charasiab is located in the south of Kabul.
119The former socialist President Najibullah did not manage to escape. He and his brother
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(Edwards, 2002, p.169). These events ultimately set in motion their transforma-
tion from a non-state military actor into a more permanent government entity
(Harpviken, 1997, p.271). The Taliban thus instituted the ‘Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan’. Massoud was able to defend his stronghold in Panjshir but he
“became increasingly isolated and his struggle seemingly ever more quixotic”120
(Edwards, 2002, p.169). The other Islamic figureheads “had to content them-
selves with fulminating to the press, and when the press stopped listening, they
mounted websites to continue their efforts to prove that they alone should rule
Afghanistan” (Edwards, 2002, p.169).
Some consider the civil war to have been even more destructive than the
Soviet occupation. Divides along ethnic lines and religious sects deepened and
even many parties with the same ethnic and religious background became bitter
enemies. One massacre followed the other, regional mujahedin commanders
turned into warlords and frequently terrorized even their own people. In this
environment also the role of Islam changed dramatically again.
Historically, Islam in Afghanistan had been quite tolerant “to other Muslim
sects, other religions and modern lifestyle”, despite the deep devotion of most
Afghans (Ahmed, 2000, p.82). The Sunni Hanafi school of thought which was
followed by 90% of Afghans was “essentially non-hierarchical and decentralized”,
which is why many mullahs refused to join and to subordinate to the radical
Islamic parties in Peshawar. Many of them rather affiliated themselves with
more moderate and “traditional tribal-based parties” which never gained much
influence because foreign funding was not available to them. Also Sufism was
a moderating factor in Afghan Islam. Its tremendous popularity, especially but
not only among the poor, lasted for centuries. Until 1992, Jews, Hindus and
Sikhs “played a significant role in the country’s economy” (Ahmed, 2000, p.82).
They controlled the urban money markets “and when Afghan kings went to war
they often borrowed money from them” (Ahmed, 2000, p.82). But the civil war
and the rise of the Taliban changed this. These religious minorities fled the
country, and consequently important parts of the economy were crippled. A
Shahpur Ahmadzai were killed and their bodies were suspended from traffic-control posts
(Edwards, 2002, p.169).
120Massoud was assassinated in his Panjir fief “by two North Africans carrying Belgian pass-
ports” in 2001, just 3 days before 9/11 (Kepel, 2002, p.3). The killers claimed to be journalist
and carried “journalist’s cards issued by a radical Islamist news organization based in London”
(Kepel, 2002, p.3). They died “with Massoud when their booby-trapped camera exploded”
(Kepel, 2002, p.3). In retrospect this was clearly seen as a successful effort to eliminate the
most viable candidate for leadership in Afghanistan. His killing also indicates that the respon-
sible operatives anticipated an American military attack on the country as response to 9/11
and, subsequently, the possibility of a disempowerment of the Taliban (Kepel, 2002, p.4).
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new creed of Islamic extremism was created. An extremism in this radicalness
did not exist anywhere in the Muslim world before and “fitted nowhere in the
Islamic spectrum of ideas and movements that had emerged in Afghanistan
between 1979 and 1994” (Ahmed, 2000, p.87). The “Taliban represented nobody
but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own” (Ahmed, 2000,
p.88).
5.1 The rise of the Taliban
“From Holy War to Holy Terror” (Shahrani, 2002, p.716)
Only very few observers had even heard about the Taliban movement before
they engaged in their rapid offensive and triumphal march out of Kandahar in
1994. In fact, they had not even existed as a real military force before 1993.
Even though students from madrassas, who were already known as Taliban
long before, fought alongside various (also opposing) mujahedin commanders,
they never had formed a coherent movement. Most of them went back to their
madrassas after the fall of the Najibullah regime. Many of the Taliban claimed
that they only got engaged when they saw Afghanistan sliding into chaos ever
deeper (Ruttig, 2010, p.11).
Their instantaneous success was even more surprising since “no other military
force had been able to accomplish” such an advance “in the preceding eighteen
years of war” (Edwards, 2002, p.170). Markedly, the Taliban encountered almost
no resistance in the Pashtun areas. The factionalism among the resistance and
the rampant spread of warlordism had created “a total vacuum of leadership”
in “the Pashtun areas” (Ahmed, 2000, p.96). In addition, many mujahedin
commanders were frustrated by the constantly changing alliances, “the ease with
which they were held hostage over funds and weapons supplies”, and in general
by the way jihad was waged under the control of the various Islamic parties
(Ahmed, 2000, p.96). Yet, at the same time they also capitalized on the dramatic
factionalism. Local jihadi leaders “always had the option of realigning their
allegiance to a different group whenever they faced pressure to follow a particular
behaviour or strategy”, political expediency dictated it or increased financial
and military support could be expected from another faction (Giustozzi, 2009b,
p.44).
However, the capture of non-Pashtun regions by the Taliban involved signif-
icant bloodshed on both sides.
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In part the Taliban were a creation of the Pakistani intelligence service ISI
which “played a substantial role in organizing, arming, training, and financing”
them (Edwards, 2002, p.170). Two of the most prominent patrons of the Tal-
iban movement were the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army, General Aslam
Beg and Hamid Gul, head of the ISI121 (Ruttig, 2010, p.15). Still, the size of
the movement and the magnitude of their fierce motivation can not be fully
explained through the machinations of the notorious ISI alone.
The term Taliban means ‘religious students’ (talib ul-elm). Already in the
nineteenth century madrassa students had founded several political movements
which were considered to be “especially dangerous by the British colonial au-
thorities” (Edwards, 2002, p.170). Tribal uprisings could always be answered
with negotiations and with concessions to the economic interests of tribal lead-
ers and khans, or, if need be, with the obliteration of the revolting villages
(Edwards, 2002, p.170 and Edwards, 1998, p.724). However, the disciples of
madrassas “were everywhere and nowhere; they were often destitute and gen-
erally had much more to gain by keeping people in an agitated state than by
allowing a conflict to die down” (Edwards, 2002, p.170). In the nineteenth and
at the beginning of the twentieth century “becoming a taleb was one of the few
ways” an individual could escape poverty, improve social status and flee “the -
for some - claustrophobic world of the tribe and the village” (Edwards, 2002,
p.170, accentuation added).
Also during the Soviet occupation the madrassas opened the possibility of
upward social mobility to many of the underprivileged Afghan refugees in Pak-
istan, a majority of them Pashtuns from rural regions. Most madrassas managed
to stay independent of the Islamic political parties, whose factionalism con-
tributed to their decline in prestige (for more information about the Taliban’s
madrassas see p.106).
As mentioned before (see p.94) the role of Islam in Afghan politics had fun-
damentally changed. Since the foundation of the state, religion has always had
the function of supporting the various rulers. Now Islam had become “identical
with state rule”, and a power in its own right (Edwards, 2002, p.173).
Probably the most important cause for the Taliban’s swift advance through-
out the country was simple fatigue of a war-worn people. In addition, many
121The Pakistani support and the non-tribal stance of the Taliban may have been the two
reasons why they never demanded the institution of a greater Pashtunistan which includes
the areas between the Durand Line and the Indus and could have bolstered their relation with
Pakistani Taliban.
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areas had sunk into poverty and many areas were affected by a persevering
drought. The rural Pashtun populations, fed up with the mujahedin-turned-
bandits, thieves and rapists, “were willing to give the Taliban the benefit of
the doubt” even if many of the locals did not even know yet what “the Taliban
were or what they represented” (Edwards, 2002, p.171). Or at least, “tired of
the status quo”, they “weren’t willing to risk their own lives to defend those”
who had betrayed their interests and security, even if they were “from the same
tribe or ethnic unit” (Edwards, 2002, p.171f). When the Taliban movement
gained momentum in 1995, the news that they kept security spread from one
region to the next. In order to escape the constant encroachments of gunmen,
most Pashtuns were “willing to accept new leadership, despite its promises of
certain austerities and purist doctrines that deviated from established custom”
(Edwards, 2002, p.172). The basic security provided by Taliban rule meant
unhindered travel for persons and goods. People were freed from being at the
mercy of predatory commanders, paying exorbitant bribes at checkpoints, be-
ing searched and harassed and, maybe most importantly, the number of rapes
dramatically declined. For the war-weary Afghans this constituted a change of
great importance which brought about a general feeling of relief. The joy over
the new-found peace was not long-lived though. Initially many Afghans were
“impressed by the fact that [. . . ] the Taliban did not demand power for them-
selves” but claimed that after “restoring law and order” they would “hand over
power to a government which was made up of ‘good Muslims” ’ (Ahmed, 2000,
p.95). Many Afghans hoped “the Taliban would bring about territorial rein-
tegration of the country” since “the territorial shape of Afghanistan” had also
become “a defining symbol of national identity” (Schetter, 2005, p.61). Later
on it turned out, as we know, that the Taliban and Mullah Omar122 were to
cling to power, arguing that “Islam is against all political parties” and therefore
only a purely Islamic leadership, which they claimed to provide, was agreeable
to God (Ahmed, 2000, p.102).
Some authors argue that the “Taliban’s success story is [. . . ] linked to their
early occupation of valuable poppy cultivation areas in Southern and Eastern
Afghanistan, which enabled them to pay higher wages to their followers and
to their mercenaries” (Kreutzmann, 2007, p.610). Even though it was officially
denounced as un-Islamic, poppy cultivation strongly increased especially around
the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar in 1996 and 1997 (Goodhand, 2005, p.200).
122His full name was Mullah Muhammad Omar Akhund.
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Goodhand stated that the “Taliban’s attitude towards” drugs “was marked by a
curious mixture of religious principles, ambiguity and expediency” (Goodhand,
2005, p.200). Only after two edicts of Mullah Omar from 1999 and 2000 in
which he declared poppy cultivation as haram (un-Islamic, sinful) and after the
Taliban began to rigorously enforce the ban, production declined from 3,330
tons of opium p.a. to 200 tons123 (Kreutzmann, 2007, p.613, Goodhand, 2005,
p.200). There are mainly three different theories about why the Taliban insti-
tuted this ban. First, it really happened for religious reasons and/or for the
negative social effects increased drug abuse had brought about (Kreutzmann,
2007, p.612). Second, it was an attempt to bolster Mullah Omar’s struggle for
international recognition and to appease to Western powers. Third, “the mar-
ket price had dropped significantly due to high stockpiles of opium and the ban
was implemented to reduce supplies” (Kreutzmann, 2007, p.613). Kreutzmann
conclusively tries to disprove the first two theories: “theological and diplomatic
initiatives were contradicted by other actions such as earlier tolerance of poppy
cultivation and the blasting of the Bamiyan Buddhas”124 (Kreutzmann, 2007,
p.613). The third theory, to the contrary, is bolstered by the fact that even
major drug traffickers had pressured the Taliban to intervene against the low
prices, and a ten-fold increase of the opium price occurred during the following
year (Barnett und Sherman, 2008, p.18, Kreutzmann, 2007, p.613). Neverthe-
less, the Taliban “consistently tried to convince the United States to recognize it
as Afghanistan’s legitimate government” (Tarzi, 2008, p.304). A rapprochement
that seemed to have gained the Clinton adminstration’s approval when the Cal-
ifornia based company UNOCAL, together with Saudi Delta Oil, engaged in the
preparation to construct a gas and oil pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan,
right through Afghanistan’s ‘Pashtun belt’125 (Tarzi, 2008, p.304, Rashid, 2004,
123Thereafter the Afghan opium and heroin production swiftly reached enormous heights
again, surmounting global demand and creating stockpiles in the size of the annual worldwide
demand. The distribution of earnings is estimated to be as follows: Afghan farmers earn about
440 million dollars per year, Afghan traffickers about 2.2 billion dollars a year, the Taliban
tax both of them and thereby create an annual revenue of about 170 million dollars (UNODC
u. a., 2011, p.12).
124Reportedly the Afghan Taliban were not really interested in the destruction of the Buddha
statues. However, their Arab donors exerted pressure and threatened to reduce funding if the
Taliban would not comply and destroy this world cultural heritage (Tarzi, 2008, p.306).
125Al-Quaeda was afraid to be pushed to the sidelines because of this cooperation between
the US and the Taliban. The formers’ terrorist attacks the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar
es Salam in 1998 were attempts to disrupt the relation between the United States and the
Taliban. Zalmay Khalilzad, the later US ambassador in Kabul, and Hamid Karzai worked for
UNOCAL and were tasked to bribe the Taliban in order to establish security along the route
of the pipeline (Rashid, 2004, p.89). The US launched some cruise missiles against assumed
Al-Quaeda camps in Afghanistan as a response to the terror in Africa. UNOCAL cancelled
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p.88).
While the regime had provoked many hostilities in Pashtun areas, the di-
visions with other ethnic groups, already deepened during the Soviet war, had
further increased. The Taliban claimed to purely follow Islam, “to be Muslims
first” without attaching “any importance [. . . ] to ethnic or tribal belonging” and
therefore being “above tribal and ethnic divisions” (Centlivres und Centlivres-
Demont, 2000, p.425). The Taliban’s claim that ethnic affiliations of the Afghan
peoples had no importance in their view, a claim that was doubted by many
non-Pashtuns, was underlined by their exclusive recognition of only their form
of “rigorous Islam”, whose norms are the Taliban’s “own interpretation of the
Shariat” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 2000, p.425). After initial hopes
that favoritism for Pashtuns would end had faded, the non-Pashtun peoples of
Afghanistan saw the Taliban movement as a new form of Pashtun hegemony.
The Taliban’s claim to fight a jihad “in the spirit of the Prophet” and that
they only attack “corrupt, evil Muslims” such as “rapacious warlords” was inter-
preted by many as being simply a religious “cover to exterminate non-Pashtuns”
(Ahmed, 2000, p.87). Uzbeks, Hazaras and Tajiks had controlled almost half of
the country at the end of the Soviet occupation. They showed “little willingness
to relinquish their hard-earned autonomy” and to abandon their “often consid-
erably more liberal traditions [. . . ] with regard to female veiling and the right
of individuals to worship as often and with whom they please”126 (Edwards,
2002, p.175). As Janata has put it: “They never again will accept Pushtun
hegemony.” (Janata, 1990, p.69).
One obvious sign of this development was, that due to the disappearance of
the educational system and the majority of the refugees being Pashtuns, most
Afghans of other ethnic groups did not learn the two main languages of the
country, Dari and Pashto, anymore. They were more likely to only speak in
its pipeline project and the country “was now seen as a pariah” (Tarzi, 2008, p.305). However,
the gain for Al-Quaeda did not last long. As soon as the smoke had cleared, the US tried to
strengthen its ties to the Taliban again (Tarzi, 2008, p.306). The Al-Quaeda attack against
the USS Cole in 2000 was further testament to this. Arab pressure finally “convinced” the
Taliban to take a more isolationist stance (Giustozzi, 2008, p.12). Also their rigid adherence
to the Sharia made “contacts with the rest of the world difficult and unpractical” (Giustozzi,
2008, p.12). Organizationally, there are no Afghans in Al-Quaeda’s leadership and “no Arabs
in the Taliban command structure” (Ruttig, 2010, p.18).
126In some areas local populations fought back when the Taliban tried to impose their rigid
ways of, “for example, how to celebrate a marriage or a circumcision” (Edwards, 2002, p.175).
There were uprisings in the eastern Pashtun provinces of Khost and Kunar, but also in Mazar-i
Sharif (in1997) where thousands died, in Herat and the Hazarajat. Many Pashtuns “resent the
Qandahari ascendance almost as much as Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Shi’a Hazaras do” (Edwards,
2002, p.175).
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their native tongue and, if at all, to learn Urdu as a second language. In the
1990s Afghanistan presented itself as ethnically more divided than ever. While
Pashtuns controlled the country south of the Hindu Kush, Tajiks and Uzbeks
were competing for dominance in the north, and Hazaras were “holding out
against both sides in the center” (Edwards, 2002, p.175).
Many social and cultural restrictions pronounced by the Taliban soon re-
minded rural tribal populations of various ethnic backgrounds of the commu-
nists’ overreaches. The Taliban adroitly substituted “tribal or regional identities
in favor of what might be called ‘village identity” ’ (Edwards, 2002, p.171). This
was achieved by proclaiming their goal to reinstate a ‘purified culture of Islam’
modeled after the Islamic traditions practiced in rural villages as opposed to
the corrupted, elitist deviations of Islam pursued by the former Islamic party
leaders who had been products of an aloof, urban culture at Kabul University.
Most Taliban never knew what life in Afghan villages was like, “but this was still
an effective position to take, given the nostalgia people felt for the world they
remembered or at least imagined before the war” (Edwards, 2002, p.171). The
“idealized [. . . ] ordinary village existence [. . . ] had been absent for twenty years
and [. . . ] was longed for all the more for that reason.” (Edwards, 2002, p.172).
Many tribes grew increasingly suspicious towards the Taliban’s attempts to in-
stitute “religious mores that are more parochial and conservative than those of
the vast majority of Afghans [. . . ] from rural areas” and especially doing so “un-
der the cover of ‘village morality” ’ and perceived it to be a foreign moral code, as
they did when confronted with the communists’ ideology(Edwards, 2002, p.174).
A “morality” that not only forbids all kinds of amusements, traditional games,
playing music, ‘Western’ haircuts and so on, but that is also impractical in ev-
ery day life. Particularly, when it comes to the division of labor between men
and women and in its conflict with “everyday realities of tilling fields, tending
flocks, and raising children” this “morality” did not have much connection to the
traditional real village life127 (Edwards, 2002, p.174).
127Ironically, the villages around Kandahar which produced Mullah Omar and many of the
top Taliban cadres “are famous throughout Afghanistan for their enjoyment of music, dancing,
and games of various sorts” (Edwards, 2002, p.174). Only some northern Pashtuns were
already traditionally known not to dance - and to shave their heads, something southern
Pashtuns did not do (Hart, 2001, p.155).
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One of the most astonishing conclusions Edwards draws from his analysis of
the Taliban regime is that they did not
“rule through fear but [. . . ] out of fear. The fear that grips the
regime more than any other is the fear of having any intercourse
with the larger world; an intercourse, with its sexual connotations,
is the appropriate word to use in this context, for in the Taliban
vision of the world all relations with outsiders, particularly non-
Muslims, carry the taint of the licentious and forbidden” (Edwards,
2002, p.178).
Even though most Pashtun’s dedication to Islam is, as mentioned at several
occasions in this paper, extraordinarily strong, many of them resented the or-
thodoxy of the Taliban and the fact that a government would dictate behavior
in these matters128. So in general it can be said that the Taliban were not
welcomed with enthusiasm and were “a product of exhaustion” rather than “ex-
citation”, a product “of nostalgia for an uncomplicated past more than hope
for a glorious future” (Edwards, 1998, p.726). Soon though, the Taliban were
resented by many Afghans. Not only for their extreme ideology and its bru-
tal implementation, but also because they were perceived “as a puppet regime
dominated by Pakistan and al Quaeda Arabs” (Barfield, 2004, p.289).
5.2 The Islamic extremist ideology of the Taliban
The Taliban “instituted an uncompromising moral severity and inflexibility that,
abuses aside, does not mesh well” with core Pashtun traditional values, “espe-
cially the valorization of individual autonomy”129 (Edwards, 2002, p.174). Their
actual ideology is “much less clear-cut” than a first look might lead us to be-
lieve. Glatzer “described it as an ‘eclectic ad hoc’ mixture full of ‘contradictions,
breakouts, gaps, alterations and highly idiosyncratic interpretations” ’ (Ruttig,
2010, p.16). One could say that the broad mass of the Taliban just obey the
leadership and especially Mullah Omar. The Taliban never created any form of
“sophisticated political programme” and simply claimed that “‘Islam is the way’
and Quran and sharia make further programmatic explanations superfluous”
(Ruttig, 2010, p.22).
128The Taliban tried, for example, to abolish the common practice of Sufi traditions and
shrine visitations and to drive people into mosques on Fridays (Barfield, 2004, p.289).
129For more information about the importance of autonomy see also p.34.
104
In addition, most Taliban foot soldiers do not know much about the Sharia,
the Koran or Islamic and Afghan history and simply follow and believe the
movement’s leaders, whatever they proclaim (Ahmed, 2000, p.93). This leader-
ship though has been exposed to definable and traceable influences of militant
political Islam.
The belief system of the Taliban is influenced by Wahabbism and Deoban-
dism. Wahabbism, a tradition within the Sunni Hanafism, founded by Abdul
Wahab (1703 - 1792) in Saudi Arabia, is a strict and austere form of Islam. In
Afghanistan it did not have any significant support before the war. Wahabbi
Afghans, who were also referred to as Salafis130 and some Arab mujahedin like
Osama bin Laden131 “won a small Pashtun following, largely due to the lavish
funds and weapons at their disposal” (Ahmed, 2000, p.85). Arabs were not
very well liked among Pashtuns in general and the Taliban in particular - ex-
cept for providing financial means. There seem to be widespread mutual racist
prejudices between them which have limited “the potential for cooperation” and
the Arab fighters were renown to resort to extreme and inappropriate levels of
violence132 (Ruttig, 2010, p.18).
The Deobandi branch of Sunni Hanafism had a long history in Afghanistan
but it has never been as extreme as in the Taliban’s practice - a radicalness “the
original Deobandi would never have recognized” (Ahmed, 2000, p.88). Deoban-
dism was founded in the middle of the nineteenth century in the central Indian
city of Deoband and was taught in a madrassa of the founders133. “They aimed
to train a new generation of learned Muslims who would revive Islamic values
based on intellectual learning, spiritual experience, Sharia law and Tariaqath or
the path” (Ahmed, 2000, p.88). Their school of thought expanded constantly
over a century and was inspired and well connected to the “Ikhwan ul Muslimeen
or the Muslim Brotherhood which was set up in Egypt in 1928 with the aim
of bringing about an Islamic revolution and creating an Islamic state” (Ahmed,
2000, p.86, accentuation added). By 1967 “there were 9.000 Deobandi madras-
130The term Salafist is used for radical Islamists from various backgrounds all over the
Muslim world. The “Salafi family includes most of the militant groups” from Afghanistan to
Algeria and commands a strong presence in some European countries, particularly in Britain
(Roy, 2004, p.234).
131Osama bin Laden came to Afghanistan first in 1981, in order to fight the Soviets. After
his return to Saudi Arabia he organized protests against the government and the US and was
forced to exile in Sudan. In 1995, the Pakistani intelligence service “brokered a deal to move
bin Laden and his entourage from Sudan [. . . ] into Afghanistan” (Shahrani, 2002, p.720). The
US unofficially approved of the deal, hoping that they would get rid of him that way.
132See also p.71 and p.109
133Mohammed Qasim Nanautawi (1833-1877) and Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905).
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sas across South Asia” and in 1971 the number had emerged to 900 madrassas
in Pakistan(Ahmed, 2000, p.88). In 1988 the number of madrassas in Pakistan
funded by Zia ul-Haq’s regime and through donations of more than 45 Muslim
countries had skyrocketed to 8.000 official madrassas “and 25.000 unregistered
ones, educating over half a million students” (Ahmed, 2000, p.89). With no
central hierarchy in place the Deobandis split into several groups, most of them
being extremist134.
One of the most important factions was led by Maulana Samiul Haq, whose
madrassa, the Haqqania, was to educate many of the later Taliban ministers,
governors, judges and administrators. 80% of the military commanders from
the Pashtun areas had studied there as well (Ahmed, 2000, p.90). Haq, born
in 1937, takes pride in advising Mullah Omar and the Taliban leadership who
would consult him in important strategic or religious questions. He is one of
the most active recruiters for Pakistani Taliban. When the Taliban suffered
a devastating defeat in Mazar-i Sharif in 1997 (see also p.112), Mullah Omar
called Haq for help. “Haq shut down his madrassa and sent his entire student
body to fight alongside the Taliban” (Ahmed, 2000, p.91). Samiul Haq and his
Deobandi followers also demanded and advanced efforts to establish a Taliban
regime in Pakistan and he was convinced that “the Islamic revolution comes to
Pakistan”135 (Ahmed, 2000, p.91). Pakistan’s financial aid for the madrassas
and the Taliban was “thus coming back to haunt the country itself” but the
country’s leaders, ignorant and unable to cope with the challenge, “continue
to support the Taliban” (Ahmed, 2000, p.93). Possible explanations for this
strategy could be that they hope to sustain a minimum of influence by further
funding these extremist groups, or they are afraid of mass uprisings if funds run
dry.
Over the time there have been some discussions whether there is a divide
between “moderate” and “hardline” Taliban. Yet, this categorization proved
to be misleading and failed to explain the controversies within the movement.
There simply “is no organised or recognisable ‘moderate [. . . ] faction’ [. . . ] to
counterbalance the ‘religious’ hardliners” (Ruttig, 2010, p.24). There is more
134There were also some pro-Western, liberal Deobandis who taught arts and sciences in their
madrassas in order to catch up with the elites. Yet, those were soon pushed to the sidelines
by the more orthodox and radical ones (Ahmed, 2000, p.88).
135In 1997 Pakistani Taliban rioted in Karachi. By 1998 they “were banning TV and videos in
towns along the Pashtun belt, imposing Sharia punishments such as stoning and amputation
in defiance of the legal system, killing Pakistani Shia and forcing people, particularly women,
to adapt to the Taliban dress code and way of life” (Ahmed, 2000, p.93). Samiul Haq is also
an influential politician and served in the Pakistani Senate.
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explanatory power in a differentiation of the approach various actors might
favor. “On the one side, there are pragmatic, politically thinking, pro talks”
Taliban who prefer a political solution to a protracted bloodshed and who are
“concerned about the indiscriminate slaughter of Afghan civilians”, but are still
ultra-orthodox extremist Islamists (Ruttig, 2010, p.15, p.24). “On the other
side are those who favor a purely military approach, often combined with a
hypertrophic recourse to terrorist means” (Ruttig, 2010, p.24). The former are
dissatisfied with the extent and the consequences of the latter’s use of suicide
bombers. The majority of the fatalities in these terrorist attacks are Muslims, a
fact that is considered to be a sin by the first group. The second group prefers
a violent victory, whatever it costs. These differences have surfaced already
during civil war but came to the foreground when the Taliban regrouped as a
guerrilla movement after their ousting by US troops. Still, even if their methods
differ, they both have the same aim of reintroducing a Taliban-led emirate.
Deobandi groups, mostly sympathetic to Saudi Wahhabism, established a
number of military training camps (for example in Khost under the guidance
of Osama bin Laden). Their madrassas sent fighters not only to Afghanistan
but also to “Kashmir, Chechnya and Bosnia” (Ahmed, 2000, p.92). Many of
the Deobandi leaders were Durrani Pashtuns from the Kandahar area and from
Chaman, a Pakistani city 100 km from Kandahar and right at the border of the
two countries. Yet, the Deobandi tradition is strictly opposed to tribal organi-
zational structures, a stance expressed in the Taliban’s mistrust of tribal leaders
and their subsequent elimination, either physical or from their leadership roles
(Ahmed, 2000, p.92). Furthermore, Deobandis as well as Taliban strictly op-
posed the Shiite creed of Islam and therefore also Iran. The Taliban massacred
Shiite Hazaras and other Afghan Shiite minorities so bloodthirstily that it “had
no precedent in Afghan history” (Ahmed, 2000, p.83). Kepel put it into more
drastic words, describing the Deobandis as “paramilitary groups who specialize
in butchering Pakistani Shiites” (Kepel, 2002, p.3). The new kind of extremism
“clearly debased the Deobandi tradition of learning and reform”, and the Tal-
iban’s stiffness was “accepting no concept of doubt except as sin and considering
debate as little more than heresy” (Ahmed, 2000, p.93). ‘Heresy’ and ‘apostasy’
were the grounds on which the Taliban asserted the right to kill whoever was in
their way (Barnett, 2003, p.570).
They do not even debate with slightly differing extremist, radical Muslim
groups as only their own way is acceptable and they reject “all Muslim ruling
elites as corrupt” (Ahmed, 2000, p.93). This constitutes a standpoint that
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has resonated across the Muslim world “and inspired a younger generation of
Islamic militants” who oppose their respective leaders (Ahmed, 2000, p.94).
The Taliban rigorously object to modernism “and have no desire to understand
or adopt modern ideas of progress or economic development” (Ahmed, 1983b,
p.93).
The imposition of the burqa on women is, according to Edwards, “the best
symbol for the fearful spirit that animates Taliban rulers” (Edwards, 2002,
p.178). They try to maintain a strict division of the male and the female,
the public and the private. Forcing women to wear a burqa seeks to eliminate
“situations of insecurity and ambiguity” and “speaks to [. . . ] men’s need to
maintain control over uncertain circumstances whatever the costs to themselves
and their dependents” may be (Edwards, 2002, p.178). He goes on to compare
the atmosphere of departure among young Afghan students in the 1970s who
were curious and had a great appetite to see the world as well as to create a
modern country, modeled after Western examples, to the Taliban:
“Now the youthful faces of the Taliban, faces that have known mostly
war, refugee camps, and the cloistered confines of all-male madrasas,
stare back with unblinking negation. Nothing outside their own
world is good, nothing outside their own experience and their scrip-
tural lessons is worth emulating or caring about. The world for them
is closed.” (Edwards, 2002, p.178).
5.3 The organizational structure of the Taliban
The Taliban are a “network of networks” and their most coherent alliances
are built around the Kandahari faction of Mullah Omar and the clans of the
Haqqani, Mansur and Khales from southeastern and eastern regions (Ruttig,
2010, p.13). Nevertheless, the latter three networks are rather “regional than
‘tribal” ’ (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). Some of them include fighters from very distinct
backgrounds. For example Mullah Dadullah136, who became known for his
“extensive use of suicide bombers” and his strong connections to Saudi Arabia,
united fighters from many tribes as well as foreign fighters under his command137
136Mullah Dadullah was killed by NATO forces in May 2007 (Ruttig, 2010, p.8).
137Quite some Taliban commanders did not allow foreign fighters into their territory because
of their inclination and reputation to act exceedingly brutal. Avoiding this brute force was
necessary in order to preclude cycles of retaliatory violence (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). When local
commanders “behave too ‘softly’ with the population” Kandahari Taliban are brought in
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(Ruttig, 2010, p.13). In recent years though also the Haqqani network expanded
into “Wardak, Logar and Kabul provinces” (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). The local com-
manders are integrated in a centralized hierarchy, and their rank depends on
the size of the territory they control.
In general terms there are three different kinds of networks, and their com-
mon cohesive force is comradeship (andiwali, habitually originating in the com-
mon resistance to the Soviets) (Ruttig, 2010, p.14). They are either religious
and thus created in madrassas and mosques, or they are political or tribal.
The Taliban leadership can draw from all of these three networks (which fre-
quently overlap) “when mobilisation, support, solidarity, etc. is needed” (Rut-
tig, 2010, p.14). These networks complement each other in a vertical and in
a horizontal organizational structure. The vertical structure is expressed by
the strict compliance to Mullah Omar and the “supra-tribal and supra-ethnic”
ultra-orthodox Islamist ideology (Ruttig, 2010, p.22). The horizontal structures
reflect the movement’s “strong roots in the segmented Pashtun tribal society”
and are advantageous for recruitment and the legitimacy or authority of local
commanders (Ruttig, 2010, p.22). The vertical structure provides a cohesion
which is remarkable for Afghan standards, a country where factionalism was
the everlasting norm. The “horizontal dimension” allows for an organizational
elasticity which gives a small but evidently “sufficient degree of autonomy” to
“local commanders, and prevents them from feeling over-controlled” (Ruttig,
2010, p.23).
The Taliban grew up in Afghan refugee villages in Pakistan. Many of them
were too young to remember what Afghanistan was like before the war and many
of them were orphans. Loyalty to watan, “to descent group, to tribal ancestor,
even to family” lost much of its former importance138 (Edwards, 2002, p.171).
After having spent years in “quasi-monastic” schools and being disillusioned by
the corruption and infighting of the political Islamic leadership, the Taliban
movement offered the possibility to realize “what they had been discussing in
theory” for a long time: the establishment of a ‘truly’ religious Islamic state
(Edwards, 2002, p.171).
The transformation of the Taliban from student group to military movement
was almost flawless. Furthermore, the leaders of the movement remained largely
(Ruttig, 2010, p.13). Almost all Taliban commanders use the title “Mullah”, even though
only few are mullahs in the conventional sense (Ruttig, 2010, p.23).
138Because they lacked social ties which bring about social control and mutual obligations,
orphans and men who were not integrated in a family structure were “the most feared members
of society” (Grima, 2004, p.36).
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invisible and decisions were made in a council of Islamic clerics in Kandahar that
“was nominally headed by the rarely seen and seldom heard” Mullah Omar139
(Edwards, 2002, p.171). Mullah Omar’s “simplicity of lifestyle and participation
in the military activities” contributed to his reputation among fighters who
attributed to him “almost legendary qualities” (Tarzi, 2008, p.291).
Edwards concludes that the leaders’ policy to keep a low profile, which
proved to be a success, was a response “to the people’s disillusionment with
the all-too-visible” ambitious Islamic party leaders who were eagerly seeking to
be in the limelight, battling for fame and power (Edwards, 2002, p.171). In
addition, this approach helped to sustain “the appearance of unity”, which was
a great accomplishment compared to the fighting among their predecessors (Ed-
wards, 2002, p.173). In the beginning the Taliban’s decision making processes
were based on “consensus building” by the shura (see also p.80 for explana-
tion), a “collective political leadership”, in Kandahar (Ahmed, 2000, p.95). The
functioning of this council was modeled after the traditional Pashtun jirga (see
p.44) and claimed to represent a “consensus amongst ‘the believers” ’ (Ahmed,
2000, p.95). Ahmed attended one such early shura in Kandahar, but already
back then final decisions were usually taken by Mullah Omar. It is not clear
though, how exactly Mullah Omar attained the status as a leader. His lead-
ership quickly took the form of a “highly centralized, secretive, dictatorial and
inaccessible” rule (Ahmed, 2000, p.95). Ahmed went on to describe the organi-
zation as that of a “secret society run mainly by Kandaharis”140 (Ahmed, 2000,
p.98).
The Taliban did not include any “Afghan intellectuals and technocrats” in
their administration, “as they considered them the spawn of a Western or Soviet-
style educational system which they detested” (Ahmed, 2000, p.97). They “re-
placed all senior Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara bureaucrats with Pashtuns, whether
qualified or not” (Kepel, 2002, p.234). Through the loss of expertise many gov-
ernment agencies “ceased to function”141 (Ahmed, 2000, p.101). The “students
139After the fall of the Taliban following the US engagement, parts of the Taliban’s leadership
around Mullah Omar regrouped in Quetta, Pakistan, roughly 50 km from the Afghan border,
and formed the so-called Quetta-shura. It is widely believed that a majority of the Quetta-
shura’s leaders is under more or less direct control of the Pakistani intelligence community,
particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is actively protected by current ad retired
intelligence officials (Giustozzi, 2008, p.25). One of the shura’s leaders is Sirajuddin Haqqani,
member of the powerful Haqqani network. See also p.91.
140It is said that before being ousted by the USA in 2001, Mullah Omar had left the city
only once in order to visit Kabul in 1996 (Ahmed, 2000, p.98).
141Government offices were opened at 8 a.m. for four hours. Then the Taliban would pray,
enjoy a long siesta and then prepare for long council meetings at night. Most people did not
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of religion” simply “had no interest in state machinery” (Kepel, 2002, p.234).
Except for “war, commerce, and religion, they couldn’t care less about what
happened under their rule” (Kepel, 2002, p.234). This also meant that they did
not pursue or implement any social policies. Food and basic health services were
preferably provided by Islamist humanitarian organizations, but they could not
deliver everything which was needed. In order to avoid uprisings of the deprived
and hunger-stricken masses, Western NGOs were allowed in. The relationship
between the Taliban, the West and the NGOs became strained, when one of the
NGOs was accused of “Christian proselytism - a major crime under the sharia,
since Muslims who convert to another faith are dubbed apostates and con-
demned to death” (Kepel, 2002, p.234). Some Afghans and foreign NGO staff
were jailed and awaited trial under “Islamic justice” (Kepel, 2002, p.235). This
event cost the Taliban the last sympathies they had enjoyed in some powerful
US political circles (Kepel, 2002, p.235).
Even major mujahedin commanders who surrendered were not allowed as-
cension in the Taliban military hierarchy, since they were discredited for their
former party affiliations and warlordish behavior. Most of the traditional tribal
leadership had already been eliminated by events during the Soviet occupation
(see also p.80) and “what little of the old Pashtun leadership was left” could
easily be annihilated by the Taliban (Ahmed, 2000, p.97). Thereby they also
eliminated the possibility of any political threat from inside the Pashtun realm.
The Supreme Shura in Kandahar consisted of old friends of Mullah Omar,
almost all of whom were Durrani Pashtuns. It never included any Ghilzai Pash-
tuns. It had ten permanent members and could be extended to up to 50 people,
including military commanders or members of the subordinate shuras in Kabul
and the provinces. The two shuras of Kabul142, one being a council of the act-
ing ministers, the other being the military council, had to cede all important
decisions to Kandahar. Sometimes even minuscule edicts of Kabul were revoked
by Mullah Omar (Ahmed, 2000, p.98). Questions of military strategy, “key ap-
pointments and the allocation of funds for offensives” were decided by Mullah
Omar (Ahmed, 2000, p.100).
Also the administrative officials and members of shuras in the provinces,
including those with non-Pashtun majorities, were almost exclusively Kandahari
turn to government institutions anymore because they knew it would be to no effect (Ahmed,
2000, p.101).
142The 17 members of the Kabul Shura comprised “at least eight” Durranis, three Ghilzais
“and only two were non-Pashtuns” (Ahmed, 2000, p.98).
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Pashtuns. They did “not speak Dari, the lingua franca” of non-Pashtun areas
or spoke it poorly (Ahmed, 2000, p.99). Furthermore, there were “no prominent
local citizens in any of these local Shuras” (Ahmed, 2000, p.99).
Mullah Omar kept watch that none of the governors or ministers was able “to
build up a local power base” and regularly shifted them all around the country
or sent them to battle as front commanders “at a moment’s notice” (Ahmed,
2000, p.99, p.101). Close to all members of the Kabul and Kandahar shuras,
“except for those with physical disabilities, have acted as military commander at
some time or the other” (Ahmed, 2000, p.101). It lead to major consternation
among international aid agencies and the UN, when the ministers they had been
negotiating with about humanitarian aid suddenly left office for some months in
order to command a punitive expedition, a massacre or to be directly involved
in fights at the front. Also, while the ministers were engaged at the front, the
ministries were unable to take any decisions (Ahmed, 2000, p.101). These fre-
quent shifts, combined with the all-encompassing control Mullah Omar wanted
to exert over his ministers, which sometimes delayed even insignificant decisions
for months, resulted in chaos, confusion and eventually in the total absence of
state governance. At the same time there were enough resources for thousands
of Taliban cadres and bureaucrats (mostly “young zealots”) to patrol the streets
“with whips, long sticks and kalashnikovs” and to “force the male population
to grow long beards” and the women to obey all kinds of extreme rules (for
example to not make any sound with their shoes while walking) (Ahmed, 2000,
p.101, p.105). This ‘religious police’ was called “Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi An
al-Munkar, or the Department of the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention
of Vice” and was probably the most active government agency, busily enforcing
ever new radical edicts (Ahmed, 2000, p.105).
Even though he did not hold a formal position, Mullah Omar was the ab-
solute leader of the military forces. After the Taliban defeat at Mazar-i Sharif
in 1997, where they had “lost some 3,000 of their best troops” and “3,600 were
taken prisoner”, some Ghilzai commanders who provided the bulk of the fighters,
criticized the military leadership. They were angry about “not being consulted
on military and political issues”, being excluded from the Supreme Shura and
increasingly refused to be “used as cannon fodder by the Taliban” (Ahmed, 2000,
p.99). This forced the Taliban to fall back on less experienced Pakistani fight-
ers (for example from the Haqqania madrassa, see also p.106). In 1999 about
30% of the Taliban’s roughly 30,000 fighting troops were provided by Pakistani
madrassas. These numbers could be augmented dramatically before certain mil-
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itary raids. In its organization the Taliban army resembled that of a traditional
lashkar (see also p.25 and p.44), except for their ties not necessarily being based
on kinship and the Taliban being prohibited to loot (one of the main purposes
of a tribal lashkar). Until their defeat at Mazar-i Sharif in 1997, the Taliban
were relatively disciplined in this respect (Ahmed, 2000, p.100). Most of the
Taliban fighters did not receive fixed, regular salaries but their commanders
decided about “an adequate sum of money” they would receive “when they go
on home leave” (Ahmed, 2000, p.100). The only ones who were to be paid on a
regular basis were professional soldiers who were recruited from the former com-
munist army (Ahmed, 2000, p.100). Most of them were Pashtuns who worked
as “tank drivers, gunners, pilots and mechanics” and were rather simple merce-
naries fighting for whoever controlled Kabul and provided an acceptable income
(Ahmed, 2000, p.100).
Mullah Omar confided the implementation of his decisions increasingly on
the Kandahari ulema (see p.30 for definition) and the religious police in Kabul.
He did not even consult the Supreme Shura in Kandahar anymore, but no one
was willing or able to contest his leadership. All the shuras accepted him as
the highest authority, the “Amir-ul Momineen” (Commander of the Faithful),
to rule in line with the Sharia. Any deviation from or criticism of his rulings
was considered contradicting Islamic law (Ahmed, 2000, p.102). Mullah Omar
relied only on a very small and secretive circle of friends. The most prominent
member of this group was Maulvi Said Mohammed Pasanai, “the Chief Justice of
Kandahar’s Islamic Supreme Court, who had taught Omar the basics of Sharia
law during the jihad” (Ahmed, 2000, p.102).
Deteriorating economic conditions and an intensifying alienation with large
parts of the population, combined “with massive military losses” in the north
“led to increasing internal divisions” (Ahmed, 2000, p.103). A revolt arose in the
Taliban’s heartland around Kandahar as a result of forced conscription. “Taliban
recruiters were killed by villagers who refused to join the army” (Ahmed, 2000,
p.103). Ahmed reports from interviews he conducted in 1998 that village elders
pronounced their anger saying that the “Taliban had promised peace, instead
they have given us nothing but war” (Ahmed, 2000, p.103). Mullah Omar
could once again rely on the manpower of Pakistani madrassas but soon “acts
of looting and robbery by Taliban soldiers” multiplied, “reflecting the growing
indiscipline caused by economic hardship”143 (Ahmed, 2000, p.104).
143Taliban fighters who were caught in such incidents had their right arms and left feet
amputated by authorities. They then “hung the amputated limbs from trees in the city centre
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Behind the scenes there was a struggle between different groups of Taliban.
It is said that Mullah Rabbani, the head of the Kabul Shura, co-founder of
the Taliban movement and acting prime minister144, got involved in adapting
a more “moderate” stance in order to gain access to much needed foreign hu-
manitarian aid. However, foreigners in general and UN staff in particular were
labeled as infidels and spies by the leadership surrounding Mullah Omar who
therefore obstructed most of these attempts. Rumors have it, that Rabbani
built a power base among the influential traders of Jalalabad who saw their
commerce and smuggling activities suffer under the Taliban’s strictness. Many
of his decisions were overturned by Mullah Omar. After Mullah Rabbani had
made some concessions to US special envoy Bill Richardson in 1998. He disap-
peared “on one of his periodic long leaves”, and many believed he was arrested.
In the end though these tensions never really rose to surface, no Taliban leader
was “willing to contradict Omar or oppose him” and Mullah Omar surely kept
total control of the movement (Ahmed, 2000, p.104).
Other tensions, respectively “a high level of mutual mistrust”, arose between
the Kandaharis and Pashtuns from the Paktia province since the latter saw
themselves excluded from the inner leadership circles (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). Fur-
ther rivalries were continuations of “traditional” conflicts, for example between
Durranis from Kandahar and Ghilzais from Zabul, who competed for influential
posts in the Taliban hierarchy (Ruttig, 2010, p.14).
5.4 Traditional tribal structures and the Taliban
As described in the previous chapters, tribal structures have been confronted
with challenges on many levels. Even if the Taliban have presented themselves as
supra-tribal and in some ways anti-tribal movement (since they strictly oppose
traditional tribal rivalries and claims to power) in a variety of ways they rely on
some tribal structures which are still functioning. The Taliban often have failed
to contain inner tribal divisions and frequently the “parochial interests of a local
commander overrode the non-tribal attitude of the leadership” (Ruttig, 2010,
p.14). The tribal features of the Taliban are more pronounced in the periphery
and where the control of its central leadership is weaker.
The massive migratory movements of the past have “narrowed the urban-
rural gap” and “gradually undermined and transformed the traditional relation-
where they could be seen by the public until they rotted” (Ahmed, 2000, p.104).
144Not to be mistaken with Burhanuddin Rabbani of Jamiat-e Islami.
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ships of village, tribal and ethnic communities” (Ruttig, 2010, p.8). One of
the core values in Pashtun tribal organization, the respect for the elders (see
also p.36), has lost much of its importance during the decades of war. Young
men “questioned the authority of the ‘elders’ whom they held responsible for
these conflicts or, at least, for their inability to solve them with their traditional
means”145 (Ruttig, 2010, p.8, see also Rashid, 2004, p.23). The warlords of the
anti-Soviet jihad, drug barons and other militarily and economically powerful
newcomers can “ignore jirga decisions with impunity” and nowadays “might of-
ten trumps pashtunwalai and even Islamic law” (Ruttig, 2010, p.8). With the
decreasing importance of the jirga “the major conflict-resolving mechanism of
the Pashtuns” was gone (see also p.44 and p.80) (Ruttig, 2010, p.8). Also the
post-9/11 governments of Afghanistan have done little if nothing “to support
initiatives of key Pashtun tribes” to strengthen their structures even if they
were willing to renounce or fight the Taliban (Ruttig, 2010, p.9). Kabul’s at-
tempt to reinforce tribal military power by paying local militias (arbaki see also
p.44) backfired when funds dried up. Sometimes the allocation of these means
was impeded by difficult relationships between local governors and the central
administration. The arbaki remained unpaid for longer periods of time, not only
giving an opening to the usually well funded recruiting efforts of the Taliban
but also lowering “the enthusiasm of individual tribesmen to join” such a militia
as well as producing undesirable effects: “To pay the arbaki means to render it
uncontrollable when the payment stops” (Ruttig, 2010, p.10).
The madrassas and mosques the Taliban networks evolved from were located
in territories of particular tribes. Nevertheless, these tribal identities “were
not the primary reference of these fighting Taliban” (Ruttig, 2010, p.11). The
Taliban also strengthened the role of the village mullahs who had only held a
marginal role in the political realm for centuries (see also p.31). The mullahs
became “the eyes and ears” of the Taliban in the villages and further augmented
their influence through the increased collection of religious taxes (ushr and
zakat)146 (Ruttig, 2010, p.12).
Most of the Taliban foot soldiers, contrary to their leadership, are rather
driven by dire economic circumstances than by ideology. The Taliban networks
145I would argue though, that the tribal traditions, though they heavily structured violence
among themselves, were simply unable to deal with the excessive level of violence which
occurred in the wars. For sure the disappearance of the khans (see also p.80) and jirgas
strongly contributed to this.
146Some of their traditional influence was based on the fact that the mullah often was “the
only literate person in a village” (Ruttig, 2010, p.12).
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in themselves are sectioned in a way that reminds of tribal segmentation (Ruttig,
2010, p.13). On the local level the Taliban fronts (fighting groups) are strongly
rooted in tribes and subtribes. “Recruitment, operations and succession patterns
follow tribal lines in a majority of cases” (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). Most individual
Taliban identify themselves with and are strongly connected to their tribe or
subtribe. They rarely ever sever this connection since this “would mean a loss
of status, identity and protection” and one’s tribe provides a fallback structure
to rely on, should it be necessary in times of crisis (Ruttig, 2010, p.23).
The Taliban foot soldiers mostly do not fight outside the area of their tribe,
which is in line with traditions of tribal warfare147 (see also p.75). Ruttig
presents estimates that today 80% to 90% of all Taliban “fighters operate in or
close to their communities, not least because most Taleban fighters are part-
timers” (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). However, even if tribal rivalries sometimes sur-
faced, generally the ultra-orthodox Islamist ideology of the Taliban created suf-
ficient “cohesion amongst the fighters from segmented Pashtun tribes” (Ruttig,
2010, p.19).
147When local commanders want to engage in “out of area” endeavors they “must notify the
commanders in the particular province and must ‘obey their orders” ’ (Ruttig, 2010, p.13).
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6 The Fall of the Taliban and the US and NATO
intervention
“And when people are entering upon a war they do things the wrong
way around. Action comes first, and it is only when they have
already suffered that they begin to think.”
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 431 BCE
The US-led military campaign, Operation Enduring Freedom, began on October
7, 2001. Initially, it was carried out through aerial bombardments and missile
attacks from US and British war vessels and submarines. Subsequently, a “lim-
ited number of Special Forces [. . . ] in coalition with the Northern Alliance”
managed to oust the Taliban regime148 (Kipping, 2010, p.4). A majority of
Afghans was relieved that the strict and brutal oppression of the Taliban had
ended, and they welcomed the US intervention (Kipping, 2010, p.5). Following
a period of relative calm, the unpreparedness and ignorance of the US military
about their enemy and the country in general led to increasing support of the
insurgency149. “Despite vastly superior training, leadership, and weaponry, the
American military was gradually losing its grip, and one of the weaknesses of
American efforts has been their lack of knowledge of the social context in which
they were fighting” (Edwards, 2010, p.1). In addition, the intervention coalition
jeopardized its very own efforts by strengthening local warlords who claimed
to fight Al-Quaeda and the Taliban, but more often simply pursued their own
interests (Kipping, 2010, p.2). The United Stated were also very skeptical to-
wards the capabilities of its Western allies and delayed the expansion of ISAF
(NATO’s International Security Assistance Force) beyond Kabul until midyear
148In the first successful stage of the Afghanistan war, the United States did not have more
than 300 to 500 troops on the ground and increased troop levels to about 1300 in the first
weeks. By the end of 2003, about 10,000 US soldiers were in Afghanistan and until the end of
2008, US troop levels slowly augmented to a little more than 30,000. In the following one and
a half years troop numbers were more than tripled to around 100,000 Americans (another 29
countries provided about 30,000 troops) who are in the country up until today. In addition,
the US Department of Defense employs more than 110,000 private military contractors in the
country.
149As late as August 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, (then head of the Afghanistan
operations and later fired for public insubordination, because he awkwardly criticized the
political leadership in Washington in an interview with The Rolling Stone) submitted a report
to Defense Secretary Robert Gates in which he stated: “our conventional warfare culture is
part of the problem” and in order to succeed “the operational culture” has to be changed,
seeking to connect with people (McChrystal in Edwards, 2010, p.3).
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of 2003 (Kipping, 2010, p.11).
The United States military learned up on those issues years later and adapted
their approach in the so-called counter-insurgency strategy (COIN), which is
considered being “the most important and influential doctrine in the history
of the US Army”150 (Edwards, 2010, p.17). However, it remains to be seen
whether this approach can still bear fruits and correct the initial mistakes.
The implementation of so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) was
another attempt to gain a favorable viewing among the Afghan population151.
Particularly the Pakistanis and Arabs which were seen to be “imported” by the
Taliban were widely resented by the Afghans (see also p.71, p.109 and p.125).
Under these circumstances, “using a non-Muslim power to rid the country of
unwelcome Muslims was deemed acceptable”, specifically since “Americans could
be counted upon to leave the country at some point, while it was widely feared
that Pakistanis and Arabs would not” (Barfield, 2004, p.290). At the same time,
the tribes which are located near the border or are dispersed across the border
tend to see Pakistani involvement favorably. Most Pashtuns in the area believe
“that being on the pro-Pakistan side in the conflict was wiser, as Pakistan was
going to be involved in Afghanistan much longer and more effectively than the
United States” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.27).
The military reaction of the United States to Al-Quaeda’s terrorist attacks of
9/11 was anticipated by some informed key players in Afghanistan even before
the airplanes were hijacked (see also p.97). Still, the speed with which the
Taliban movement fell, surprised even its own leaders. On November 13, the
Taliban left Kabul without a fight as the city was overrun by Tajik fighters of the
Northern Alliance152. “Among demonstrations of joy and liberation, residents
of Kabul rushed to barber shops for a clean shave and waited in long lines to
reclaim old TV sets, as Kabul television programming was soon to be back on
the air” (Kepel, 2002, p.19). Afghans were far “from rising up against the infidels
and demanding the foreign troops leave, the Afghan population was now asking
150“COIN represents a seismic shift not only in how we organize and deploy our military
force, but - whether we notice or not - in how we conceive of the military’s and, by extension,
America’s role in the world” (Edwards, 2010, p.18). See (Petraeus und Amos, 2006) for more
information.
151Successes and failures of these PRTs are an exceedingly fascinating topic which I can
not respond to in a satisfactory manner in this paper. I take the liberty to refer the more
interested reader to the abundantly available specialist literature on this topic.
152The Northern Alliance was a military-political alignment of groups from various ethnic
backgrounds. Tajiks, Hazara, Pashtuns, Uzbeks and Turkmen fought against the Taliban
regime. Their most famous leaders were Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was killed 3 days before
the 9/11 attacks, and the Uzbek warlord and general Abdul Rashid Dostum.
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for a larger international force to prevent the return of the warlords and provide
basic security for the country’s reconstruction”153 (Barfield, 2004, p.289).
Already a few days after the beginning of the US strikes, Mullah Omar
recognized their effectiveness and send his family to safety to Pakistan (Tarzi,
2008, p.277). Yet, he still seemed to believe that his troops would be able to hold
their ground, as reinforcements from Pakistani madrassas joined the fight. Soon
though he realized that his movement was falling apart. For fear of being traced
by US intelligence, Mullah Omar terminated all communications with his field
commanders. This “absence of commands from Mullah Omar reportedly led to
countless casualties among Taliban forces” (Tarzi, 2008, p.277). By December
the Taliban surrendered. On December 6, the Taliban cabinet met in Kandahar,
led by Defense Minister Mullah Obaidullah, “and decided that the Taliban would
transfer power to the tribal council headed by Hamid Karzai” (Tarzi, 2008,
p.278). The leadership had learned that their forces in Uruzgan Province, next
to Kandahar, had been annihilated by troops of Hamid Karzai. Additionally,
powerful local tribes wanted to use “the opportunity to regain power and expel
the Taliban from Kandahar” (Barfield, 2004, p.289). Mullah Omar ordered to
surrender Kandahar and the Taliban leadership “scattered, fleeing Afghanistan
for the save havens nearby” (Tarzi, 2008, p.274). Kandahar, the last major
urban center under Taliban control, the heartland of their movement and the
starting point of their conquest throughout the country, came under the control
of the tribal council on December 7th. Karzai declared “a general amnesty for all
of the Taliban forces” from his base in Uruzgan (Tarzi, 2008, p.278). Western
intelligence officials thereafter observed what they dubbed “the great escape”
(Tarzi, 2008, p.278). Taliban leaders who had been jailed were released, many
of them fled to Pakistan where they reportedly were “living in luxury”, others
“promised that they would not participate in politics” and stayed (Tarzi, 2008,
p.279). The United States unofficially supported this policy and an official of
the tribal council reasoned: “Those men who have surrendered are our brothers,
and we have allowed them to live in a peaceful manner” (Tarzi, 2008, p.279).
The power vacuum created by the collapse of the Taliban was “immediately
filled by large numbers of militia commanders as well as tribal and religious
leaders” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.137). Some of this strongmen pos-
sessed legitimacy among the local populations, yet many of them based their
153Only ten weeks later many Afghans started to say, that they had felt more secure under
the hardline regime than “under the power-sharing interim administration that has replaced
it” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.346).
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power solely on controlling the means of violence (Schetter und Glassner, 2009,
p.137). Their position was further strengthened by “the US-strategy to use
Afghan militias in their fight against remnants of al-Qaida and the Taliban”
(Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.137). These militia leaders were commonly
called warlords (jang salar in Dari), for years “virtually no influential politi-
cal figure in Afghanistan could avoid this label” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009,
p.138).
Hamid Karzai was named head of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) which
was to take power on December 22nd 2001, in the so-called Bonn Agreement154.
Karzai later claimed to distinguish two different kinds of Taliban. On the one
hand, “the ordinary Taliban who are real and honest sons of this country”, and
on the other those, “who still use the Taliban cover to disturb peace and secu-
rity in the country” (Tarzi, 2008, p.279). This was clearly aimed at reducing
the risk of major resistance and an offer to accommodate the political needs of
the large part of the population which previously had joined the Taliban. Fur-
thermore, Karzai did not have a strong base of supporters even within his own
tribe155. By issuing the amnesty he hoped to gain the backing of southern Pash-
tuns and wanted to create a political counterbalance to the growing strength
of the Northern Alliance (Tarzi, 2008, p.282). Yet, many Pashtuns saw Karzai
“as an impotent figurehead surrounded by foreigners and non-Pashtuns” and
blamed him for the ascendency of the mostly non-Pashtun Northern Alliance,
especially the powerful Tajiks (Tarzi, 2008, p.286). In 2002, the new adminis-
tration convened a Loya Jirga (see also p.81) to transfer power from the Afghan
Interim Authority (AIA) to the Transitional Administration. Many Pashtuns
wanted the former king, Zahir Shah (see also p.61 and p.92), to take a leading
role in the Transitional Administration in order to ensure Pashtun influence at
the top level. However, Karzai managed to garner enough support to become
leader again. The “unceremonious manner in which” Zahir Shah “was shown
the exit [. . . ] created the impression that the Loya Jirga was a rubber-stamp”
154In December 2001, a group of Afghan leaders, UN officials and politicians had met in Bonn,
Germany. One part of the agreement dealt with establishing NATO’s International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) under the UN-Resolution 1386. The official name of the compact
was Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment
of Permanent Government Institutions.
155The Karzai family has been influential for quite some decades in the Kandahar region. The
Karzais are “one of the leading families of the Popolzai tribe, to which the king’s [Zahir Shah]
family also belongs” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.142). More specifically, they are from
the Qaranagh sub-tribe (Ruttig, 2010, p.7). Ahmad Wali Karzai, Hamid Karzai’s brother, is
governor of the region and a powerful warlord who controls “a big share of the drug trade in
the region” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.142).
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for the AIA, which was seen to be dominated by the Northern Alliance (Tarzi,
2008, p.290). Rasul Amin, minister for education under the AIA, said: “The
perception that Karzai had betrayed his ethnic Pashtuns is now firmly in the
minds of the Pashtuns” (Tarzi, 2008, p.290). Resistance against the new gov-
ernment augmented. Simultaneously, the new leaderships clemency towards the
old regime deeply angered many in the Northern Alliance who had fought the
Taliban at high costs of blood and treasure. They interpreted it as an attempt
to restore Pashtun hegemony and marginalize other ethnic groups156 (Tarzi,
2008, p.280). In fact, even if many Pashtuns might not have identified with
the extreme ideology of the Taliban, “they appreciated the position of power
the Pashtun-dominated Taliban held over the population” (Tarzi, 2008, p.285).
Karzai continued to include former Taliban in the political process, excluding
only those who demonstrably had had ties to Al-Quaeda (Tarzi, 2008, p.281).
At the same time, Karzai urged Islamabad repeatedly over several years to
arrest top Taliban cadres, especially those who reentered the resistance and were
known terrorists. Pakistan generally ignored those pleas. In some cases they
arrested several hundred Taliban and handed them over to Afghan authorities.
However, most of those Taliban were unimportant and unknown foot soldiers.
They had to be released by the Afghans since no one had any proof of their
involvement in illegal activities157. The Taliban leadership remained mainly
untroubled and deepened its contacts with the Pakistani military and the ISI.
They received “intelligence and tactical information” and the ISI assisted the Tal-
iban in adopting “a relatively sophisticated strategy”, especially for “a Taliban
leadership which was never known for being well read or sophisticated” (Gius-
tozzi, 2008, p.25). General James Jones informed the US Senate about these
ties in 2006, yet there was only little evidence for the transfer of “large amounts
of weaponry” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.25). If the Pakistani authorities also arm the
Taliban, they do not provide everything which is needed by the insurgents, a
fact that is mirrored by a twentyfold increase of prices on the weapons black-
market in the Pakistani Northwest Frontier Province in recent years (Giustozzi,
2008, p.26). In some cases Pakistan’s aid to the Taliban has worked against
156An influential northern newspaper described Karzai’s approach as “a betrayal of Islam,
betrayal of the nation, betrayal of humanity” (Tarzi, 2008, p.280).
157Until 2006, Pakistan had only arrested a handful of Taliban. The described alibi-mass-
arrests took place in July 2006, shortly after a visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
Just hours after a visit of Vice President Cheney in February 2007, Mullah Obaidullah, a key
Taliban commander and former defense minister, was arrested. Even if Pakistan seemed to
give in to US pressure this time, they freed Obaidullah after the smoke had cleared (Giustozzi,
2008, p.24).
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them since the idea of creating a greater Pashtunistan was clearly suppressed
by the interest groups behind these efforts. In addition, some Taliban “resented
the pressure of Pakistani security services, accusing them of forcing the Taliban
to attack schools and development projects to prevent Afghanistan from pro-
gressing as a country” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.27). So even in this alliance there are
different factions following various diverging interests.
The spectacularly swift military victory of the US engagement and the
Northern Alliance in 2001 opened a small window of opportunity “for Afghanistan
to free itself from the grips of extremism and the scourge of international isola-
tion” (Jalali, 2002, p.174). Nonetheless, relatively peaceful conditions and the
absence of resistance did not last long. Killings, rapes and kidnappings increased
in areas where the Pashtuns were a minority. The atrocities agains Pashtuns in
those areas, where they sometimes generally were ‘stigmatized’ as Taliban, was
widely seen as retaliation for Taliban brutality (Tarzi, 2008, p.288). Particu-
larly during the initial phase of the US military engagement Pashtuns felt that
they were sought out “based solely on their ethnicity” and unjustly targeted “as
threats to the new governing process”158 (Tarzi, 2008, p.288).
In December of 2002, reports about the regrouping of the Taliban and Al-
Quaeda surfaced. Shortly before, the United States had declared to end the
phase of conventional battle and shifted “to the reconstruction phase of engage-
ment”, claiming that three quarters of the country had been pacified (Tarzi,
2008, p.282, see also, Giustozzi, 2008, p.11). At the beginning 2003, attacks
against “aid workers, Afghan officials, and the U.S.-led coalition forces became
more customary” (Tarzi, 2008, p.283). By the middle of the year, the security
situation had worsened throughout the country, especially in areas close to the
Pakistani border. Attacks on military targets as well as terrorist attacks against
civilians increased dramatically (Tarzi, 2008, p.284). In general though, there
seemed to be little or no coordination between these attacks and frequently no
one claimed responsibility (Tarzi, 2008, p.284).
158The US special forces division Task Force 121, was assigned to eliminate ‘high-value
targets’. They used 19th-century British anthropology which focused on Pashtuns to prepare
for their mission. One Special Forces operative, assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence admitted: “We literally don’t know where to go for information on what makes
other societies tick, so we use Google to make policy” (McFate, 2005, p.46).
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6.1 The New Taliban
Questions arose about who initiated those attacks. Many groups claimed to
be Taliban, but the authenticity of these assertions was doubtful. Were these
“the same Taliban emerging from defeat to reassert their hold on power, or
were other groups attempting to capitalize on the Taliban name and legacy
[. . . ] ?” (Tarzi, 2008, p.275). Contrary to the Taliban’s first rise to power, this
insurgency “did not emerge as a cohesive group with a uniform mission” (Tarzi,
2008, p.291). There did not seem to be a central leadership which was directing
operations. The various actors shrouded themselves in a veil of secrecy, acted
mainly independently and seemed united only in their motivation to oust the
foreign powers (Tarzi, 2008, p.291). Even “members of the Taliban acknowledge
that at this stage there was no coordination among the various local groups”
(Giustozzi, 2008, p.11).
Subsequently, the labels Taliban, neo-Taliban159 or New Taliban have been
used to describe the movement which had emerged in 2002. All those labels
are often used interchangeably and many groups called themselves mujahedin,
further adding to “the confusion over the identity and makeup” of this move-
ment (Tarzi, 2008, p.275). Identifying oneself as Taliban can be a powerful tool
in Afghanistan, it “instills fear and anger in some while uniting others” (Tarzi,
2008, p.276). The new violent resistance showed certain characteristics of the
old Taliban movement, and parts of it certainly maintained connections to the
ousted leadership, at the same time though they portrayed significant differ-
ences. They had “evolved beyond the old regime to encompass new groups with
new agendas” (Tarzi, 2008, p.277). The fact that no one claimed responsibil-
ity for many of the initial attacks, the intangible organizational structure and
the “chameleon-like operations [. . . ] further heightened outsiders’ confusion”
regarding the identity of the insurgents (Tarzi, 2008, p.284).
Soon though the attacks started to be increasingly coordinated and some
well-known figureheads of the old regime reappeared. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
leader of the extremist Hezb-e Islami, who had also been prime minister in the
mujahedin period, recipient of major US and Pakistani aid, and initially an
enemy of the Taliban, reportedly supported Al-Quaeda (see also p.90 for more
information about Hekmatyar). He managed to accommodate himself with Mul-
lah Omar, and though their relationship was strained at times, formally accepts
159The denomination neo-Taliban was introduced by an article in The Economist in 2003
(Tarzi, 2008, p.276).
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him as leader of the insurgent movement and rightful leader of Afghanistan
(Tarzi, 2008, p.300, Giustozzi, 2008, p.91). Some assumed insurgents turned
out to be “warlords settling old accounts”, fighting over the control of poppy
cultivation (Tarzi, 2008, p.284). However, most of the other attacks could be
related to either Hekmatyar, the old Taliban leaders, Jalaluddin Haqqani (see
also p.91) and Al-Quaeda. Discontent with his policies, some of Hamid Karzai’s
supporters of the very first hour turned against him and joined the insurgency.
Also some other opposition groups became more and more violent and began
to align themselves with the old regime (Tarzi, 2008, p.285). “Something new
and very violent had arrived on the scene” (Tarzi, 2008, p.285). Again, there
still were many other factions which, at the time, did not necessarily follow any
central guidance or leadership and mainly pursued their own, sometimes local
goals. Yet, the old guard of the Taliban regime seemed to be able to control
sizeable funds from their Pakistani hideouts. Thereby they attracted a growing
following and seemed to slowly regain control over quite some insurgent groups.
Mullah Obaidullah, the Taliban regime’s defense minister, was instructed by
Mullah Omar to organize the insurgency against Hamid Karzai and the United
States (Tarzi, 2008, p.293). The reasons why it took the old leadership quite
a while to organize the insurgency were caused by “the need to re-adjust, to
find secure hideouts, and possibly to recover psychologically from an unexpect-
edly fast collapse of the regime” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.11). Some leading Taliban
cadres claimed that they were “waiting for some ‘offer’ from Kabul (presumably
for power-sharing)” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.11). When this hope turned out to be
to no avail, the leadership tried to mobilize its commanders. These attempts
did not work out that well, only very few of the former rank-and-file joined the
fight in 2002 (Giustozzi, 2008, p.12).
In 2003, Mullah Omar issued a fatwa against all foreigners present in the
country and the Afghans who supported them. He claimed the fatwa was sup-
ported by 1,600 “prominent scholars from around Afghanistan” (Tarzi, 2008,
p.297). In it, he asserts that it is every Muslim’s duty to engage in jihad and
that everyone who “helps the aggressive infidels and joins their ranks under any
name or task” should be killed (Tarzi, 2008, p.297). According to the fatwa, the
people who work with the foreign coalition or the Afghan government would “be
considered as Christians” and would have to face punishment160 (Tarzi, 2008,
160Mullah Omar issued several other fatwas with the same tenor. For example on April 1st
2003 he publicized: “I also issue a fatwa ordering the murder of anyone who cooperates with
the Americans” (Tarzi, 2008, p.298). He repeatedly stressed that anyone who supports the
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p.298).
The neo-Taliban have “absorbed from their foreign jihadist allies a more flex-
ible and less orthodox attitude towards imported technologies and techniques”
(Giustozzi, 2008, p.13). Whereas the old Taliban had strictly enforced a ban
of images in various forms (photography, videos, movies, television) and mu-
sic, they now produced tapes with jihadist songs (without any instrumental
accompaniment) and propaganda videos (Giustozzi, 2008, p.13).
Especially in the context of the internationalization there are “significant
differences between the ideology of the former Taliban and those presently op-
erating under this label” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.144). The neo-Taliban
are much more integrated in international jihadist movements and adapted their
ideology and rhetoric to reflect that. They express solidarity with jihadists
around the world and stress the unity of Islam in the global war against Chris-
tians (Giustozzi, 2008, p.13). The old Taliban to the contrary had followed
a policy that had focused solely on Afghanistan, had denounced other Mus-
lim leaders as impure and corrupt and had been isolationists. There is not
a big constituency for pan-Islamist propaganda in Afghanistan. Yet, such a
rhetoric facilitates access to foreign financial support (Giustozzi, 2008, p.14).
Still, the relations between the Taliban and Al-Quaeda are ambivalent. They
profit from one another, yet generally Al-Quaeda seems to need the Taliban
more than the other way around161. In addition, mutual racist intolerances
complicate sustained cooperation. Many Taliban resent Al-Quaeda’s extremely
brutal methods and their lack of consideration towards Afghan civilians. Many
Arab fighters on the contrary viewed the Afghans as backwards and still vividly
remembered the images of locals who molested and slaughtered Arab fighters
after the fall of the Taliban (Kepel, 2002, p.19). However, the major bone of
contention between the two organizations is the fact that many Taliban blame
Al-Quaeda “for the fall of their emirate and the loss of power in 2001” (Ruttig,
2010, p.18). The Taliban believe that they would still be in power, had it not
been for Al-Quaeda’s terrorist attacks of 9/11162 and hold them responsible for
all the suffering and killing that resulted from their acts. Many of the Taliban
foreigners or the government does “not remain Muslim” (Tarzi, 2008, p.299). The frequent
repetition of the same fatwa in slightly different words could be interpreted as sign for Mullah
Omar’s discontent with the extent of its implementation.
161This is reflected in the fact that Osama bin Laden gave “an oath of allegiance (bay’a) to
Mullah Omar, not the other way round” (Ruttig, 2010, p.18).
162Shortly after 9/11, a religious shura tried to convince Mullah Omar to request Osama
bin Laden to leave the country voluntarily in order to avert an attack by the United States
(Ruttig, 2010, p.18).
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still have no big interest in international politics or a transnational jihad and
just want to impose their radical and oppressive ideology on their own people
(Kepel, 2002, p.223).
The actual ideology of the neo-Taliban does not seem to matter that much
anymore and does not need to be expressed in a coherent, explicit manner. Still,
it seems to be important that the movement has “a substantial base of ‘true be-
lievers” ’ who “are often ready to sacrifice their lives for the cause”163 (Giustozzi,
2008, p.15). The neo-Taliban have established a shadow administration and
shuras in most of the Afghan provinces, including local sharia courts and other
institutions people frequently turn to, in order to settle conflicts. Their growing
influence on the population, even in areas where there are no or almost no mil-
itary activities, can not be denied. Most of the higher ranks in the insurgency
are confident that final victory is just a matter of time. Therefore “the recon-
ciliation offers of the government [. . . ] attract little interest” (Giustozzi, 2008,
p.15).
To summarize, it can be said that the Taliban have maintained something
like a ‘corporate identity’ which heavily relies on its old leadership. At the same
time, they are “becoming more and more an umbrella for heterogeneous actors
such as militant Islamists, drug barons, tribal elders, warlords and unemployed
youth” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.144).
6.1.1 Cohesion and unity of the (New) Taliban in a factionalized
society
The reason why the different factors of cohesion among the Taliban are rele-
vant in the context of this paper is, that none of the mechanisms they employ
rely on tribal structures. To the contrary, the strategies utilized by the Taliban
specifically aim to limit and undermine tribal organizational structures or pre-
vent their re-emergence. The Taliban organize hierarchy and cohesion through
their radical ideology, the centralized control of financial means and armament,
through the ruthless enforcement of shura decisions and elimination of poten-
tial foes. In the Taliban’s sphere of influence, the tribal organization, at least
as far as the economic and political activities are concerned, can not unfold its
primary qualities of structuring social life as it used to.
163Since 2002, the Taliban have had an estimated annual loss rate of about 13% of their
fighters. This rate stayed about the same, even as the fighting force of the Taliban markedly
increased and almost quadrupled between 2002 and 2006 (Giustozzi, 2008, p.33). Their “re-
silience in the face of such heavy losses” and the fact that they did not even show signs of
“cracking” surprised quite some observers (Giustozzi, 2008, p.15).
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The neo-Taliban did not present themselves as a united body in the first
years after their emergence and there are questions about the cohesiveness of
the movement. Many self-proclaimed ‘official spokesmen’ for the Taliban ap-
peared, frequently contradicting each other, claiming and denying involvement
in various attacks (Tarzi, 2008, p.294). The inner circles of the old leadership
again followed two different approaches (see also p.114). Some attempted to gain
political influence, participating in the official process. Others opted for jihad
and terrorism. Still, this fissure did not cause any major split within the inner
circle. The fact that local commanders who started to get too powerful and
refuse the leadership of Mullah Omar are frequently killed speaks for a strong
cohesion of the movement. There are some reports about rivalries between the
Ghilzai dominated Peshawar Shura and the Durrani dominated Quetta Shura of
the Taliban, mainly about the allocation of resources. Nevertheless, these con-
flicts do not appear to have the potential to split the movement (Tarzi, 2008,
p.300).
NATO ended some of the personal rivalries within the old Taliban leadership.
Mullah Dadullah (see also p.108) was disdained by many Taliban because of his
strong ties to the Arab world, “his extremist attitudes”, and the excessive use of
suicide bombers, killing mainly Muslims (Giustozzi, 2008, p.84). Conflicts with
one of his main rivals, Akhtar Osmani, allegedly led to physical confrontations
between the two men who were in charge of controlling the Taliban’s military
operations. Osmani was killed by NATO forces in December 2006 and “sources
from within the Taliban claimed that Dadullah had tipped the enemy off about
Osmani’s location” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.84). Dadullah was killed by NATO in
a raid in May 2007. Rumors have it that opponents within the leadership
have used the same method employed in the elimination of Osmani. More
important than this personal struggles is the fact that both men were killed
inside Afghanistan. This shows that “the leadership travels often to the zone of
operations” and thereby maintains “a sufficient degree of cohesion in the field”
(Giustozzi, 2008, p.84). With their presence on the front lines, the Taliban
leaders strengthen “the ideological commitment of their ‘cadres’ and the [. . . ]
legitimacy” of their leadership (Giustozzi, 2008, p.84).
At the end of 2004, the ‘pro-politics’ faction among the Taliban seemed to
gain the upper hand as many Arab donors and Osama bin Laden dramatically
reduced their funding for the Taliban in order to channel more money to Iraqi
insurgents (Tarzi, 2008, p.306). This trend was soon to be reversed though.
As the Iraqi branch of Al-Quaeda was strengthened, it engaged in infiltrating,
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supporting and training the neo-Taliban164 (Tarzi, 2008, p.306). Pakistan was
and probably still is the biggest state-sponsor of the old Taliban cadres. The
viewpoint that continued support of Mullah Omar and his followers constitutes
a strategic asset which is serving Pakistan’s security interests seems to have pre-
vailed so far165 (for more information about Pakistan’s support for the Taliban
and other extremist Islamists see also p.69, p.91, p.98, p.106, and p.106). Some
of their aims include making sure that Afghanistan does not develop all too
friendly relations with India and securing continued US military aid. In short,
Islamabad sees the neo-Taliban as allies who can promote their regional policies
and geostrategic interests (Tarzi, 2008, p.308).
An important potential for medium-term fragmentation of the movement
lies in the fact that its recruiting efforts rely heavily on local communities. The
latter “could one day quit” the Taliban, “once their interests start diverging”
(Giustozzi, 2008, p.85). The Taliban try to minimize this risk by fostering their
relations beyond financial support through intermarriage and the training of
local youth in madrassas (Giustozzi, 2008, p.85). This speaks to the fact that,
even if tribes as a socio-political entity do not have the influence they have held
for a long time anymore, the societal organization along patrilineal descent lines
is still strong and important. In addition, they have the ability to micromanage
local communities: they “rely on village mullahs to identify friends and po-
tential foes and subsequently ruthlessly eliminate the latter” (Giustozzi, 2008,
p.85). The former US-tactics like ‘sweep and clear’166 and “air bombardments
[. . . ] might also have helped bring the different components of the insurgency
together in the common hatred of the ‘foreigners” ’ (Giustozzi, 2008, p.85, see
also Schetter and Glassner, 2009, p.143). General Petraeus’ counter-insurgency
164At the time, a CIA station chief apparently tried to analyze the insurgent groups and
dubbed them “pissed-off Pashtuns” (Tarzi, 2008, p.306).
165Since Osama bin Laden was killed in the garrison town Abottabad, Pakistan, on May 2nd
of 2011, the anti-US sentiments in the Pakistani security apparatus increased. The United
States Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU, formerly known as SEAL Team
Six), the Joint Special Operations Command and the CIA entered Pakistan without the
knowledge of its authorities in the Operation Neptune Spear. The US had assumed for quite
some time, that Bin Laden was protected by parts of the Pakistani authorities. The latter
were embarrassed not only by Bin Laden’s presence, but also by the fact that they did not
gain knowledge about the raid until the US forces had left Pakistani territory again.
166The approach, which was already employed in Vietnam, was called ‘find, fix and destroy’
or ‘search and destroy mission’ before. It means that troops would enter a certain area, kill
as many ‘enemies’ as possible, and then leave again. This caused trouble in Afghanistan
mainly because large numbers of civilians were killed during these efforts which prompted
many villagers to join the Taliban. In other cases the coalition forces took out militias who
were not aligned with the Taliban on the basis of bad intelligence. When the coalition forces
left, those areas were easily captured by the Taliban.
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(COIN) strategy167, which also includes embedding anthropologists in Forward
Operating Bases (FOBs), tries to address these problems, but it remains to be
seen whether this change in policy has not come too late. It focuses on an
approach that is called ‘secure-the-population first’ and thereby “gaining their
support” (Edwards, 2010, p.2).
The Taliban leadership established rules of behavior for its fighters, writ-
ten down and distributed in the so-called Layeha (Rulebook). These rules in-
clude guidelines about how to treat prisoners, about not recruiting fighters who
are known for their bad behavior, the ban of looting, the fair distribution of
weaponry and the places in which fighters are allowed to engage (only within
their district, except the commander of another district allows it)168 (Giustozzi,
2008, p.84). The fact that “Taliban throughout Afghanistan tend to respect
these rules” is another important indicator which “suggests the continuing func-
tionality of a unified chain of command” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.85).
Another policy, already employed by Mullah Omar when the Taliban were
still in power (see also p.112), included the frequent rotation169 of field com-
manders in order to “prevent the development of personal fiefdoms” (Giustozzi,
2008, p.92). In addition, the commanders were obliged to form “mixed groups
of combatants”, meaning that individuals from various tribes and provinces had
to serve in units with locals (Giustozzi, 2008, p.93). This was also intended to
prevent locals from uniting against the central leadership. Ruttig argues that
from 2008 on, an inclination to ‘re-tribalize’ local units could be observed in core
Taliban “areas like Helmand, Zabul and Uruzgan” (Ruttig, 2010, p.14). This
was a response of locals who perceived the ‘out-of-area-Taliban’ as dispropor-
tionately brutal towards local civilian populations (Ruttig, 2010, p.14). I would
argue though, that it was rather a re-localization than a re-tribalization, since
tribal structures have had lost much of their relevance already.
The actual ‘every-day-operations’ were carried out autonomously, without
direct central orders and based on the commanders’ “understanding of the strate-
gic and political aims of the Movement” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.93). When direct
167The strategy was encoded in the Joint Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24. See
also (Petraeus und Amos, 2006).
168There were made some amendments over time. In recent years the leadership has asked
its fighters to refrain from beheadings, since this practice has caused bad press even in friendly
countries. Instead they should simply shoot people.
169Hamid Karzai attempted to employ the same strategy with warlords who had gained a
“position in the state apparatus” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.139). He was less successful
though in limiting their power base. They would simply not comply with any unwanted
relocation and threaten to react violently to any such attempts.
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orders were necessary for specific operations, they were transmitted by a mes-
senger. The use of satellite phones or other telecommunication “had to be aban-
doned relatively early in the conflict, due to US monitoring” (Giustozzi, 2008,
p.93). In the appointment of commanders, the commitment to the extremist
Islamic ideology was “privileged over skills”, and tactical “mistakes were often
forgiven as long as ideological purity was demonstrated” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.93).
The cohesive force of the extremist ideology should not be underestimated.
Nevertheless, other factors like the funding of the neo-Taliban are immensely im-
portant for the cohesion of the movement too. Any localized sources of revenue
can contribute to rivalries and factionalism and advance the field commanders’
independence from the central leadership. On the other hand, a diversification
of external sources almost certainly leads to splits “within the leadership if they
are managed by different individuals or factions” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.86). The
absence of such challenges to his power suggests that Mullah Omar has been
able to “maintain a unified control over revenue” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.86). The
main sources for the Taliban’s financing are drug money170, Pakistani political
and militant religious networks, the Pakistani military and intelligence commu-
nity, jihadi sympathizers throughout the Arab world, “Saudi oil men, Kuwaiti
traders” and wealthy businessmen from Karachi and Peshawar (Giustozzi, 2008,
p.86). The notorious Mullah Dadullah capitalized on his connections to the
United Arab Emirates, even traveling there for fundraising. Reports over the
last years suggest “that the Taliban were awash with cash”171 (Giustozzi, 2008,
p.86). The Pakistani shuras have appointed ‘officials’ who are responsible for
the control of funds and who “prevented field commanders from establishing
their own independent sources of revenue” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.86). The fact
that various external sources have not led to a fragmentation of the movement
suggests that they are centrally channeled to the Taliban’s top leaders by Pak-
istani authorities (Giustozzi, 2008, p.89). Circumstantial evidence implies that
a certain “degree of control over revenue” through parts of the Pakistani gov-
ernment is “a pre-condition for letting the Taliban operate from their country”
(Giustozzi, 2008, p.89).
Though different circumstances throughout the country make it hard to gen-
eralize, a pattern of influence of tribal organization can be observed. The various
170The Taliban even offered financial compensation to poppy farmers who were targeted by
Western eradication programs in exchange for their support (Giustozzi, 2008, p.87).
171However, Taliban cadres lament that the financial support is insufficient to “acquire so-
phisticated anti-aircraft [. . . ] weaponry” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.89).
130
insurgents and the Taliban gain more support in areas where the tribal codes and
structures are weakened or extremely fragmented, as compared to areas where
they are more stable. This is also mirrored by the fact that members of tribes
which were not able to protect individuals who had formerly fought alongside
the Taliban from being arrested or killed by government and US forces, were
forced back into the movement (Ruttig, 2010, p.9). The tribes which preserved
their ways and traditions still seem to generally dislike outside intervention.
Consequently, in the rare cases where tribal traditions are still dominant in
daily life, neither the government nor the Taliban have gained much influence
(Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.147).
As yet, “a pronounced rift between pro-government and pro-Taliban tribes
and sub-tribes cannot be observed” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.150). This
is especially true for tribes which have managed to maintain their traditional
leadership and decision-making structures. One such region is the province of
Paktia. There the Pashtunwali and its norms of behavior, honor, justice and
societal organization are still “binding for everybody” (Schetter und Glassner,
2009, p.148). Decisions are still made in traditional, egalitarian jirgas by consen-
sus building, and tribal arbaki (see also p.44) take care of security and enforce
jirga determinations. There are still long lasting tribal feuds and blood feuds
(for example between the Ahmadzai and the Totakhel), but they are dealt with
in the traditional fashion and by the rules and the modus operandi of traditional
tribal warfare (see also p.25 and p.75). The tribal leaders in Paktia have not
accepted any outside interference and their arbaki are strong enough to hold
their ground172.
Additionally, their egalitarian structures have obstructed the emergence of
warlordism from within their own ranks, as it has happened in so many other
tribes (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.149). This case constitutes an exception
though, particularly considering the respectable size of the territory. Generally
it can be said that “tribal ‘encapsulation’ is stronger in mountainous” and re-
mote areas (Ruttig, 2010, p.12). Nevertheless, this does not mean that tribes
which had their traditional structures in tact did not participate in the insur-
gency independently from the Taliban. In fact, many of them might resent the
presence of foreigners as much as the Taliban. And sometimes, tribes which had
rather been indifferent to what had happened politically outside their sphere of
influence, participated in the insurgency after their villages had been targeted
172They allowed all warring parties to transit their territory as long as they would leave them
alone.
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by aerial bombardments or other military raids. In some cases, even “former
left-wingers stated that they would be bound to tribal solidarity if their tribe
‘decided to join the uprising against the Americans” ’ (Ruttig, 2010, p.15).
6.2 Tribal structures under the influence of post 9/11 gov-
ernment policies
The Karzai government and the US-led coalition co-opted “regional warlords
and strongmen into the central government and the subnational administra-
tion” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.16). As mentioned in other contexts in this paper,
“the well established notable families” had progressively lost their influence “as
security became the primary concern”173 (Giustozzi, 2008, p.16). The fact that
tribal organization had lost much of its regulatory force led to the emergence
of “tribal entrepreneurs” or warlords who, based on their command of small
militias, claimed tribal leadership and attempted to unify the manifold tribal
factions (Giustozzi, 2008, p.16).
The policies pursued by the United States, the Karzai government and also
those of the Taliban (see chapter 6.1.1) have undermined the relevance and
functionality of what was left of tribal organizational structures. Many of the
local strongmen had been disempowered by the Taliban in the second half of the
1990s. They reappeared as the Taliban regime imploded. In many provinces
and districts “local strongmen, militia commanders, tribal leaders and local no-
tables who had somehow established a relationship with either Karzai or the
Americans were appointed to positions of responsibility, influence and power”
(Giustozzi, 2008, p.17). Considering that their followers were frequently not
bound by tribal loyalties, their base of support was habitually “shaky at best”
(Giustozzi, 2008, p.17). Their incorporation in government structures somewhat
legitimized and fostered their leadership roles as they enabled them to distribute
resources. Another consequence of this policy was that the government adminis-
tration was “often negatively affected by the need of these strongmen to reward
their followers with jobs and positions of influence in order to consolidate their
leadership” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.17). The warlords who had become governors
or police chiefs “had the legal power to make appointments in the structures
they were leading”(Giustozzi, 2008, p.17). Soon most provincial administrative
posts, even those of the ministries (for example the Ministry of Defense) were
173See also p.87.
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filled with “close associates of the strongmen”, who were often incompetent and
corrupt174 (Giustozzi, 2008, p.17). Taking into account that only few of them
were “skilled and committed administrators, the consequences in terms of gover-
nance become obvious” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.19). As another consequence Kabul
was not able to consolidate its influence throughout the country. To the con-
trary, the central government was and is often held hostage to local interests.
Regional strongmen simply refuse to comply with orders from Kabul and do
not accept outsiders in local administrative positions. If the Karzai government
insists on such an assignment, the locals threaten to create an uprising and
to destabilize the region. The local strongmen mobilize their clients, organize
demonstrations and usually force the central government to backpedal and with-
draw their candidates. The same is true for any legislation or other government
decisions which are unwelcome, though sometimes these can be handled in a
less confrontational manner by simply not implementing the new rules (Schet-
ter und Glassner, 2009, p.140). Furthermore, the local elites are often enough
connected to “decision-makers in Kabul by family ties” (Schetter und Glassner,
2009, p.140). They are able to use those ties to influence policies which affect
the local level to their favor and thereby frequently impede reforms (Schetter
und Glassner, 2009, p.140). It can be said that the “concentration of power on
the local level is so strong, that even the core institutions of the state are under
siege to local interests” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.153). In addition, many
of the strongmen used their newly gained power to “face off against each other
in a local power struggle, which opened up a space for the Taliban to re-emerge”
(Giustozzi, 2008, p.21). They frequently did so by denouncing their opponents
and thus using Afghan and foreign troops to settle the problem for them. In
many areas the dominance of strongmen and their families depend heavily on
the opium economy. The “financial resources connected with the drug economy
contribute to the strengthening of the hierarchical structures” in society and
diminish the relevance of traditional tribal organization (Schetter und Glassner,
2009, p.152). Depending on the sphere of influence, the drug lords and warlords
accommodate either with the Taliban or government officials175 who are either
corrupt or related by kin (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.144).
174A frequent practice was to take goods from shops without paying. In addition with the
general weakness of government, these practices delegitimized “the government, paving the
way for the insurgency to spread” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.19). Also the fact that operations of
foreign troops, “such as house searches and arrests, were not usually communicated to the
local authorities [. . . ] humiliated and discredited” them (Giustozzi, 2008, p.19).
175See also: Ahmad Wali Karzai, p.120.
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These developments and policies are consequential because they show that
the warlords and the government are not diametrically opposed, mutually ex-
clusive entities. Customarily the emergence or warlordism is seen as being con-
nected to a lack or the absence of state power. Yet in Afghanistan, warlords and
government authorities are inextricably interwoven and each side attempts to
strengthen its influence by using the other (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.138).
Warlords capitalize on the resources and power the state provides and the state
can exert some influence on the local level, or at least sustain the illusion of
doing so (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.153). “Warlordism is very strong in
exactly those regions where the state, at least in the notion of elites, is regarded
as important” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.153). In addition, warlords and
local elites seek to foster their relations and influence on the central government
through intermarriage. This speaks to the fact that kinship still plays a major
role in political organization and power structures. “However, ‘closeness’ fosters
conflict as well as co-operation, and people continually express regret at the
degeneration of the times, such that nowadays even one’s agnates cannot be
relied on, brother fights brothers, father fights son - all, moreover, regarded as
signs of the impending end of the world.” (Tapper, 1991, p48f).
Since 2007, Afghanistan finds “itself again facing a fierce armed struggle
throughout most of its territory” (Tarzi, 2008, p.310). The task for the inter-
national forces and the Karzai government are complicated by the fact that
the current insurgency is not only a “resurrection of the Taliban regime”, but
also an insurgency of countless groups, Arab terrorists, drug lords, warlords,
“disenchanted political personalities, centuries-old tribal rivals, and the foreign
players” (Tarzi, 2008, p.310). If the Afghan government proves to be unable to
ensure a minimum of security, the general population will turn against it. That
is the calculation of the Taliban.
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Part IV
Conclusion
7 Conclusion
As the disquisitions of the last chapters have shown, many aspects of Pashtun
tribal organization have been subject to profound changes over the last decades.
Though, again, it is unfeasible to give a generalized answer for all Pashtuns of
Afghanistan due to the locally very diverse circumstances. Some substantial
comments, whose validity might apply to a majority of Pashtuns described, can
be made.
Evidently, a crisis in tribal leadership has negatively affected the intra-tribal
social cohesion and the formerly prevalent concept of equality. Through the
vicissitude Pashtun culture experienced, it was subjected to profound struc-
tural transformations. This crisis resulted in the emergence of new leaders in
an increasingly hierarchical system, yet these new strongmen command only a
deficient degree of legitimacy. Subsequently, the new leadership based its exer-
tion of power on control over the means of violence and economic supremacy,
or in other words, on political and economic dependencies. Since also tribal
leadership has often been contested and subject to negotiation, interpretation
and change in history, this might not seem to be such a great change in itself
at first glance. However, the factors which have accompanied this change are
indeed profound for several reasons. The new leaders often lack legitimacy, yet
they are able to cling to power. Traditional tribal leaders who lacked legiti-
macy to the contrary were exchanged rather sooner than later. Many of the
new strongmen did not abide by traditional rules of conduct, norms and val-
ues anymore. Though changes in value systems are harder to detect and prove
than those in outer organizational forms, they do reflect on one another. In-
creasing and consolidating social stratification, violence and insecurity, access
to modern weapons and new sources of revenue through crime, drugs, and for-
eign funding have pushed traditional structures to the sidelines. Furthermore,
the geographic dispersal of tribal groups through war and unprecedented levels
of violence, flight and economic migration impeded the re-establishment of the
structures for consensus oriented decision-making in a prewar fashion in most
cases.
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Howbeit, not all tribal structures are necessarily affected through the new
forms of leadership. Several tribal organizational features still persist, though
they are portrayed in a vast variety of combinations, strength and shape, and
they are subject to change in space and time. For example, tribal networks
of solidarity and support may still function and expand across various nation
states’ borders. Some of the mentioned research has shown that tribal solidar-
ity can even transcend mutually exclusive, competing ideologies of individual
tribesmen, prompting them to fight alongside one another if either is attacked.
However, proceedings on the local level have been lastingly altered.
Urban classes, communists, Islamists and various other groups contested
tribal power in Afghanistan. In addition, alternative value systems and ideolo-
gies have become more readily available even in rural areas. Various currents
of Islamist ideologies, emphasizing a global pan-Islamic identity, and the ultra-
orthodox Islamic creed of the Taliban and the Deobandi madrassas compete
for dominance, as well as some Western ideals and a free market wartime econ-
omy. Particularly religion has substituted much of the tribal identity. Weakened
tribal structures have made it easier for the Taliban to gain influence, and the
latter further diluted the power and relevance of tribal organization. To use
the concepts of the theoretical part of this paper, it can be said that the tra-
ditional boundary maintenance of tribal groups through differential patterns of
identification has been softened or rendered impossible by adopting these new
ideologies. Contemporaneously, these ideologies and beliefs have brought about
new levels of politicization. Modern telecommunication has closed the urban-
rural gap with respect to the spread of ideas and social and political control.
Both disperse more easily to the most remote areas and local warlords have
become participants in a globalized world of arms trade, drug trafficking and
Islamist extremism.
From the literature analyzed in the creation of this paper, it seems clear
that kinship ties are still exceedingly important in structuring social and polit-
ical organization. The Taliban seek intermarriage with local power-brokers to
foster their ties and the latter do the same with respect to government elites and
decision-makers in Kabul and elsewhere. Though tribal networks of loyalty (and
surely of information) still play an important role in many cases, the alliances
which are created through these marriages seem to be confined to a lower level
of organization, namely that of powerful families or patrilineal descent groups.
One could argue that this fact constitutes nothing more than an augmented
fragmentation or a more pronounced ‘micro-segmentation’. However, the tribal
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cohesive forces have been weakened to such an extent in many cases, that it
is questionable, whether they still exist at all. In analyzing the fieldwork and
research of many, much more experienced and knowledgeable colleagues than
myself, I tend to agree, that the new hierarchical structures of Pashtun lead-
ership do not merely constitute a new expression of the same old organization,
even if some features may persist. Nevertheless, under some circumstances the
tribal organizational structures seem to provide a fallback system. In cases of a
power vacuum or upheaval, tendencies to reassert traditional tribal organization
can be observed. This speaks to the fact that a process of ‘detribalization’ is not
irreversible and ‘retribalization’ may occur under certain conditions. When in-
dividuals or groups fail to excel and perform within the frame of a given system
or identity, they tend to redefine their identity. They commit to other available
identities in order to increase performance or at least ameliorate its valuation.
The role of anthropology in Afghanistan has changed a lot throughout his-
tory. First, the British used the disciplines’ knowledge to influence the Afghan
tribes according to their interests. Then, during the international conflicts in
the second half of the twentieth century, suddenly the research of remote areas,
which was expected to be of a highly localized focus, developed a global signifi-
cance. The implementation of the Human Terrain System (HTS) by the United
States Army, embedding anthropologists in their units at Forward Operating
Bases (FOBs), caused anthropological knowledge to take an exposed role in a
military endeavor once again. This has been heavily criticized by many in the
discipline not necessarily only because anthropologists are used to gather intelli-
gence and thereby potentially endanger other colleagues, but also because they
engage in Psychological Operations (PsyOps, today commonly referred to as
IO, or Information Operations). Many colleagues have declined to participate
in the project for moral objections or fear of being black-listed and therefore
not being able to find a job in academia.
In my view, this discussion within the discipline is a little overrated. Usually,
anthropologists embedded in Western armies do not carry out scientific research
during their employment simply because it is impossible to do that in such a set-
ting. Therefore, their influence on the production of scientific knowledge seems
to be limited to the fact that their engagement might increase mistrust of local
individuals towards anthropologists. Whether this incorporation of anthropol-
ogists in various armies will actually add to the insecurity of other researchers
for the fear of local individuals of spies or military agents is not yet entirely
clear to me. However, anyone who carries out research in war zones has to be
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aware of the risks which come with such a task. In fieldwork, the access a re-
searcher gains to local individuals has always depended on the level of openness
and trust he or she has been able to generate. My personal viewpoint is, that
overcoming potential mistrust is just one of many hurdles in fieldwork and is
best achieved by being authentic and willing to learn from more experienced
anthropologists. In addition, I would argue that anthropology will also play an
important role in future armed conflicts, no matter how many scholars oppose
such an utilization. Whether individual scholars approve of such a practice or
not will probably depend on the context of those conflicts and, in any case,
provide for an ongoing debate within the discipline. It is possible though, that
anthropology loses some of its clout in military approaches. If the armies which
try to employ the discipline’s findings, and especially the US Army, prove to
be unable to implement strategies which incorporate anthropologic knowledge
(a viewpoint which seems not to mesh well with a military culture), other ap-
proaches will take its place. Doing anthropology and doing fieldwork in highly
volatile places like Afghanistan has become ever more difficult and dangerous for
researchers independent of programs such as HTS. Even researchers who have
decades-long relationships with local populations might find security risks too
ubiquitous to stay there for several months. There has been quite some work
done in and about war zones in recent years, but the decreasing opportunities to
do research on-site will probably negatively affect the quantity of anthropologic
output for a while.
In the introduction I asked what new light anthropology could possibly shed
on the current situation in Afghanistan. I think that already many of the
questions posed in this paper reflect an anthropologic perspective on recent de-
velopments and forcefully establish the disciplines’ relevance. How did Pashtun
tribal systems change? What is the relation between local strongmen, Pashtun
tribal elders and the Taliban? How does the generational divide between vari-
ous political leaders express itself? How can we make sense of the coexistence
of tribal structures and transnational networks of militant political Islam? In
collecting insights from distinguished authors, I hopefully was able to deliver
at least some possible answers to these questions and thereby demonstrate the
explanatory power which lies in this discipline.
Future research will for sure engage in the question, how Pashtun tribal
organization develops over the next decades. Time will tell, if a broad tendency
to reestablish tribal structures, be it in a traditional or in a new fashion, will
prevail. Anthropology will play its role, and the genuine and profound way
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of the discipline to look at the world will probably and hopefully continue to
elucidate the fundamental dynamics of this conflict, and its findings resonate
ever more in public perception.
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Part VI
Appendices
8 Abstracts & Curriculum Vitae
8.1 English Abstract
This paper examines the possibility and extent of structural societal changes
in Pashtun tribal systems since 1978. The question I aim to answer is, in
how far tribal structures have changed and what has triggered those changes.
The relevance of this question lies in its potential to elucidate the societal and
cultural dynamics at play in this conflict, as well as to determine some causes
for the course of events in a persisting struggle. The underlying hypothesis
is that influences like war, foreign interventions and the impact of militant
political Islam have caused an ongoing disarrangement in the traditional tribal
organization of Pashtuns. In this context, I investigate whether the structures
in question have actually changed or just express themselves in a new way.
The analysis will also take into account the effects of the exilation of a large
proportion of Afghanistan’s population to Pakistan. Furthermore, I examine
which effects the newly established social structures of refugees and/or their
homecoming as fighters, mujahedin or later as the so-called Taliban, had on
their tribal organization. Doing so, this paper aims to find out about changes
in the relationship between different groups of political, religious, and military
leaders, their amalgamation or possible separation with tribal leaders, elders
and landlords, and whether it is possible to explain the rise of the Taliban in
terms of tribal structures. A short treatise of Afghan history aims to give a
more thorough understanding of the Afghan political sphere and to illustrate
the constitutive power tribes have held (and fought over) for centuries. This
basic information serves as a point of departure for a more detailed examination
of events since 1978.
Many aspects of Pashtun tribal organization have been subject to profound
changes over the last decades. Though, again, it is unfeasible to give a gen-
eralized answer for all Pashtuns of Afghanistan due to the locally very diverse
circumstances. Some substantial comments, whose validity might apply to a
majority of Pashtuns described, can be made. Evidently, a crisis in tribal lead-
ership has negatively affected the intra-tribal social cohesion and the formerly
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prevalent concept of equality. At the beginning of the 1980s, this crisis resulted
in the emergence of new leaders in an increasingly hierarchical system, yet these
new strongmen command only a deficient degree of legitimacy. Subsequently,
the new leadership based its exertion of power on control over the means of
violence and economic supremacy, or in other words, on political and economic
dependencies. However, the factors which have accompanied this change are
indeed profound for several reasons. The new leaders often lack legitimacy, yet
they are able to cling to power. Many of the new strongmen do not abide by
traditional rules of conduct, norms and values anymore. Though changes in
value systems are harder to detect and prove than those in outer organizational
forms, they do reflect on one another. Urban classes, communists, Islamists and
various other groups contested tribal power in Afghanistan. Various currents
of Islamist ideologies, emphasizing a global pan-Islamic identity, and the ultra-
orthodox Islamic creed of the Taliban and the Deobandi madrassas compete
for dominance, as well as a free market wartime economy. Contemporaneously,
these ideologies and beliefs have brought about new levels of politicization. In
addition, alternative value systems and ideologies have become more readily
available even in rural areas. Modern telecommunication has closed the urban-
rural gap with respect to the spread of ideas and social and political control.
Both disperse more easily to the most remote areas and local warlords have
become participants in a globalized world of arms trade, drug trafficking and
Islamist extremism. Weakened tribal structures have made it easier for the Tal-
iban to gain influence, and the latter further diluted the power and relevance of
tribal organization. Increasing and consolidating social stratification, violence
and insecurity, access to modern weapons and new sources of revenue through
crime, drugs, and foreign funding have pushed traditional structures to the side-
lines. Furthermore, the geographic dispersal of tribal groups through war and
unprecedented levels of violence, flight and economic migration impeded the
re-establishment of the structures for consensus oriented decision-making in a
prewar fashion in most cases.
The role of anthropology in Afghanistan has changed a lot over time, from
being used by the colonial powers in order to control various tribes, to relative
obscurity and a comeback to the public spotlight with its utilization in Western
armies. Current developments and questions which arise from the conflict in
Afghanistan underline the disciplines’ relevance and provide the opportunity to
demonstrate its explanatory power.
154
8.2 German Abstract
Diese Diplomarbeit untersucht das Ausmaß und die Ursachen für Veränderun-
gen in tribalen paschtunischen Organisationsstukturen in Afghanistan seit 1978.
Die Frage, welche Veränderungen stattgefunden haben und wie sich diese auf
die Gesellschaft auswirken soll dazu beitragen, Erklärungsmöglichkeiten für die
sozialen und kulturellen Dynamiken und die Ursachen für den Verlauf des ak-
tuellen Konfliktes aufzuzeigen. Die Hypothese hinter dieser Fragestellung ist,
dass die Kriege der letzten Jahrzehnte und alternative Ideologien wie der mil-
itante politische Islam der Taliban traditionelle tribale Strukturen geschwächt
oder zur Gänze verdrängt haben.
Der Schwerpunkt der Untersuchung liegt hierbei auf den Auswirkungen kom-
munistischer Politik und der sowjetischen Intervention in Afghanistan, der Or-
ganisation, Ideologie und Finanzierung des Widerstandes durch die Mujahedin,
dem Aufstieg der Taliban und letztendlich der US-Intervention und der gegen-
wärtigen afghanischen Politik. In diesem Kontext soll auch erklärt werden, ob
sich die tribalen Strukturen tatsächlich verändert haben oder nur in neuen For-
men ausdrücken.
Das methodische Vorgehen basiert auf einem Vergleich der Beschreibun-
gen traditioneller paschtunischer tribaler Organisationstrukturen vor 1978 mit
späteren anthropologischen Quellen. Weitere berücksichtigte Aspekte umfassen
die Auswirkungen der Flucht eines großen Teils der afghanischen (insbesondere
der paschtunischen) Bevölkerung auf deren tribale Gesellschaftsordnung und die
Organisationsstrukturen der Mujahedin und Taliban.
Paschtunische tribale Strukturen waren in den letzten Jahrzehnten tief-
greifenden Veränderungen unterworfen. Auch wenn es aufgrund der lokal höchst
unterschiedlichen Gegebenheiten nicht möglich ist generalisierende Aussagen
für alle Paschtunen Afghanistans zu tätigen, können in diesem Zusammenhang
einige Aussagen, die auf die Mehrheit der Paschtunen zutreffen, getätigt wer-
den. Seit dem Ende der 1970er Jahre verursachten andauernde Gewalt und
Krieg eine Krise in den tribalen Organisationsstrukturen, insbesondere in den
tribalen Führungs- und Entscheidungsfindungsstrukturen. Dies wirkte sich neg-
ativ auf den intra-tribalen sozialen Zusammenhalt aus. Die neue Generation von
Anführern brachte eine zunehmend hierarchische Organisationsstruktur mit sich
und ersetzte die früheren egalitären Strukturen. Da Herrschaft immer weniger
auf Konsens und immer mehr auf Zugang zu Geld und Waffen basierte, ver-
fügten die neuen Anführer nicht über das gleiche Ausmaß an Legitimität wie
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die früheren Stammesräte. Viele der neuen Anführer ignorierten traditionelle
Verhaltensnormen und Werte, ein bis dahin beispielloses Niveau von Unsicher-
heit und Gewalt ermöglichte es ihnen jedoch, sich an die Macht zu klammern.
Zugang zu modernen Waffen, neue Einnahmequellen durch Drogen, Kriminal-
ität und massive finanzielle Unterstützung durch eine Vielzahl anderer Länder
wie Pakistan, Saudi Arabien und den USA trugen dazu bei, traditionelle trib-
ale Strukturen zu verdrängen. Auch eine Vielzahl an radikalen islamistischen
Strömungen, die eine pan-islamische Einheit der Gläubigen propagierte und ins-
besondere der ultra-orthodoxe, militante Islam der Taliban konkurrierten um
Dominanz. Neue Kommunikationsmittel vereinfachten die Ausübung politis-
cher und sozialer Kontrolle selbst in den abgelegensten Regionen des Landes.
Auch die Organisationsstrukturen und die Ideologie der Taliban richtete sich
ausdrücklich gegen tribale Strukturen und trugen dazu bei, tribale Identitäten
und Strukturen durch ein radikales religiöses System zu ersetzen.
Die Rolle der Anthropologie nahm im Laufe der Geschichte Afghanistans
unterschiedliche Formen an. Die britische Administration wendete anthropolo-
gisches Wissen an um Stämme entsprechend der Interessen der Kolonialmacht zu
beeinflussen. Bis zum Einmarsch der Sowjetunion schien die anthropologische
Forschung in Afghanistan in relativer Bedeutungslosigkeit zu versinken, zumin-
dest was ihren Einsatz in geostrategischen Überlegungen betraf. Forschungen
mit starkem lokalem Fokus in abgelegenen Regionen gewannen neuerlich an Be-
deutung als die US Army begann ihre erfolglose Strategie nach dem Einmarsch
in Afghanistan zugunsten eines Counterinsurgency-Ansatzes (COIN) zu erset-
zten und Anthropologen in ihre Einheiten einzubinden - ein Vorgehen, das von
vielen in der Disziplin stark kritisiert wurde.
Aktuelle Entwicklungen in Afghanistan und die Fragen, die sich aus dem
Konflikt ergeben, untermauern die Relevanz anthropologischer Forschung und
bieten eine Möglichkeit die Erklärungsmacht der Disziplin zu demonstrieren.
Das Verständnis der sozialen, kulturellen und politischen Dynamiken, die dem
Konflikt in Afghanistan zugrunde liegen, lässt gegenwärtige Entwicklungen in
einem neuen Licht erscheinen und bietet Erklärungen für die andauernde Gewalt
und Instabilität.
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8.3 Curriculum Vitae
Curriculum Vitae
Roland Kraml
Eduard-Suess-Gasse 17/13
1150 Wien
Tel.: +43 676 92 64 625
Mail: roland.kraml@gmx.at
Qualifikationen
• Sprachkenntnisse: Deutsch, Englisch & Französisch in Wort und Schrift
• Erfahrungen in verschiedenen Berufsfeldern: Erwachsenenbildung, Verkauf,
Marketing, Musik, Gastronomie, Organisation und Leitung von Bildungssem-
inaren u.v.m.
• Ausbildung als Sanitäter und Einsatzlenker
• Ausbildung zum Trainer in der Erwachsenenbildung
• Ausbildung in Konflikttransformation und gewaltfreier Kommunikation
• Erfahrung als selbständiger Unternehmer
• Graduierter des "International Civilian Peace-keeping and Peace-building
Training"
Geboren am
• 23.03.1981 in Linz, Oberösterreich
Ausbildung
• 2002-2012 Studium der Kultur- & Sozialanthropologie sowie der Erziehungswis-
senschaften an der Universität Wien. Inhaltliche Spezialisierung auf Kon-
fliktforschung, Bürgerkriege und Terrorismus.
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• 2009 Absolvierung des „International Civilian Peace-Keeping And Peace-
Building Training Program“ (IPT), am Austrian Study Center for Peace
and Conflict Resolution, Stadtschlaining.
• 2008 Studienprogramm am UNO-Hauptquartier, New York.
• 2004-2005 Ausbildung zum Trainer in der Erwachsenenbildung.
• 1991-1999 Europagymnasium Auhof, Linz, Matura mit gutem Erfolg.
• 1987-1991 Bertha von Suttner Grundschule, Linz.
Berufserfahrung
• 2011-heute Marketing und Verkauf bei Sonicsense Österreich (www.sonicsense.eu).
• 2009-2011Berater für das deutsche Telekommunikationsunternehmen SIMSA
(www.simsa.de), Berlin/Wien.
• 2009 Mitglied im Organisationsteam eines wissenschaftlichen Symposiums
(„On the origin of societies? Darwin and the social sciences.“), Wien.
• 2008-2010 Selbständiger Unternehmer in der Erwachsenenbildung, beru-
flichen Fortbildung, Kursleiter, Wien.
• 2006-2007 Mitarbeit bei der Erstellung des Bachelor-Studienplanes und
studentischer Vertreter in der Studienkonferenz des Institutes für Kultur-
& Sozialanthropologie, Universität Wien.
• 2005-heute Trainer für Schnelllese- & Lerntechniken für Kinder und Erwach-
sene, vornehmlich an öffentlichen Schulen. Organisation von und Unter-
richt an Sommerlerncamps für Jugendliche im In- und Ausland (Polen).
• 2005-2008Mitarbeit in der Institutsgruppe Kultur- & Sozialanthropologie,
Unterstützung der gewählten Studierendenvertretung. Organisation von
Lese-, Arbeits- und Diskussionskreisen am Institut für Kultur- & Sozialan-
thropologie mit dem Ziel eine fachspezifische Vertiefung zu verschiedenen
Themenkomplexen zusätzlich zum regulären Lehrangebot zu ermöglichen.
Erstellung eines monatlichen Newsletters.
• 2005 Übersetzung wissenschaftlicher Fragebögen ins Französische für die
Südwind-Agentur Wien.
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• 2005 Organisation einer Workshop-Reihe um StudentInnen der Kultur-
& Sozialanthropologie mit möglichen Berufsfeldern für AnthropologInnen
vertraut zu machen.
• 2005-2006 Projektleiter für die Organisation von Erstsemestrigentutorien
für über 400 StudentInnen des Institutes der Kultur- & Sozialanthropolo-
gie (Universität Wien), sowie Verantwortlicher für die Ausbildung der Tu-
torInnen.
• 2002-2003 Bewerbung und Verkauf von Segeltörns für das Grazer Reise-
büro „Segeln-Echt“ mittels Diavorträgen.
• 2001-2002 Zivildienst als Sanitäter beim Roten Kreuz Linz Stadt, Ausbil-
dung als Einsatzlenker.
• 2000 Ehrenamtliche Betreuung von Kindern und Jugendlichen in einer
Notunterkunft („La Soupape“), Rouyn-Noranda, Kanada.
• 1999Mitgliederwerbung für das Deutsche Rote Kreuz in Baden-Württemberg.
• 1996-1999Diverse Ferialjobs in der Gastronomie, im Kulturbereich (Bruck-
nerhaus Linz) und beim Radio (Freies Radio Oberösterreich).
Vorträge und Veröffentlichungen
• 2008 Verfassen eines Handbuches im Rahmen der Tätigkeit in der Erwach-
senenbildung (Schnelllesetechniken und Lerntechniken).
• 2007 Vortrag über verschiedene theoretische Ansätze in der Konfliktforschung
im Rahmen der 3. Tage der Kultur- & Sozialanthropologie an der Univer-
sität Wien.
• 2006 Vortrag über Kriegsursachenforschung am Austrian Study Center for
Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR). Der Vortrag wurde publiziert und
ist unter http://www.aspr.ac.at/sak2006/safran03.pdf einsehbar.
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